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Executive summary 
This report reviewed approaches taken in Ireland and nine other jurisdictions to simple possession 
drug offences with the aim of identifying alternative approach options that would be possible in the 
Irish context and the advantages and disadvantages of each.  
Approach 
A rapid realist review was conducted of the international evidence on alternatives to simple 
possession following the RAMESES protocol (Realist And Meta-narrative Evidence Syntheses: 
Evolving Standards) (Wong, Greenhalgh, Westhorp, Buckingham, & Pawson, 2013). Nine nations 
with alternative approaches were selected based on their mix of reform types and relevance to the 
Irish situation: Australia, Czech Republic, Denmark, England and Wales, Germany, Jamaica, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and the United States of America (USA). This gave rise to 15 different 
approaches: between one and three per country.  
A coding schedule was devised that covered the context, mechanisms and outcomes of the 
approaches (intended and unintended) on the individual, the family and society, the criminal justice 
system (CJS) and the health system. A total of 6198 records were initially identified and 158 were 
included for extraction. The number of documents ranged from three in Jamaica (the country with the 
most recent reform) to 45 in the USA.  
Two forms of analysis were conducted. First, literature on the context, mechanisms and outcomes of 
the reforms was synthesised for each country. Secondly, qualitative comparative analysis was used to 
produce an empirically based, theoretically informed typology of alternative approaches to deal with 
simple possession offences, extrapolating across countries. Advantages and disadvantages were 
then synthesised for each policy option.  
The Irish context 
Ireland has a common law, constitutional legal system, without a well-developed system of civil, 
administrative law. Under current law Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 possession for personal use of 
cannabis is punishable by up to one-year imprisonment for a summary conviction or three years 
imprisonment for conviction on indictment. Possession for personal use of other illicit drugs is 
punishable by up to one-year and seven-years imprisonment, for a summary or indictable offence 
respectively. 
The existing use of alternatives is more limited than in many other European Union (EU) countries 
(Kruithof et al., 2016). Only one formal alternative for drug-related offenders is currently used: the 
Drug Treatment Court in Dublin, which is mainly targeted at serious drug-related offenders. The 
potential benefits of using alternatives to arrest in Ireland for minor drug offenders have been 
discussed for several years (e.g. Griffiths et al., 2016), including in the 2017 National Drug Strategy. 
Drug-related harms are significant issues in Ireland, including reported overdoses and infections and 
concerns about violent and organised crime. Of particular concern:  
• Ireland has the second highest rate of ‘problematic opiate users’ in the EU.  
• Rates of HIV infection among people who inject drugs are also relatively high by European 
standards and has seen a further outbreak of new infections in 2015.  
• There was an increase in Ireland from 2005 to 2015 in current and recent use of cannabis 
and ecstasy, particularly among young people aged 15 to 34.   
Recent trends in criminal justice responses also show:  
• Between 2015 and 2017 there were an average of 11,626 incidents of recorded possession 
for personal use in any one year.  
• The total number of recorded possession incidents for personal use has increased.  
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Alternate approaches for dealing with simple possession drug offences 
Qualitative comparative analysis was used to derive six different approaches for dealing with simple 
possession drug offences. The set of options took into account core differences in:  
1. The legal basis: de jure = in law or de facto = in guidelines. 
2. Whether or not the approach employs pathways to education/treatment/social services  
3. Whether the approach utilises administrative or civil sanctions   
The key features of each are summarised below alongside applicable examples across the nine 
nations.  
Alternate approaches for dealing with simple possession drug offences 
Type Legal 
basis 
Pathways to 
education / 
therapy / social 
services 
Administrative 
/ civil 
sanctions 
Examples 
Depenalisation De facto No No Netherlands Gedoogbeleid 
'tolerance policy' (cannabis 
only), US police 
‘deprioritisation’, UK 
cannabis and khat warnings, 
Denmark warnings 
Police diversion 
(de facto) 
De facto Yes No Police diversion schemes in 
most Australian states, 
Netherlands diversion (hard 
drugs only), English police 
diversion schemes in 
Durham, West Midlands and 
Avon, US LEAD programme, 
Baltimore pre-booking 
scheme   
Police diversion 
(de jure) 
 
De jure Yes No South Australian Police Drug 
Diversion Initiative and 
Queensland Police Drug 
Diversion Program (police 
mandated by law to offer 
diversion to treatment) 
Decriminalisation 
with no sanctions 
attached 
De jure No No Germany (by virtue of 
Constitutional ruling) and 
Vermont USA (since 2018) 
Decriminalisation 
with civil or 
administrative 
sanctions 
De jure No Yes Czech Republic, Jamaica, 
Cannabis Expiation Notice 
schemes in three Australian 
states (ACT, SA, NT), many 
US states (e.g. Ohio, 
Mississippi, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island)  
Decriminalisation 
with targeted 
diversion to 
health / social 
services 
De jure Yes Yes Portugal and several US 
states (Maryland, 
Connecticut & Nebraska)  
Programme theories for each approach and the advantages and disadvantages differ in significant 
ways. Two approaches are outlined below. For full details see chapter five.  
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Depenalisation: Programme theory and advantages and disadvantages for Ireland 
The first approach – depenalisation – has been used in many parts of the world, including Denmark, 
the Netherlands, England and Wales and the USA. Under depenalisation the goal is to avoid 
criminalising young people and to save police time to focus on more serious criminal activity. This is 
based on the belief that traditional policing approaches are ineffective and that police could better 
allocate resources to more serious crime (be that drug trafficking or other offences). Implicit in this 
approach is also the belief that people detected for drug possession do not warrant criminal 
sanctions, nor any other form of social intervention. That is “doing nothing” or “doing little” is the best 
approach for any people found in possession of drugs.  
The programme theory says that if police switch to minimal intervention for people who possess drugs 
for personal use (e.g. issue warnings instead of arrests), police, prosecutors and courts will have 
more time to focus on other activities (e.g. serious crime) and there will be fewer people who use 
drugs who are arrested or convicted for possession alone. In turn this will save the CJS money, lead 
to more effective resource allocation, and improve the ability of people who use drugs to obtain 
employment, and to travel without the collateral consequences from criminal justice interventions. 
Evidence suggests this may also increase some access to drug treatment and harm reduction 
services, albeit via voluntary means.  
An advantage of this approach is that there are few required inputs to implement a model of 
depenalisation other than new police or prosecutorial guidelines. Particularly in the Irish context it 
would not necessitate changes in laws or new civil or administrative sanctions for this offence. There 
is also little risk of over-burdening other systems such as treatment. However, analysis of 
depenalisation approaches in England and Wales, Denmark and USA suggest that this may not be 
supported by police and it may lead to net-widening, whereby more people receive some form of 
intervention, and thus increase the burden on the CJS. It may also lead differential implementation on 
the ground (justice by geography). Evidence suggests voluntary uptake of drug treatment or harm 
reduction services may in some cases be minimal and hence that it may be difficult using this model 
to reduce drug-related harms associated with problematic opiate use. This therefore may be an option 
which the Irish government may consider applying only to some drugs (e.g. cannabis), or only to first 
or second time offences. 
Decriminalisation with targeted diversion to health/social services: Programme theory and advantages 
and disadvantages for Ireland 
The second approach – decriminalisation with targeted diversion to health / social services – has 
been employed in Portugal and several US states (Maryland, Connecticut & Nebraska). Under this 
model the goal is to ensure that people are not criminalised for simple possession alone, while 
recognising that certain patterns of drug use can be harmful and a symptom of broader health or 
social problems. As such, governments ought to use the point of detection as a means by which to 
screen and identify high-risk offenders and address their treatment and other needs. A number of new 
inputs are required for this approach to work including new laws (civil or administrative) and referral 
pathways and the ‘purchase’ of additional supports (e.g. for treatment or employment/training). 
However, the evidence base on model types in Portugal and several US states (Maryland, 
Connecticut and Nebraska) indicates that such an approach should increase offender access to 
alcohol and other drug (AOD) treatment and other services (if and when required), albeit mainly for 
high-risk offenders, while low risk offenders receive faster, cheaper, less intensive, non-criminal 
response (e.g. suspended sanctions, civil penalties etc). This should avoid collateral consequences of 
convictions for people who possess drugs for personal use (e.g. on employment), reduce costs to the 
CJS high-frequency use, criminality and infections. It may also increase social reintegration (through 
direct or indirect means), especially if combined with investment in public health and social support.    
Several factors have been found to affect the ability to deliver these goals: a) level and quality of 
treatment and other services, b) design of referral pathways, c) design of eligibility criteria, and d) 
overarching legal framework. Best practice models ought to consider what type of support is needed: 
treatment, social supports (e.g. employment assistance) or a mixture, as well as ensure high efficacy 
of service provision. Some referral mechanisms are more resource intensive (e.g. Portugal which 
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established 18 dissuasion committees across the country, as opposed to simple police referrals in 
Maryland). Some legislative frameworks are also less effective as they limit ‘reach’ over the potential 
pool of offenders. Of note, Nebraska only partially removed criminal penalties, which led to many 
people continuing to receive criminal sanction. If proceeding with this option ‘full’ removal of criminal 
penalties is thus recommended as it will maximise impact.  
In short there are a variety of options that could be taken: each of which could offer advantages for 
the Irish context. Given the known shape of the drug problem in Ireland (including relatively high 
levels of both cannabis and heroin use, with an interrelationship between unemployment and 
problematic drug use), one final proffered model is a mixed approach (combing two different options, 
as is done in some parts of the world – see Table 22). The Irish government could, for example, 
reduce the burden of criminalisation on people who use drugs by applying both depenalisation of the 
most minor drug possession offences and decriminalisation with targeted diversion for those 
offenders who are more likely to need it. On the basis of the available evidence, this would not pose a 
very high risk of increasing drug use (and so may have little effect on serious organised crime or drug 
driving), would reduce costs in the CJS, and would provide additional pathways into treatment or 
other social supports for people who need it (while not over-burdening the system with people who do 
not need it).  
Any alternative approach to dealing with simple drug possession comes with risks. The research in 
this area is complex, incomplete and not capable of providing definitive answers about what the 
outcome of any given approach will be in the Irish context. The current approach also entails risk, 
including that costs and burdens are placed on citizens (taxpayers and people who use drugs) that 
are not justified by the effects in reducing social and health harms.  
We hope this report will help to inform discussion in Ireland on how the best balance of risks and 
burdens can be achieved. 
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Chapter one: Introduction  
This report reviews approaches taken in Ireland and other jurisdictions to simple possession drug 
offences with the aim of outlining alternative approach options that would be possible in the Irish 
context. The review was conducted for the Irish Department of Justice & Equality and the Department 
of Health (and the working group on this issue) over the period May to September 2018. 
More specifically, the review covers:  
A. The current legislative regime that applies to simple possession offences in Ireland and the 
rationale underpinning this approach, and any evidence of its effectiveness.  
B. The approaches and experiences in nine other jurisdictions to dealing with simple 
possession offences.  
C. The advantages and disadvantages, as well as the potential impact and outcomes of any 
alternative approaches to the current Irish system for the individual, the family and society, as 
well as for the CJS and the health system.  
The broad aims of the review were:  
1. To describe the current legislative regime for or policy approach to dealing with simple 
possession offences and its rationale in the jurisdictions selected.  
2. To describe the legal or societal remedies for dealing with simple possession offences that 
applies in these jurisdictions.  
3. To describe the experiences of these jurisdictions in using legal or societal remedies for 
dealing with simple possession offences.  
4. To describe or synthesise the effectiveness (outcomes and impact) of legal or societal 
remedies for dealing with the offence of simple possession in these jurisdictions on the 
individual, the family and society, the CJS and the health system  
5. Using the research and information available in the review, describe policy options to deal 
with simple possession drug offences available to the Irish government and the advantages 
and disadvantages of each. 
The approach taken to this review was a rapid realist review (RRR). Such an approach differs to a 
traditional narrative or systematic review, in that policy makers and experts are used to define the 
research questions and streamline the review, in the aim of informing policy makers of answers to 
questions that are most directly relevant to the policy problem they are trying to solve. A core focus is 
placed on unpacking the relationship between context, mechanisms and outcomes to illuminate in 
whether, why and how specific mechanisms will produce intended policy outcomes (for further details 
see chapter three).  
Chapter two outlines the Irish context. Chapter three outlines the methods for the rapid realist review. 
Chapters four outlines the approaches and experiences in nine other jurisdictions: including the 
context of reform, mechanisms and outcomes (intended and unintended). Chapter five extrapolates 
policy learnings across the reforms and puts forward six difference policy options that could be 
implemented in Ireland.  
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Chapter two: Irish context, existing 
alternatives and implications for new 
alternatives 
The aim of this chapter is to lay out the background to the current Irish approach for dealing with 
simple possession offences, discuss related issues and harms, describe existing alternative means of 
dealing with offences, and to draw implications for the consideration of new alternatives that arise 
from the specific features of the Irish context. This section is based on a narrative review of available 
literature, including peer-reviewed journal articles, books, government reports and other ‘grey’ 
literature. This includes the 2016 expert review of the Irish national drug strategy (Griffiths, Strang, & 
Singleton, 2016) and a 2016 report of the working group on alternatives to prosecution. The review of 
the Irish National Drug Strategy noted a consensus among the consulted experts that a wider range 
of alternatives for dealing with simple possession offences should be considered.  The possibility of 
Ireland adopting the Portuguese model of decriminalisation has frequently been mentioned, including 
in a 2016 report of the Joint Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality and in the National Drug 
Strategy of 2017 (Department of Health, 2017). 
Legal context 
It is commonly asserted that countries can be classified as having either common law or penal code 
approach to defining criminal offences (although this distinction is often blurred in actual cases). 
Ireland falls into the former group, although moves have been made towards codification, with a draft 
criminal code published in 2013 (CLCAC, 2013). Some countries, such as Portugal, also have a 
comprehensive civil code or administrative law. Ireland does not, although there are some legal bases 
for the use of administrative penalties (e.g. the Central Bank Act 1942(CBI, 2018)) 
Irish law is founded on the Constitution of Ireland, which came into force in 1939 following a national 
plebiscite in 1937. Ireland is also a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (which 
was given further effect by the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003) and to the three UN 
drug conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988. 
Ireland’s criminal law is still based on a mixture of statutory and common law precedents, some of 
which date back to the period before the Irish Free State, when Ireland was subject to English criminal 
law (O’Donnell, 2005).  
Current law on simple possession of drugs 
Current Irish law on drug offences is based on the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 and the Misuse of Drugs 
Act 1984, as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 1994 , the Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act 
1996 , the Licensing (Combating Drug Abuse) Act 1997, the Criminal Justice (Illicit Traffic by Sea) Act 
2003 and the Criminal Justice (Psychoactive Substances) Act 2010 (LRC, 2016). According to the 
report to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA, 2018) the two 
most important Irish drug laws are the Misuse of Drugs Acts 1977 and 1984 (MDA). These criminalise 
drug possession, cultivation, importation and supply, but not use per se.  The laws also distinguish 
between possession (for personal use) and possession for sale or supply.  
The Misuse of Drugs Regulations 1988 (SI 328 of 1988) are also relevant to the criminalisation of 
drug possession, as they specify the circumstances under which it is not a criminal offence to possess 
one of the substances that are controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Acts (e.g. under medical 
prescription, or for clinical research) 
From here on, ‘simple possession’ offences will be taken to mean offences that involve merely the 
possession for personal use of substances that are controlled by the Misuse of Drugs Acts in 
circumstances that are not exempted from prosecution by the Misuse of Drugs Regulations. Simple 
possession does not include possession with the intention to sell or supply. The offence of possession 
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is based on Section 3 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 1 (S3 MDA). It should be noted that the 
Criminal Justice (Psychoactive Substances) Act 2010 does not create an offence of possession of the 
substances it covers. Possession of new psychoactive substances (NPS) for personal use is a 
criminal offence where the substance is designated a controlled substance for the purposes of the 
Misuse of Drugs Acts 1977 to 2016. 
The penalties laid out by Irish law for drug possession offences depend on drug type (whether it 
involves cannabis or another controlled substance) and in which court the case is tried. The 2018 Irish 
report to the EMCDDA described the applicable penalties as follows: 
Possession of cannabis or cannabis resin for personal use is punishable by a fine on first or 
second conviction; however, third and subsequent offences are punishable by up to one year 
in prison for a summary conviction and up to three years for conviction on indictment. 
Possession in any other case is punishable by up to one year in prison and/or a fine on 
summary conviction and up to seven years’ imprisonment for conviction on indictment. 
However, the Criminal Justice (Community Service) Act 2011 requires courts to consider 
imposing a community service order instead of a prison sentence in all cases where up to 12 
months’ imprisonment might have been deemed appropriate. (EMCDDA, 2018) 
In contrast, the maximum penalty for offences involving drug supply is life imprisonment, and a 
minimum 10-year sentence is also available for supply offences involving more than €13,000-worth of 
drugs. 
Ireland does not have a system of sentencing guidelines that advises judges on what the most 
appropriate sentences is for the severity of an offence, or the level of culpability of the offender 
(O’Malley, 2013). This may help explain – in addition to the complexities of assessing market values 
as a basis for sentencing – why Irish experts gave widely differing responses to questions in a 
European survey on the sentences given for typical drug trafficking offences (EMCDDA, 2017). 
An important consequence of being arrested or convicted of simple possession of drugs is that the 
person receives a criminal record that may have to be disclosed under certain circumstances (e.g. in 
applying for work, or in applying for visas to travel to other countries). The 2016 expert review of the 
National Drug Strategy particularly highlighted concerns about the criminalisation of young people in 
Ireland caught in possession of drugs and the negative impact this may have on their life chances 
(Griffiths et al., 2016). Criminalisation may also create difficulties in gaining certain licenses (e.g. to 
drive passenger vehicles). Under the Criminal Justice (Spent Convictions and Certain Disclosures) 
Act 2016, convictions that lead to a prison sentence of less than 12 months (or a fine) become ‘spent’ 
seven years after the sentence came into force. This means that the person is no longer required to 
declare the offence when applying for a job in Ireland, but they may still be required to declare an 
arrest or conviction in other circumstances (e.g. applying for a visa to enter the USA, or for Irish 
citizenship).  
Current practice in law enforcement 
Internationally, law enforcement practice cannot be read off directly from the law on the statute book, 
and may change over time (Belackova, Ritter, Shanahan, & Hughes, 2017). So, we need to look at 
the actual picture of law enforcement on the ground. In Ireland, the police, public prosecutors and 
courts have discretion – within the law – to act in the public interest in deciding on arrests, 
prosecutions and sentencing offenders. Herein we look at trends in all illicit drug offences over the last 
ten years as well as recent trends in drug possession arrests, court outcomes and convictions over 
the period 2015 to 2017, and how many convictions were for possession alone.  
  
                                                     
1 The 1977 Act may be viewed in full on www.irishstatutebook.ie 
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Trends in the number of illicit drug offences in Ireland 
Table 1 outlines the total number and type of illicit drug offences in Ireland from 2008 to 2017. This 
data is from the Central Statistics Office, under reservation, and as such is subject to change, but 
nevertheless provides a useful time series to contextualise recent trends. Table 1 shows that from 
2008 to 2017 there have an average of 17,800 recorded controlled drug offences per year in Ireland. 
Possession of drug offences for personal use account for between 71% and 77% in any one year, or 
73% offences over the ten years inclusive. The number of recorded drug offences decreased year on 
year from 2008 until 2013, albeit that there has been a moderate increase over the last few years.  
Table 1: Recorded controlled drug offences in Ireland, 2008 to 2017, by type of offence and 
year 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Possession 
of drugs for 
personal use 
18,076 16,765 14,387 12,606 11,796 11,160 11,247 10,932 11,411 12,201 
Possession 
of drugs for 
sale or 
supply 
4,266 3,967 4,097 3,817 3,459 3,241 3,563 3,368 3,628 3,888 
Cultivation or 
manufacture 
of drugs 
216 271 532 579 513 390 345 240 263 249 
Importation 
of drugs 
67 46 29 40 30 44 29 19 28 21 
Other drug 
offences 
731 824 748 530 582 490 679 494 709 491 
All controlled 
drug 
offences 
23,356 21,873 19,793 17,572 16,380 15,325 15,863 15,053 16,039 16,850 
Source: Central Statistics Office, 2018. Data is under reservation and hence may be subject to change.  
There is large regional variation in possession offences, with both higher detections and unique 
trends in Dublin compared to other parts of Ireland (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Recorded possession for personal use offences in Ireland, by region and quarter, 
2003-2018 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office, 2018. Data is under reservation and hence may be subject to change.  
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   Section 3 Misuse of Drugs Act (S3 MDA) offences 
Herein we look at data provided by An Garda Síochána. The number of recorded incidents detected 
by the Gardaí involving possession for personal use (a S3 MDA offence) for the three-year period 
2015 to 2017 are outlined in Table 2. This shows that consistent with the data above, that the total 
number of recorded possession incidents has increased, and that there are an average of 11,826 
incidents in any one year. (The number of offenders is unknown).  
  Table 2: Number of possession incidents under Section 3 Misuse of Drugs Act, 2015 to 2017 
2015 2016 2017 
11,149 11,740 12,589 
Not all these incidents resulted in the person being charged for a S3 MDA offence and not all 
proceeded to court or led to a court outcome. Table 3 outlines the number of incidents and number of 
court outcomes recorded for a S3 MDA offence (irrespective of whether they did or did not lead to a 
criminal conviction). (Some incidents result in more than one court outcome. For instance, if a person 
was in possession of two different types of drugs this may result in two separate court outcomes.) 
To arrive at the figure of number of incidents that involve simple possession only, Table 3 
differentiates firstly all incidents and secondly all simple possession incidents excluding those linked 
to non-S3 MDA offences. The most common other offence types over the period were no insurance, 
obstruction, driving without a driver’s licence, failure to produce insurance certificate or driver’s licence 
and intoxication. In the three-year period 2015-2017 there were 7,614 court outcomes for unlawful 
possession of drugs contrary to S3 MDA and 7,360 outcomes for S3 MDA which were not linked to 
any other offence type. This suggests that most S3 MDA court outcomes involve only possession of 
drugs.  
Table 3: Number of possession incidents that led to a court outcome under Section 3 Misuse 
of Drugs Act, differentiating those that involved possession alone versus possession and 
other offences  
 
Offence description 
Total 
incidents  
Total court 
outcomes  
Unlawful Possession Of Drugs Contrary to Section 3 
MDA (all) 
7,317 7,614 
Unlawful Possession Of Drugs Contrary to Section 3 
MDA (only where there are no other offences types linked 
to incident) 
7,010 7,360 
 
Looking at the number of outcomes versus the number of individuals sanctioned for this offence (see 
Table 4) shows that over the 3-year period 2015 to 2017 there were 5,633 individuals who received a 
court outcome for possession for personal use alone. Moreover, nearly 80% of suspected offenders 
were linked to just one outcome in the 3-year period 2015 to 2017.  
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Table 4: Number of outcomes versus number of individuals sanctioned under Section 3 
Misuse of Drugs Act, 2015 to 2017 inclusive 
 S3 MDA Outcomes Total 
(All S3 MDA offences) 
Total 
(S3 MDA only, no other 
linked offences) 
Total Outcomes 7,614 7,360 
Total Individuals 5,781 5,633 
≥ 10 Outcomes 4 4 
9 Outcomes 6 5 
8 Outcomes 4 4 
7 Outcomes 6 5 
6 Outcomes 14 14 
5 Outcomes 20 20 
4 Outcomes 63 57 
3 Outcomes 239 222 
2 Outcomes 856 818 
1 Outcome 4,569 4,484 
 
Information from the Courts Service 
The number of offenders put on probation is an important response, as under the Probation of 
Offenders Act 1907, a judge may decide not to convict. According to information provided by the 
Department for Justice and Equality if a person received the Probation Act in respect of a S3 MDA 
offence and for another offence it may be included in the information supplied by the Courts Service. 
Table 5 outlines the number of people who were dismissed under the Probation Act for a S3 MDA 
offence. 
Table 5: Number of people receiving a Probation Act for a Section 3 Misuse of Drugs Act 
offence, 2015 to 2017 
2015 2016 2017 
884 835 1,123 
Combining this information with the information from Table 4 suggests that of the 5,781 people with a 
court outcome for a S3 MDA offence in the three-year period 2015-2017 2,939 of them may have 
received a criminal conviction. This amounts to 980 persons per year. That said, this assumes that all 
those given probation did not receive a conviction.  
Information from the Irish Prison Service 
The Irish Prison Service annual report for 2017 indicates there were 6,037 committals to prison for 
2017. Of these 6% (371) were for a controlled drug offence. And as of 30 November 2017, there were 
2,990 prisoners in custody and 11.6% (347) were for a controlled drug offence. The total number of 
persons committed with sentences solely for possession for personal use from 2015 to 2017 is 
outlined in Table 6 below, showing 752 persons. There is a clear downward trend from 365 in 2015 to 
73 in 2017. Moreover, as of 31 July 2018, the figure for the number of individuals in prison for the 
unlawful possession of drugs only is 27. We have been advised this downward trend in people 
imprisoned for possession for personal use may be shaped by broader criminal justice reforms in 
Ireland, namely the introduction of the Fines (Payment and Recovery) Act 2016, which has reduced 
prison committal numbers generally and the implementation of the penal policy review (that has at its 
core custodial sentencing as a last resort).  
Table 6: Number of people imprisoned for unlawful possession of drugs, 2015 to 2017  
2015 2016 2017 
365 287 73 
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In summary, these figure show that over the period 2015 to 2017, there were 35,478 recorded 
incidents of possession for personal use (or about 11-12000 in any one year). A total of 5633 unique 
offenders received a court outcome for simple possession alone: and an estimated 2,939 offenders or 
980 per year received a criminal conviction for simple possession alone. Custodial sentences were 
rare in Ireland for this offence. This raises implications for the use of alternatives (see below). 
Nevertheless, it shows that a small but potentially important group of offenders continues to proceed 
to court and/or receive a conviction for simple possession alone.    
According to information provided by the Department of Justice and Equality, the cost of enforcing 
drug laws in Ireland was estimated to be €47 million in 2017 for Gardaí drug enforcement and €17.36 
million for Revenue/Customs drug enforcement. This means that the total cost in 2017 of enforcing 
drug laws was €64.35 million.  
Consequences of enforcement of law on simple possession 
The consequences of treating simple possession as a criminal offence may include general 
deterrence (i.e. deterrence of drug use in the general population), specific deterrence (i.e. deterrence 
of the individual offender from repeating that offence), costs incurred in the CJS (i.e. arrests, 
prosecutions, trials, imprisonments), and harms to the arrested individuals. 
Our literature search did not find any peer-reviewed studies that have focused on these issues in the 
Irish context, but there are a number of relevant government and government commissioned reports, 
including the 2016 expert review of the Irish national drug strategy (Griffiths et al., 2016), the 2016 
report of the working group on alternatives to prosecution, the 2017 report on the public consultation 
undertaken to inform the new National Drugs Strategy and the 2018 public consultation on personal 
possession of illegal drugs.  
Key conclusions of these reports include:  
• There is concern about the criminalisation of young people caught in possession of drugs and 
the negative impact this may have on their life chances.  
• There appeared to be a widespread consensus that for minor drug offences, especially those 
related to cannabis possession, the long term costs for both the individual and society of the 
offence remaining on file were considerable and unjustified (Griffiths et al., 2016). 
The 2017 report on the public consultation undertaken to inform the new National Drugs Strategy 
noted: 
• That criminalisation of drug use impedes effective HIV prevention efforts. 
• That criminalisation sometimes stops people who use drugs from contacting emergency 
services in an overdose situation due to fear of criminal repercussions. 
• That criminalisation restricts travel and limits employability, productivity and full integration 
into society. 
• That decriminalisation of some or all drugs would lower expenditure on policing and 
courts/prison. 
 
Little research has been conducted on the ‘secondary effects of imprisonment’ in Ireland (Breen, 
2010). One article commented on how the barriers to education and employment that are provided by 
incarceration and a criminal record operate in Ireland (O’Reilly, 2014), but did not specify how many 
of those affected were convicted of simple possession alone. Another echoed the international 
literature on the lack of a direct effect of imprisonment rates in reducing indictable crime 2 (O’Sullivan 
& O’Donnell, 2003). The authors noted, ‘it may be that alternative measures, such as drug treatment, 
employment, community service or probation would have a similar (or greater) effect’. 
Neither is there much ‘grey’ literature published that covers these issues specifically in the Irish 
context. They are covered by the international literature, as summarised in two editions of the book 
                                                     
2 N.B. The majority of drug offences in Ireland are not treated as indictable crimes. 
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Drug Policy and the Public Good (Babor et al., 2010; Babor & et al, 2018). In short, this shows that 
the international literature: 
• Suggests that drug law enforcement has little effect in the general deterrence of drug 
possession, partly because the proportion of consumers who face arrest is so small (see also 
Nguyen & Reuter, 2012). 
• Does not support a specific deterrent effect of drug law enforcement, with very high rates of 
recidivism among those arrested and punished for drug possession. An interesting and 
relevant study from the USA shows, for example, that arrests for drug offences have little 
effect in reducing future offending, but do have an impact in reducing employment prospects, 
especially for ethnic minority arrestees (Mitchell, 2016). 
• Shows that the costs of drug law enforcement are relatively high, compared to other policy 
interventions (such as prevention and treatment), with weaker evidence of effect or cost-
effectiveness. 
• Supports the argument that drug law enforcement has harmful effects on those who are 
arrested and prosecuted for simple drug possession. 
Issues related to simple possession offences 
There are a variety of harms related both to the possession and to the control of possession of drugs 
(Caulkins & Reuter, 2009). These include harms related to drug use itself, as well as to the existence 
of drug markets. It also includes drug-related crime and the need for and costs of drug treatment. The 
aim of this sub-section is to highlight some issues that are particularly relevant to how simple 
possession is dealt with in Ireland.  
A more detailed picture on these and other issues is given by Bates (2017) in a report commissioned 
by the Health Research Board: “The drugs situation in Ireland: an overview of trends from 2005 to 
2015.” This showed a general increase in current use (one or more times in the month prior to the 
survey) and recent drug use (one or more times in the year prior to the survey) between 2011 and 
2015, particularly for cannabis and ecstasy and amongst young people aged 15-34, as well as 
increases in treatment presentations for cannabis, particularly among young people. This led Bates 
(2017, p.8) to conclude that patterns of drug use and harms had changed over the last decade and 
that the increased trends amongst young people pose concern given the “increased risk of cannabis 
related problems that may be associated with increased use of high potency cannabis”.   
Drug use and related harms 
The use of illicit drugs - as for licit and prescribed drugs - can lead to health problems including 
mental health issues, physiological damage, infectious diseases (especially among people who inject 
drugs), overdose and death. The 2014/15 all Ireland survey of drug prevalence suggested that 7.5 per 
cent of people aged 15 or over had taken any illegal drug in the year prior to the survey year (NACDA, 
2016). This was defined as cannabis, ecstasy, cocaine powder, magic mushrooms, amphetamines, 
poppers, LSD, mephedrone, solvents, crack, heroin and new psychoactive substances 3. According to 
the 2016 census, there were 3,755,313 people aged 15 or over in Ireland. This suggests there may 
be about 280,000 who use drugs in Ireland each year. Cannabis is the most frequently consumed 
illicit drug in Ireland, with 13.8 per cent of the population aged 15-34 estimated to have taken it in 
2015. This is the age group that is most likely to report use of illicit drugs and to be arrested for simple 
possession. Other commonly consumed illicit drugs include MDMA (4.4 per cent) and cocaine (2.9 
per cent). Relatively to other EU nations Ireland, has the second highest prevalence of MDMA 
consumption and fifth highest prevalence of cocaine amongst those aged 15-34 (EMCDDA, 2018).  
Heroin use is much less common. It was, however, estimated that there were between 18,720 and 
21,454 ‘problematic opiate users’ in 2014. This gives Ireland the second highest rate (6.2 per 1,000 
population) in the European Union.4 This group is heavily concentrated in Dublin. The highest rate 
(8.8 per 1,000 population) was estimated for the 25-34 age group, although the rate fell between 
                                                     
3 Please note the addition of new psychoactive substances into this category for 2014/15 following the Criminal Justice 
(Psychoactive Substances) Act 2010. 
4 The highest rate, 8.2 per 1,000 population, is reported in the UK. 
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2006/7 and 2014 in this age group. The rate rose between 2006/7 and 2014 in the 35-64 age group, 
which already accounted for two thirds of opiate users (NACDA, 2017).  
Rates of HIV infection among people who inject drugs in Ireland are relatively high by European 
standards, with a concerning outbreak of new infections in 2015. Rates of recorded overdose deaths 
are also relatively high by comparison with other EU countries: 224 ‘overdose deaths’ were reported 
in 2015. However, it should be noted that Ireland has a more comprehensive reporting system for 
overdose deaths compared to other EU countries, which may account for the relatively high recorded 
death rate. Most of these deaths involved at least one opiate, with the majority involving more than 
one substance. The rate of drug-related deaths in Ireland is relatively stable. 5  
Drug markets and violence 
The demand for psychoactive substances, when combined with the prohibition of supply, creates illicit 
markets. These markets are very lucrative, with much higher profit margins than observed in licit 
markets (Kilmer & Reuter, 2009). Due to their illegality and profitability, these markets are sometimes, 
but not always, characterised by intimidation and violence. This has been a particular concern in 
Ireland, partly due to high profile killings, such as that of the journalist Veronica Guerin in 1996 
(Conway, Daly, & Schweppe, 2010). More recently, there have been several murders that were 
reported to be related to the drugs trade, including several incidents relating to a reported feud 
between the Hutch and Kinahan gangs, both of which are linked to the drugs trade.  
A review carried out for the Health Research Board also noted the problem of lower level violence and 
intimidation related to drug use and sale (Murphy, Farragher, Keane, Galvin, & Long, 2017). It noted 
the common practice of selling drugs on credit, and then using intimidation to ensure the payment of 
debts. A large proportion (46 per cent) of such incidents reported to 13 local and regional Drug Task 
Forces involved physical violence, while 32 per cent involved damage to home or property. A specific 
feature of the Irish drug market is the interaction between organised crime groups of paramilitary 
organisations, on both sides of the border (Hourigan, Morrison, Windle, & Silke, 2018). 
Drug-related crime 
Internationally, people who use drugs are more likely than other people to commit other crimes. And 
people who commit other crimes are also more likely to use drugs (Lurigio & Schwartz, 1999). This 
has also been observed in Ireland (Connolly, 2006). The highest rates of offending in Ireland are 
concentrated among those people who have problems with heroin and crack. As this is a compulsive 
behavioural pattern, these people often offend in order to get money to buy drugs; a phenomenon 
known as ‘economic-compulsive’ crime (Goldstein, 1985). Some drugs, and particularly alcohol and 
stimulants such as cocaine, may also reduce inhibitions and induce aggression; which Goldstein 
(1985) calls ‘psycho-pharmacological’ crime. Goldstein also coined a third term – ‘systemic’ crime – 
that refers to violence related to the regulation of illicit drug markers (see above). 
Illicit drug use also contributes to forms of social harm that can be described as nuisance or anti-
social behaviour, rather than crime. This includes the public use of drugs and the discarding of used 
injecting equipment in public places. In 2017, the Irish government decided to open a pilot safer 
injecting facility in Dublin. On the basis of evidence from other cities, this facility should reduce some 
of these harms in its local vicinity (Potier, Laprévote, Dubois-Arber, Cottencin, & Rolland, 2014).   
These links between drugs and crime should not be taken out of the social contexts in which they 
operate. The highest rates of all forms of drug-related crime are observed in communities that suffer 
from deprivation, unemployment and social exclusion (O’Mahony, 2008; Stevens, 2010). Drug 
possession – even of heroin – tends not to be associated with other forms of criminality when 
consumed by people who are wealthy and well-connected (Warburton, Turnbull, & Hough, 2005). This 
                                                     
5 It has been much less stable in the UK, where the peak of initiation into heroin started a few years before the ‘heroin 
epidemic’ crossed the Irish sea. The British experience shows that long-term users become increasingly likely to die as they 
age; a phenomenon that has contributed to sharp increases in drug-related deaths in the UK (ACMD, 2016; Carew & 
Comiskey, 2018). Older opiate users are also at greater risk of dying with methadone (Pierce, Millar, Robertson, & Bird, 2018). 
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is not the group who typically seek treatment. According to Bates (2017), those receiving treatment for 
opioid use in Ireland were most likely to be unemployed (75%) and homeless (13%). 
It is also important to emphasise that use of cannabis and ecstasy (i.e. the two most commonly used 
drugs in the Irish context and the drugs associated with most of the recent increase) have much 
weaker links with other types of crime (Payne & Gaffney, 2012).  
The Department of Justice and Equality has provided an initial, indicative estimate of the cost of drug-
related crime of approximately £2 billion, or 27 per cent of the total estimated cost of crime in Ireland. 
Drug treatment 
Although most people who use drugs do not become dependent, people who develop problematic 
patterns of drug use often require treatment to help them manage and overcome these problems.  
Data on demand for drug treatment are collected through the National Drug Treatment Reporting 
System (NDTRS) and Central Treatment List. The NDTRS data does not include continuous care 
service users i.e. those on methadone for longer than one year would not typically be included in this 
data. The Central Treatment List is the most comprehensive list of all people who are accessing 
methadone treatment in the county, but there is some overlap with the NDTRS data for those who 
have entered methadone treatment for the first time in 2016 or returned to methadone treatment after 
a period of absence. Data from the Central Treatment List shows that in 2016, there were 10,087 
treatment cases in Ireland for problem opiate use on 31st December 2016 (Health Service Executive, 
2017). Of those 69.5% were male, and 50.5% were aged 35-44 and 10% were aged ≤29. The 
NDTRS data indicate that in 2015 there were 9892 cases involving treatment for problem drug: which 
included 3742 new cases, 5855 previously known cases and 255 cases unknown (HRB, 2017). 
Across all cases, 47.8% reported that opiates were their main problem, while 28.2% sought treatment 
for cannabis use, but amongst new cases cannabis was the main drug: 45.2% compared to 25.9% for 
opiates. In 2015 across all cases 72.2% were male and the median age was 30, an increase from 28 
in 2010. In 2015 across new cases only 75.3% were male and the median age was 25, the same as 
in 2010 (HRB, 2017). Those entering treatment for cannabis were significantly younger, with a mean 
age of 22.9 years compared to 32.3 years for heroin (EMCDDA, 2018). As noted above, there are 
increasing numbers of people entering treatment for cannabis, but declining trends for heroin.  
The main mode of treatment provided was outpatient. For people who have problems with opiates, 
the most commonly used treatment modality is opiate substitution treatment (OST). In Ireland, most of 
this is delivered in the form of methadone (EMCDDA, 2018), with suboxone also being offered in 
some cases. According to information provided by the Department of Justice and Equality, average 
waiting time between assessment for OST and either exit from the waiting list or treatment entry was 
26.5 days.  
Estimating expenditure on drug treatment in Ireland is not easy given the many different types of 
treatment and varying costs. The EMCDDA report noted that the annual cost to central government of 
providing addiction treatment services in Ireland was approximately €120 million in 2016. But this 
includes money spent by the Department of Justice on drugs. New figures for drug treatment 
specifically are currently being developed.  
Drug Driving 
Driving under the influence of drugs has been illegal in Ireland since the Road Traffic Act 1961 and 
has more recently been the subject of an ‘anti-drug driving’ campaign by the Road Safety Authority 
(RSA, 2017). The RSA has noted high levels of positive tests for drugs among drivers, with a study in 
Kildare finding that almost a tenth of drivers killed in 1998 and 2009 tested positive for a drug.  
There is international concern over the role of drugs in increasing the risks of driving (Watson & 
Mann, 2016). A 2013 meta-analysis showed detrimental effects on driving performance from all the 
drugs examined, including opioids, cocaine, amphetamines and cannabis (Elvik, 2013). Opioids do 
not necessarily impair the driving of people who are tolerant to them (Galski, Williams, & Ehle, 2000), 
but they do reduce the ability of new consumers (Schisler, Groninger, & Rosielle, 2012). Combining 
other drugs with alcohol while driving is particularly dangerous (Li, Brady, & Chen, 2013).  
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Alternatives already available in Ireland 
The range of existing alternatives available for dealing with simple possession offences in Ireland 
remains limited, in comparison to some other European countries (Kruithof, Davies, Disley, Strang, & 
Ito, 2016). The expert review of the National Drug Strategy also noted concerns that it was difficult to 
establish the extent to which existing alternatives were being used, or the evidence base for their use 
(Griffiths et al., 2016, p. 26).  
Formally, section 28 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 enables courts to divert some drug law 
offenders to treatment, instead of imposing a different punishment. However, this is rarely used. This 
is for the following reasons (according to information provided by the Department of Justice and 
Equality): 
• The sentencing resulted in a conviction. 
• The sentencing resulted in a 12-month order which may have been considered overly 
punitive. 
• Other options available to the court would be less punitive; e.g. adjourned probation 
supervision or probation supervision by way of the Probation Act 1907 – thereby preventing 
conviction. 
• Lack of designated residential units. 
• Research evidence that it was not good practice to order treatment on an involuntary basis. 
Drug treatment court 
The only alternative sanction mentioned in RAND Europe’s study of such measures is the Dublin 
Drug Treatment Court (DTC) (Kruithof et al., 2016). This also involves the threat of conviction. 
Participants who successfully complete the programme do not receive a conviction for the offence for 
which they were being prosecuted for on that occasion.  
The DTC is intended to target offenders who commit a range of non-violent offences related to their 
problematic drug use such as shoplifting or failing to appear on bail and be used for offenders who 
would usually receive a custodial sentence. This means that the majority of people who are arrested 
for simple possession would not be eligible for the DTC (Connolly, 2006).  
The DTC has served a relatively small number of people (DJELR, 2010); only 682 people were 
referred to this court between 2001 and 2014 (Kruithof et al., 2016). According to information provided 
by the Department for Justice and Equality, the number of people referred to the court has increased 
since 2014; 112 people were referred in 2017. The most common potential convictions are for theft, 
bail (failure to appear) and public order offences. Some also have records of drug possession 
offences, but a person could only be referred to the DTC for this offence if they were facing their third 
conviction for a S3 MDA charge and a possible custodial sentence (as they are then considered "at 
risk").   
In 2017, 10 people successfully completed the DTC programme (and so had their charges struck out), 
while 59 left the programme without completing it and 49 were still in the programme at the end of the 
year. Another 126 people were deemed unsuitable for entry. 
Adult cautioning scheme 
The Garda Adult Cautioning Scheme was established in 2006 on a non-legislative basis with the 
agreement of the Director of Prosecutions (An Garda Síochána, 2006). It enables the police to divert 
adults from prosecution by giving them a caution. It applies to a limited range of offences and 
offenders, and requires consideration of, not only the weight of evidence, but also public interest 
factors and views of victim (where relevant).  
The offences covered by the Scheme include offences contained in the Criminal Justice (Public 
Order) Act 1994, the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001, the Intoxicating Liquor Act 
2003, the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 and the Criminal Damage Act 1991, such 
as minor assault, minor theft, possession of stolen property, public drunkenness and disorderly 
conduct. These offences do not currently include any illicit drug offences. 
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The scheme is largely reserved for first-time offenders. A person may be given a second caution 
under the scheme only in the most exceptional circumstances and with the consent of the Office of 
the Director of Prosecutions. All cautions are required to take place at the Garda station: not on the 
street. According to Garda figures, between its introduction in 2006 to 5 June, 2013, there were a total 
of 67,765 adult cautions recorded on PULSE (Working Group on Alternatives to Prosecution, 2016). 
The Minister for Justice and Equality has approved a recommendation of the Working Group to 
extend the Adult Cautioning Scheme to offences involving the simple possession of any illicit drug. 
This will still only apply to first offences and in contexts where this meets the public interest. It will still 
require the offender to attend a police station. 
The Garda Authorities are currently working with the Health Service Executive to create a drug 
awareness and advice leaflet (including national and local contact points where people can get further 
support). This will be handed to everybody who is given a caution for simple possession. Although 
information can be provided alongside a caution, there is no provision in Irish law to attach conditions 
or obligations to cautions (such as a condition to attend a drug education programme or undertake an 
assessment of treatment need). The Working Group has considered the use of conditions alongside 
cautions for a range of offences, including persistent offending related to problematic drug use. It has 
described this as a complex issue and has recommended that a cross-sectoral committee consider it. 
Diversion programme, for juvenile offenders 
For offenders aged 12 to 18 (or very serious offences by children aged 10 or 11), the Children’s Act 
2001 formalised the previously existing Diversion Programme. This aims to avoid bringing children 
into the CJS. To enter this scheme, the child must admit the offence and give consent to receive a 
caution and – where judged appropriate by the Garda Juvenile Liaison Officer – supervision for up to 
12 months. If they do, they will receive either a formal or informal caution. All juvenile cautions take 
place in the presence of the offender’s parents or guardians and occur at either the Garda station 
(required for all formal cautions) or offender’s home.   
In 2016 17,615 referrals were made to the Juvenile Diversion Programme, covering 9,451 children. Of 
these 7,262 received cautions (5,016 informal and 2,246 formal). Only 794 of the referrals related to 
simple possession offences (Garda Bureau of Community Engagement, 2017).  
While there is strong international evidence to suggest that diverting young people from the CJS 
reduces the chances of further offending (e.g. McAra & McVie, 2005 from Scotland), concerns have 
been expressed in Ireland that diversion to caution may compromise the due process rights of 
suspected offenders (Cambell, 2005) and may also lead to a larger number of people having any 
action taken against them, rather than being dealt with informally, a phenomenon known as ‘net-
widening’ (Cohen, 1985; Tolan, 2014). 
Other alternatives 
Some countries, such as Portugal, use administrative or civil processes to deal with offences that 
were formerly criminalised (Hughes & Stevens, 2010). Others, such as the UK and USA (Brunet, 
2002; Heap, 2014), use civil orders and police-administered fines to deal with some relatively minor 
offences or anti-social behaviour.  
Civil penalties have not been widely used in Ireland, and there may be constitutional impediments to 
doing so. Article 38.1 of the Irish Constitution states “no person shall be tried on any criminal charge 
save in due course of law”. Article 38.5 further states “no person shall be tried on any criminal charge 
without a jury”. This has been interpreted to mean that substantial criminal penalties cannot be 
imposed other than by a court (Fitzgerald & McFadden, 2011). However, there are situations under 
which an administrative penalty can be imposed. Using the Central Bank Act 1942, the Central Bank 
of Ireland can impose cautions, fines and other administrative sanctions on regulated bodies and 
individuals (CBI, 2018). While the Joint Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality did not consider 
the constitutional issue to be a blockage to establishing a civil procedure for dealing with simple 
possession offences they recommended that discretion for the application of this approach would 
remain with An Garda Síochána/Health Providers in respect of the way in which an individual in 
possession of a small amounts of drugs for personal use might be treated. 
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The potential constitutional barrier has not impeded the implementation and expansion of Fixed 
Charge Penalty Notices (FCPN) in Ireland. Originally introduced to deal with minor motoring offences, 
these have since been extended to pedal cycle offences and – under the Criminal Justice Act 2006 – 
public disorder offences (Working Group on Alternatives to Prosecution, 2016). There have been 
issues with non-payment of these penalties, but the payment rate increased towards 80% in 2013 and 
2014.  
FCPNs have been applied to offences that meet three criteria: 
• There is no appreciable degree of moral culpability. 
• There is no dispute as to whether or by whom the offence has been committed. 
• It is not necessary to prove mens rea. 
On this basis, the Working Group on Alternatives to Prosecution (2016) recommended that FCPNs be 
extended to more public order offences (under sections 21 and 22 of the Public Order Act). It may be 
argued that simple possession offences could also meet these criteria, but this has not yet been 
considered in detail. 
The national drug strategy 
Before 1996, Irish drug policy could be characterised as being led by a law enforcement approach to 
prohibition (O’Mahony, 2008), with the aim of creating a ‘drug-free Ireland’ (Comiskey, 2018). In the 
wake of the HIV epidemic, this shifted towards a policy based more on harm reduction, with a rapid 
expansion in the provision of methadone maintenance for people who had problems with heroin. 
Both the Irish drug situation and its policy have evolved since then. Following a wide-ranging 
consultation, including the expert review (Griffiths et al., 2016), a new national strategy – entitled 
Reducing Harm, Supporting Recovery – was launched. The vision of the strategy is to create: 
‘A healthier and safer Ireland, where public health and safety is protected and the harms 
caused to individuals, families and communities by substance misuse are reduced and every 
person affected by substance use is empowered to improve their health and wellbeing and 
quality of life’ (Department of Health, 2017, p.8). 
The strategy is led by the Department of Health, reflecting the focus on drug use as a public health 
problem which requires a health-led approach. The focus on health is exemplified by the decision to 
open the pilot supervised injecting facility in Dublin, as well as the current exploration and consultation 
on options to provide alternative measures for dealing with simple possession offences. The strategy 
included ‘the establishment of a working group to examine alternative approaches to the possession 
of controlled drugs for personal use…to promote a harm reducing and rehabilitative approach to drug 
use’. 
Implications for consideration of alternatives for simple possession 
offences 
Ireland shares some important feature with several other countries where illicit drug consumption has 
grown since the 1960s. These include: 
• The vast majority of simple possession offences go undetected and unpunished. 
• The majority of those detected for drug offences are for simple possession, not supply.  
• There is political and public concern over harms related to drug markets, and the role of 
violent organised crime. 
• The scale and cost of drug-related crime is also a significant concern. 
• The policing and criminalisation of illicit drug possession carries many costs, including costs 
of enforcement, reduced employment opportunities and barriers to accessing harm reduction 
and drug treatment services.  
Specific features of the Irish policy context include: 
• Arrest for simple possession can lead to a person receiving a conviction, although the 
numbers convicted for this offence alone are relatively small.  
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• The possible extension of the Adult Cautioning Scheme to include simple possession 
offences could reduce the number of people receiving a conviction for these offences. But this 
has yet to be implemented and it is unclear how many people this could apply to, or how cost-
effective it will be. It could increase the number of people who are formally dealt with for this 
offence through ‘net-widening’. It may also provide an opportunity for people to receive 
information and advice on drugs and available health services. 
• Ireland does not, as some other countries do, have a well-developed system of civil or 
administrative law to which to divert offenders from criminal conviction. Nor does it have a 
well-developed system of alternatives to prosecution for adults.  
• Other potential alternatives already exist in Ireland, including the use of fixed penalties or 
administrative sanctions, but it is not clear whether and how these could be applied to simple 
possession offences. 
• The most serious drug-related health harms in Ireland relate to heroin, although there 
appears to be increasing demand for treatment for problems related to cannabis, particularly 
among young people. 
• There are substantial differences in the drug situation, and responses to it, between Dublin 
and the rest of the country. 
• Ireland has decided, in a process involving consultation and public deliberation, to prioritise 
the aim of protecting public health and promoting individual recovery in its drug policy. 
From these features flow several implications in the consideration of alternatives for dealing with 
simple possession offences. These include: 
1. If Ireland wishes to reduce the harms done to people by being arrested and convicted when 
they are found in possession of drugs, it will need to: 
a. Avoid imposing penalties that are heavier than those that are already used. 
b. Avoid widening the net to include more people in the scope of formal intervention by 
the CJS. 
c. Provide pathways for people to enter treatment for drug problems, without having to 
be subject to a conviction which creates a criminal record. 
2. If possible, this should be done in a way that does not predictably increase the size of illicit 
markets. This is relevant to 
a. The profits of organised crime groups. 
b. The scale of drug-related crime and intimidation.  
c. The level of health problems related to drug use. 
d. The demand for and cost of drug treatment. 
e. The risk of drug-related traffic accidents. 
3. Any new system of alternatives will need to fit needs of both Dublin and other areas. 
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Chapter three: Methods for rapid realist 
review  
This project used a ‘rapid realist review’ (RRR). More specifically, this RRR followed the RAMESES 
protocol (Realist And Meta-narrative Evidence Syntheses: Evolving Standards) to ensure high quality 
and transparency of the review process. As outlined by Wong et al. (2013) this approach differs from 
a traditional narrative or systematic review, in that:  
• It aims specifically to inform policy makers of answers to questions that are directly relevant to 
the policy problem they are trying to solve.  
• It uses systematic processes for searching the literature and extracting data from relevant 
documents. However, unlike a traditional systematic review or meta-analysis, the aim is not to 
aggregate effects across a range of studies from different contexts to provide an estimate of 
the general effect of an intervention.  
• Rather, a RRR aims to inform policy makers of the mechanisms which produce both intended 
and unintended outcomes in specified contexts. This therefore enables better informed 
decisions on policy transfer and implantation.  
The RRR approach is especially suited to research on complex policy interventions that are not 
amenable to randomised controlled trials. For decriminalisation and other alternatives to simple 
possession offences, the mode of implementation can vary substantially within the same legal 
framework, and RRR is suited to examining these complexities.  We worked backwards from desired 
outcomes (and possible unintended adverse consequences) to develop a set of specific research 
questions on the ways in which different forms of decriminalisation of simple drug possession operate 
in real world empirical contexts (C) through identifiable mechanisms (M) to produce real outcomes 
(O). This produced a ‘logic model’ showing programme theories of ways in which different CMO 
combinations produce their effects and how each form of decriminalisation could be expected to 
operate in the Irish context.  
The RRR approach 
The RRR proceeded through ten steps. These steps were those recommended by Saul et al (2013) 
for projects which aim to meet the RAMESES protocol of Wong et al (2013):  
1. Development of the project scope: This involved work between the researchers and the 
working group to clarify the aims and limits of the RRR, specifically being clear about what it 
could and could not achieve given available time and resources. This step also clarified the 
rationale for the RRR; what policy problems were we trying to solve?  
2. Development of specific research questions and choice of countries: On the basis of the 
detailed project scope and the broad aims of the review (see page 5), the researchers then 
proposed a more specific list of research questions and choice of countries that were in scope 
(see below). This included decisions on the countries to be included for specific attention in 
the RRR (both common law and common countries).  
3. Identification of how the findings and recommendations would be used: The researchers 
then proposed the ways in which it would be possible to use the results of the review, for 
agreement by the working group. This included: a. The broader policy questions to which the 
RRR results would be relevant. b. The intended forms of publication and dissemination of the 
results.  
4. Development of search terms: On the basis of the specific research questions and selected 
country cases, researchers then specified terms to be used in a systematic search of the 
literature (including legislation and policy documents). Researchers also identified criteria for 
exclusion of documents (e.g. those that focused on legalisation of drug supply, or on cannabis 
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for solely medical purposes, or which did not provide original information on the contexts, 
mechanisms and outcomes of alternatives to simple possession drug offences).  
5. Identification of articles and documents for inclusion in the review: The search terms were 
deployed systematically across a range of sources. For details see below.  
6. Quality review: A quality review was then conducted including: 
a. initial assessment of the identified documents to select only those that were likely 
to produce information that is relevant to the specific research questions.  
b. outreach to experts in the field to ask for information on other or more recently 
published documents.  
Such an approach ensured focus on forms of approaches and jurisdictions which can most 
produce useful and robust findings for the Irish context.  
7. Extraction of data from the literature: Data were extracted from the selected documents 
and placed in an extraction template (designed based on the research questions). See below 
for the final template of extraction. The completed template was used to generate programme 
theories of the ways that mechanisms of alternatives to simple possession drug offences 
combine with contexts to produce outcomes, enabling informed judgement on which 
alternatives will or will not ‘work’ in the Irish context.  
8. Validation of findings with content experts: The programme theories that were generated 
from data extraction were reviewed by senior researchers and members of the working group 
in order to check for quality and relevance of the emerging findings. Researchers attempted 
to fill any remaining gaps identified at this stage by returning to search even more specifically 
for relevant documents and reports.  
9. Synthesis of the findings in a final report: Answers to the specified research questions were 
written up in ways that are directly useful to policy makers (e.g. by clarifying the context in 
which these findings were produced, the source and quality of the evidence for the findings). 
The final report therefore included policy options to deal with simple possession offences 
available to the Irish government and the advantages and disadvantages of each.  
10. Dissemination of results: Researchers provided information in forms that can be 
disseminated, as agreed in step 3.  
Choice of countries in scope  
Due to the relevance of the legal context, the initial review identified four common law countries for 
inclusion that have reduced penalties for simple drug possession offences. In effect, this includes: 
• All states and territories of Australia.  
• Some states of the USA. 
• England and Wales (via the cannabis warning) and some English police service areas (via 
diversion schemes). 
• Jamaica. 
 It is worth noting some common law countries also use civil penalties e.g. Australia. 
Other countries were selected based on their salience, relevance and ability to provide useful 
information for the Irish context. A review of reviews was conducted to inform this. This showed a 
large variety in decriminalisation approaches across the globe and a lack of consensus about what 
countries had or did not have decriminalisation. It also showed different mechanisms by which 
decriminalisation can occur: by law, court judgement or police/prosecutorial agreement or multiple.  
Based on the review of reviews, the following five additional countries were included:  
• Portugal as it involved a de jure reform, high salience in public discussions of alternate legal 
approaches to drug possession and a high level of evidence. 
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• Czech Republic, on the basis it has a well-studied and long-standing system for the 
decriminalisation of possession of all drugs. 
• Denmark, as it involved all illicit drugs and involved a reform via police. 
• Germany, as it involved all illicit drugs and a reform via court ruling and police.   
• The Netherlands, as it involved non-prosecution of simple drug possession. 
• USA, due to high salience and diversity of approaches taken.  
NB. Austria was identified for potential inclusion but excluded on the basis it was too recent for 
meaningful information. 
The final list of countries included in the detailed country search was thus: 
• Australia 
• Czech Republic  
• Denmark 
• England and Wales 
• Germany  
• Jamaica  
• Portugal 
• The Netherlands 
• USA 
Detailed country search 
On the basis of the selected countries, the detailed per country search included: 
1. Three bibliographic databases (Web of Science, Scopus, Criminal Justice Abstract). 
2. Two grey literature bibliographies: one held by the International Society for the Study of Drug 
Policy [ISSDP] and the other being the drug law reform bibliography at UNSW’s Drug Policy 
Modelling Program). 
3. The bibliographies of existing reviews identified in the initial search above. 
4. A forward citation search for relevant documents which cite these reviews. 
5. A forward web search of all cited documents (using Google Scholar).  
6. A check with country level experts. (These were identified on the basis of our existing 
international networks each of whom sent the full list of material and asked to identify if there 
were any missing documents). 
The search terms for the detailed per country/state search included: 
- [country OR state] AND (drug  OR  cannabis  OR  marijuana  OR  heroin  OR  cocaine ) AND 
- (decriminali*  OR  depenal*  OR  liberal*  OR  diversion  OR  warning  OR  expiation  OR  civil
  OR  infringement  OR law OR policy) AND ( possess*  OR  use ) AND 
(evaluat*  OR  effect*  OR  impact* ) NOT ( pharma*  OR  medic* ) 
The specific search for relevant literature on Ireland used the following terms: 
- Ireland AND [(drug AND possession) or (drug AND policy)] AND NOT [pharma* OR medic*] 
In search tools that did not allow the use of Boolean operators (AND/OR/AND NOT) or ‘wild’ word 
endings denoted by asterisks, different searches were run using these alternative terms and spellings 
(e.g. decriminalisation/decriminalization]. In these searches, results from journals in the 
pharmacological and purely medical subject areas were excluded from the results. Citations were 
managed using the bibliographic software Endnote, with duplicates removed manually. 
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Document selection 
Inclusion criteria for documents found in the detailed per country search were: 
- Contains original 6 data on the contexts, mechanisms and/or outcomes of some form of 
decriminalisation or alternative to simple drug possession in the selected countries. 
- Is written in English. 
- Is available via open access, through the libraries of University of Kent or UNSW Australia, or 
on request from the lead author. 
- Refers to drug policy in the modern era (i.e. since the UN Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs 1961).  
We excluded studies of the legalisation or regulation of drug production or supply which did not cover 
decriminalisation of possession. Documents that discussed opinions, policies or preferences without 
providing any original data on decriminalisation were excluded from the review. 
Data extraction  
A standardised coding form was used, and the key domains were:  
- Description of the study 
o Authors 
o Date 
o Type of study (e.g. cost, quasi experimental, observational cross-sectional) 
o Country (and state/territory/area if relevant) 
o Type of approach (e.g. formal decriminalisation, formal depenalisation, alternative 
disposals without legal change) 
o Year of change in law/practice 
o Period covered after the change 
- Contexts 
o Common law/penal code legal system 
o Level of drug use and related problems prior to decriminalisation. 
o Criminal penalties for possession prior to reform 
o Simultaneous economic developments 
o Simultaneous health system developments 
o Simultaneous criminal justice developments 
- Mechanism 
o General text description of the mechanism 
o Any changes to statute law, guidance to police and/or guidance to prosecutors 
o Drugs covered (cannabis only/all/other) 
o Eligible target group/s 
o Applies to minors <18 (yes/no) 
o Threshold amount if specified (e.g. 50g cannabis) 
o Any sanctions applied to those found in drug possession post reform  
o Measures for diversion to treatment (if any) 
o Other diversionary measures 
- Outcomes 
o Arrests 
o Charges 
o Convictions 
o Prison sentences 
o Prison population 
o Prevalence of drug use (by drug type if available) 
o Age of onset of use (cannabis, heroin, other drugs) 
o Drug availability 
o Health harms 
▪ Drug-related deaths 
                                                     
6 By original, we mean data that is not available in English in previous documents found by the search. 
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▪ Overdoses 
▪ HIV infections 
▪ Viral hepatitis infections 
▪ Hospital presentations 
▪ Monitored drug poisonings 
▪ Dependence or problematic drug use 
▪ Injecting drug use 
▪ Presentations to drug treatment 
▪ Road traffic accidents 
o Costs in health system 
o Crime harms 
▪ Crime in general 
▪ Acquisitive crime 
▪ Violent crime 
▪ Organised crime 
▪ Street dealing 
o Costs in CJS 
o Harms of criminalisation 
▪ Employment 
▪ Housing 
▪ Family 
▪ Travel 
o Cost-effectiveness 
o Other potential unintended consequences 
▪ Net-widening 
▪ Burden on health system 
▪ Burden on police officers 
o Attitudes to drug use 
o Attitudes to the policy 
o Other outcomes and impacts 
 
Search results 
A total of 5910 records were initially identified via the database searches and 288 from other sources 
(see Figure 2). 405 articles were accessed for eligibility, with 11 excluded due to full text not being 
available and a further 210 excluded primarily for lacking original information on the context, 
mechanisms or outcomes of decriminalisation policies in the countries of interest. A total of 183 
articles met the eligibility criteria and 158 were included for extraction. The number of documents 
included for extraction ranged from three in Jamaica (the country with the most recent reform) to 45 in 
the USA. There were 12 unique studies extracted that contained content relevant to multiple countries 
of interest. See Appendix A for the list of included studies.  
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5,910 records identified through 
database searching 
Criminal Justice Abstracts = 1,375 
Scopus = 2,425 
Web of Science = 2,110 
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288 additional records identified 
through other sources 
Grey /first-phase searches = 53 
Forward citation checks = 152 
Content experts = 31 
Cross-country articles = 52 
6,004 records after duplicates removed 
6,004 records screened for eligibility 
(title/abstract) 
 
5,599 records excluded 
405 articles assessed for eligibility 11 abstracts excluded (no full 
text available) 
3 cross-country duplicates 
excluded 
208 full-texts excluded due 
to not meeting the eligibility 
criteria  
 
 
183 articles met eligibility 
International (multi-country) = 19 
Australia = 37 
Czech Republic = 13 
Denmark = 7 
Germany = 5 
Jamaica = 3 
Netherlands = 21 
Portugal = 20 
UK = 11 
US = 47 
 
158 articles included for extraction 
International (multi-country) = 12 
Australia = 29 
Czech Republic = 13 
Denmark = 6 
Germany = 5 
Jamaica = 3 
Netherlands = 14 
Portugal = 20 
UK = 11 
US = 45 
 
25 relevant but not extracted 
due to duplicative 
information  
 
 
Figure 2: PRISMA extraction of studies on alternative approaches taken to simple possession drug 
offences 
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Data analysis 
Data analysis occurred via two methods.  
• First, within countries: to describe the context, mechanism and outcomes (CMO) and any 
areas of conflict between studies. Here we also differentiated evidence on different types of 
reforms within a nation.  
• Second, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) was used to produce a typology of alternative 
approaches across the nine countries (for details see chapter five).  
A programme logic or programme theory was then developed for each approach. As described by 
Wong et al. (2013, p. 11) the goal of a realist review is to provide theor(ies) of why a social 
programme/intervention generates particular outcomes in particular contexts: that is how the 
programme triggers change. Then we outlined the outcomes from each alternative approach.  
By way of example, in chapter four we describe the impacts of depenalisation within several different 
countries (including the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK). In the final chapter we consolidate all 
known examples to describe the mechanisms, programme theory and outcomes across the set of 
nations, as well as any contextual factors that shape the outcomes. This is followed by a list of 
advantages and disadvantages (and where relevant other factors to consider) for each reform type. 
Unlike a meta-analysis where the aim is to produce a single statistical analysis (e.g. that drug use 
increased by 5% given a particular reform), the aim was to explicate patterns of responses across a 
broad array of data (including quantitative, qualitative or administrative) and multiple contexts, as well 
as the contingencies that may shape reform outcomes. In so doing the realist review sought to 
produce a guide of the potential outcomes of alternative approaches to simple drug possession as 
well as the steps that policy makers may need to take to trigger the desired outcomes. 
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Chapter four: Country analysis of 
approaches to simple possession drug 
offences 
This chapter describes the approach to dealing with simple possession offences in our nine nations. 
We outline the context (including legal context and drug situation), the rationale for reform, the 
legislative and judicial regime(s) that has been employed and the main outcomes. We also outline key 
changes in reform when they have occurred: and lessons for understanding the mechanisms and 
outcomes of reform. The main alternatives are summarised in Table 1, showing fourteen alternative 
approaches taken across the set of countries.  
Table 7: Summary of alternative approaches taken to simple possession drug offences across 
the nine countries 
Country Legal 
basis 
Reform type Drug type 
Australia  De jure Decriminalisation with civil penalties Cannabis  
Australia De facto Police diversion (cannabis caution) 
with referral to education session  
Cannabis  
Australia De facto Police diversion to treatment 
(assessment and brief intervention) 
Other illicit drugs 
Czech Republic De jure Decriminalisation with administrative 
penalties (fine) 
All illicit drugs 
England and Wales De facto Depenalisation with on the street 
warnings  
Cannabis and khat 
England and Wales De facto Police diversion to structured 
interventions involving treatment and 
social services 
All illicit drugs 
Denmark De facto Depenalisation – guidelines from 
Attorney General to police to issue 
warnings for a first offence 
All illicit drugs 
Germany De jure Constitutional court decision for non-
prosecution 
All illicit drugs 
Jamaica De jure Decriminalisation with civil penalties  Cannabis 
Netherlands De facto Depenalisation (‘tolerance policy’)  Cannabis  
Netherlands De facto Police diversion to treatment Other illicit drugs 
Portugal De jure Decriminalisation. Offence became an 
administrative offence, with referrals to 
dissuasion committee  
All illicit drugs 
USA De facto Depenalisation – police instructed to 
treat as “lowest priority”  
Cannabis 
USA De jure Decriminalisation with civil penalties  
 
Cannabis 
USA De facto Police diversion to education / 
treatment / social services  
All illicit drugs 
NB. This outlines the main approaches only. Further specificities were included in the final analysis: such as that Australia has 
some de jure diversion programmes and that some US states e.g. Maryland have decriminalisation with diversion to treatment.    
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England and Wales 
Context 
England and Wales use the same, common law legal framework, while Scotland and Northern Ireland 
have their own legal systems. Policing in England and Wales is carried out by 43 local police services, 
plus the British Transport Police, under the direction and funding of the Home Office. Police policy 
and practice is coordinated by the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC), the successor body to the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). 
England and Wales have a similar drug situation to Ireland, having experienced general increases in 
illicit drug use and, since the 1980s and 1990s, a serious problem with the use of heroin and – later – 
crack cocaine. These and other substances are controlled by the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, which 
separates drugs into three classes, depending on their potential for causing social harm. Class A 
includes those most considered the most harmful, including heroin and cocaine. Class B contains 
cannabis (although, as described below, it was in class C from 2004 to 2009). 
Since drugs were originally controlled in the early 20th century, the usual method for dealing with 
simple possession has been arrest, leading to a caution or conviction. The Misuse of Drugs Act allows 
for a range of penalties on conviction, including fines, community sentences and imprisonment. 
Imprisonment is used rarely for simple possession offences. In the later 20th century, concern grew 
over two issues. One was the over-policing of people for cannabis possession, and the related drain 
on police and other criminal justice resources. Another was the high proportion of acquisitive 
offending that is associated with problematic use of heroin and crack cocaine. 
Alternative mechanisms for dealing with simple possession offences 
Over the last 20 years, England and Wales have experienced two types of alternatives: police 
depenalisation; and diversion. Neither of these have involved a change in the legislation (i.e. de jure): 
instead they have occurred through changes to police practices (i.e. de facto).  
There have also been other changes in police policy that have affected the policing of drugs offences. 
During the 2000s, this included the use of targets for ‘offences brought to justice’ or ‘sanction 
detections’ to manage police performance. Since 2010, these targets have not been used. There has 
been a substantial fall in the numbers of police in England and Wales due to budget cuts. There have 
also been reductions in the use of stop-and-search. 
Police depenalisation of cannabis 
In Lambeth (a borough of London), a local programme 
was started in 2001 which came to be known as the 
Lambeth Cannabis Warning Scheme (LCWS). The goal of 
the scheme was to save police time to focus resources on 
‘high priority’ crimes such as gun crime, street robbery, 
class A drug enforcement and other serious crime. Police 
officers were instructed to avoid arresting adults for simple 
possession of cannabis, and instead to focus their 
attention on other offences, including class A drug 
offences, drug supply, robbery, theft and burglary. This 
scheme ran from 4 July 2001 to 31 July 2002. 
Later, in 2004, the UK government reclassified cannabis 
from class B to class C. At the same time, ACPO issued 
guidance that advised police officers throughout England and Wales to issue on-street warnings for 
adults in possession of unspecified small amounts of cannabis, rather than arresting them, unless 
there were aggravating circumstances. The person must admit to the offence of possession to receive 
the warning. Police retained discretion over whether to arrest. These cannabis warnings would be 
counted as sanction detections, but would not lead to an arrest, charge, conviction or criminal record.  
In 2009, following media and political controversy (often focusing on the effect of cannabis on mental 
health), cannabis was again reclassified into class B, but an amended version of the cannabis 
England & Wales: cannabis (and 
khat) warning  
• Rationale: To save police 
time to focus on more 
serious offences 
• Mechanism: De facto –
police directed to issue on-
street warnings, rather than 
arrest 
• Drugs: Cannabis and khat 
• Threshold limits: No  
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warning continued. Police were advised to continue using an on-street warning for the first possession 
offence, but to issue a Penalty Notice for Disorder (an on-street fine of £60) for the second offence. A 
third offence should lead to arrest and a criminal justice disposal (formal caution or conviction). In 
2014, this escalating warning system was extended to the possession of khat, when the plant was 
controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act. 
Diversion for other drugs and other offences 
Some police services have developed schemes to divert 
drug-related offenders from prosecution and conviction. The 
two best-researched examples are the Operation Turning 
Point programme in the West Midlands and Operation 
Checkpoint in Durham. Both are open to a wider group of 
offenders than just those found in possession of drugs. 
In the West Midlands, Operation Turning Point (OTP) was 
between November 2011 and July 2014. It was targeted at 
‘low risk’ offenders ‘for whom the police had decided it was 
in the public interest to prosecute, but who had no more than 
one conviction’, in the aim of reducing costs and recidivism 
(via structured interventions and avoiding the potentially 
counterproductive impacts whereby first-time convictions 
often increase offending). Another objective was to increase 
access to Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) 
offenders and as such they removed the requirement for 
offenders to first admit an offence before being given the 
diversion (Lammy, 2017). These offenders had their 
prosecution deferred. They agreed to take part in ‘structured 
interventions’. This included drug or alcohol treatment, mental health assessments, anger 
management courses, restorative action (such as attending a restorative justice conference) and 
social interventions such as education, training and employment. Prosecutions were subsequently 
dropped for offenders who successfully completing the intervention. Prosecutions were resumed for 
those who did not.  
Operation Checkpoint in Durham is potentially available to any offender who faces being charged. 
Offenders do not have to admit guilt to be eligible. Instead of being charged, diverted offenders go 
through a needs assessment, leading to engagement in interventions. The offender must agree to 
conditions including: ‘no reoffending within a four-month period (mandatory); participation in a 
restorative approach (mandatory if the victim agrees); attend appointments regarding individual 
personal issues or undertake one-to-one intervention work; carry out community/voluntary work for 
18-36 hours and/or wear a Global Positioning System (GPS) tag; and undertake voluntary drug 
testing’ (Lammy, 2017). 
Both have been the subject of evaluations by the University of Cambridge. The results have not yet 
been fully published, but some are available in ‘grey’ literature (see below). 
Avon police are also trialling a diversionary approach in which drug possession offenders (all 
controlled drugs) are diverted to a drug awareness session. If they attend, then charges are dropped. 
No details or results of this approach have been published. 
Outcomes 
Depenalisation 
There is some controversy over the outcomes of the LCWS, partly due to the difficulty in measuring 
and attributing outcomes. For example, there was a 61 per cent increase in recorded cannabis 
possession offences during the period of the scheme (Adda, McConnell, & Rasul, 2014). It is not 
known whether this reflects an increase in cannabis use, or an increase in the police recording of 
possession offences, as the warning scheme made it much easier and cheaper for police officers to 
do this. However, Adda, McConnell, and Rasul (2014) note that the increase in cannabis possession 
offences persisted after the LCWS ended. They also note increases in recorded cannabis supply 
England: diversion (e.g. West 
Midlands Operation Turning Point 
programme)  
• Rationale: To reduce cost & 
recidivism (and increase 
access to all racial groups) 
• Mechanism: De facto –
police divert minor offenders 
to structured interventions 
involving drug treatment, 
mental health, restorative 
justice and/or social services  
• Drugs: All (and other petty 
offences) 
• Threshold limits: No  
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offences, relative to other London boroughs. They observe a 12 per cent increase in recorded 
offences of possession of class A drugs; ‘the evidence does not suggest the Lambeth police turned a 
blind-eye towards Class-A drug possession in Lambeth during or after the LCWS policing 
experiment’. 
On other crimes, Adda et al (2014) observe significant increases in arrest rates for nearly all crime 
types, with significant reductions in robbery, burglary, theft and handling, fraud and forgery and 
criminal damage. This supports the contention that the LCWS achieved the intention of enabling 
Lambeth police to focus their resources on higher priority crimes.  
On the other hand, a time series analysis by Kelly and Rasul (2014) showed ‘an immediate and 
sustained increase in drug-related hospital admissions in Lambeth compared to other boroughs’. 
They argue that this is an effect of increases in cannabis use leading to increases in class A drug use, 
and therefore to increased hospital admissions. They do not directly observe an increase in cannabis 
use. 
A public opinion poll was also carried out to assess local residents’ views on the LCWS. These were 
generally supportive. The report of this poll concluded: 'probably the over-riding message to emerge 
from the data is how positively the overall population of Lambeth has received the scheme. The 
survey contained a diverse range of measures of public reaction to the scheme, and across all of 
these, the survey consistently recorded high levels of public support’ (Ipsos MORI, 2002). This is even 
though Adda et al (2014) found that house prices in Lambeth were reduced in Lambeth, compared to 
other London boroughs, which they suggest shows a loss of local quality of life.  
If there were effects of depenalising cannabis possession on increasing cannabis use, crime and 
mental health problems in Lambeth, they were not observed when the national cannabis warning was 
introduced in 2004. Nationally, reported cannabis use continued to fall in the adult population and 
remained stable among young people. There were general reductions between 2005 and 2011 
among people aged 10-18 in England, except for some increases among people aged 16-18 (Herbert, 
Gilbert, Cottrell, & Li, 2017). It could be argued, from the data provided by Herbert et al (2017), that 
these indicators improved more rapidly in children in Scotland than in England, but it should be noted 
that Scotland started this period with higher rates of use.  
A study of self-reported drug use and offending exploited the fact that the cannabis reclassification 
implied different changes to the threat of punishment for people in different age groups. By comparing 
changes in behaviours reported by this age group before and after the reclassification, it conclude: 
‘findings imply no consistent pattern of changes in either cannabis consumption or other risky 
behaviour’, including crime and consumption of other drugs (Braakmann & Jones, 2014). The survey 
used did not ask these young people whether they were aware of these changes in potential 
penalties. 
A particularly interesting finding, given the concern expressed over mental health while cannabis was 
in class C, is that hospital admissions for cannabis psychosis reduced rather than increased between 
2004 and 2009. They started to rise again once cannabis was put back in class B (Hamilton, Lloyd, 
Hewitt, & Godfrey, 2014), although – given that the cannabis warning remained – there is no clear 
mechanism by which to link classification to mental health outcomes. 
In terms of policing, there was clear evidence of ‘net-widening’ associated with the introduction of the 
cannabis warning.  Despite the apparent absence of an increase in cannabis use, there was a 
substantial increase in the numbers of people who were given some sort of recorded intervention – 
mostly in the form of a cannabis warning – by the police. This increase reversed after the government 
stopped using targets for sanction detections to manage police performance. Initially, the number of 
cautions and convictions fell as cannabis warnings rose, but these started to climb back from 2006 
(Shiner, 2015). 
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Diversion 
There has been one main evaluation of diversion to date in England: of the Operation Turning Point 
programme in West Midlands. This compared two randomised groups: those given the deferred 
prosecution versus those receiving prosecution as normal. It found victims were in general satisfied 
with the scheme, that the scheme yielded 68 per cent fewer court cases than those prosecuted in 
the usual way. There was little difference in re-offending for OTP participants compared to treatment 
as usual, except that OTP participants showed lower recidivism for violent offences than the treatment 
as usual comparison group. Finally, “despite the costs associated with the structured interventions 
paid for through the OTP scheme” the Turning Point programme led to “a saving of around £1,000 
per case” (Lammy, 2017, p. 28). More generally they concluded:  
Rarely does an intervention improve outcomes for victims, offenders and wider society all at 
the same time. OTP does this – and without the usual trap of sifting out defendants through 
the plea process, which is likely to disproportionately affect those from BAME [Black, Asian 
and Minority Ethnic] backgrounds. Critically, it also holds the potential to prevent large 
numbers of children and young adults from picking up a criminal record, which can be hugely 
damaging for their future employment prospects (Lammy, 2017, p. 29).  
An internal presentation by the Cambridge University evaluators (provided by the West Midlands 
police) further noted that compared to the comparator group the Turning Point programme had led to 
an overall reduction of 36 per cent in the relative ‘crime harm’ of reoffending as measured using the 
Cambridge Crime Harm Index. There had been a 45 per cent reduction when comparing 'all costs of 
processing (All Courts, CPS, Police)': Cost of prosecution as usual = £1762.03 per person. Cost of 
Turning Point = £977.34. This suggests that the programme may achieve several objectives, 
particularly reducing costs. That said, we do not yet know whether impacts and cost-effectiveness 
may differ for possession offenders specifically. No other outcomes of depenalisation or diversion 
have been evaluated in published documents. 
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Czech Republic 
Context 
The context of drug policy reform in the Czech Republic is unique for several reasons. First, the 
Czech Republic employs a “continental” legal system: with both Civil and Criminal Codes. It also has 
administrative procedures to protect individual rights in relation to public law. Second, over the last 
thirty years the Czech Republic has experienced significant political and economic change. Of note, 
Czechoslovakia was under communist rule from 1948 until 1989. Czechoslovakia then split into two 
countries—the Czech Republic and Slovakia on 1 January 1993. In 2004, the Czech Republic joined 
the European Union. Third, the Czech Republic has traditionally had much lower rates of drug use 
than other European nations, due in large part to Soviet rule and restrictions on the free movement of 
goods (Zábranský, 2004). For example as noted by Radimecký (2007, p. 15) “under the control of the 
communist regime, nonconformists such as drug users were treated as public enemies of the so-
called ‘ideal classless society’ and were persecuted.” Patterns of drug use also differed to other 
European nations as heroin use was rare and the main drugs consumed were cannabis, MDMA and 
pervatin (a home-made variant of methamphetamine). The penal code of the Czechoslovak Socialist 
Republic had established criminal sanctions, for drug possession, of up to three years imprisonment 
for possession and a fine, albeit also mandated compulsory “treatment” for people deemed 
problematic drug users (Zeman, 2007). This was rarely used due to the low levels of drug use. 
Nevertheless, the penal code was changed in 1990.  
Rather than being in response to rising drug use (or drug-related harms), reform occurred 
simultaneously with political and CJS upheaval following the 1989 transition to democracy that 
included the abolition of the death penalty and a shift towards a legal system that emphasised the use 
of criminal sanction as the last resort (ultima ratio). The resultant reform - decriminalisation of 
possession – was thus part of this broader change, albeit here using criminal sanctions for drug use 
as a last resort. For example as noted by Zábranský (2004): “These changes constituted one 
component of a larger systemic reform that was designed to revise the deviant system of communist 
‘class-conditioned justice’ where those who supported the regime were treated differently than those 
who did not.” 
Alternative mechanisms for dealing with simple possession offences 
In 1990 the Czech Republic decriminalised possession for 
personal use of all illicit drugs making drug possession of 
any amount an administrative offence: de jure 
decriminalisation. In line with the objective of use of 
criminal sanctions for drug use as a last resort the reform 
removed criminality of the offence. Detected offenders 
were instead liable to pay a fine (amounts have varied 
over time).   
As outlined in Table 8, since 1990 there have been 
changes to the amount of drug that could be possessed 
under the reform. Specifically, in 1999, following fears that 
decriminalisation of all possession could send the wrong 
message, the law was amended to decriminalise use up to 
a specified amount (Zábranský, 2004) and to allow 
criminal sanctions for possession over that amount. Specific threshold quantities (TQs) were not 
legislated at that time. Following a national evaluation (see below) the law was then modified in 2010 
and 2014 to introduce threshold quantities on the amount of drug that could be possessed. 
Importantly, as outlined by Belackova and Stefunkova (2018), while there have been changes in TQs, 
the intent and operation of the law has remained largely constant over the time.  
  
Czech Republic  
Rationale: To use criminal sanctions 
as a last resort 
Mechanism: De jure –administrative 
offence 
Drugs: All  
Threshold limits: Yes, currently 1.5 
grams of heroin and 10 grams of 
cannabis 
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Table 8: Czech Republic decriminalisation periods of reform 
1990-1998 De jure decriminalisation of possession for personal use of all illicit drugs by 
law (for possession of any amount) 
1999-2009 De jure decriminalisation only for possession in 'small amount'. But TQs 
were not legislated and internal guidelines differed across CJS institutions. 
(TQs from the General Instructions of Supreme Public Prosecutor were: 0.3 
grams of pure THC, 0.15 grams of pure heroin, 1 grams of pure MDMA, 0.25 
grams of pure cocaine. TQs for police were: 0.3 grams pure THC, 0.5 grams 
pure heroin, 1 grams of pure MDMA, 0.3 grams of pure cocaine.) 
2010 -2013 De jure decriminalisation of possession in 'small amount' using legislated 
TQs. (15 grams dried cannabis, 2 grams methamphetamine, 1.5 grams of 
heroin, 1 gram of cocaine, 0.4 grams of MDMA). Personal cultivation in 
‘small amount’ also decriminalised. 
2014-present De jure decriminalisation of for possession in 'small amount' with revised 
legislated TQs for personal use (10 grams of cannabis, 1.5 grams of 
methamphetamine or heroin, 1 gram of cocaine, 0.4 grams of MDMA) 
Outcomes  
Analysis of the outcomes of reform, shows most data has been collected since 1999, following the 
introduction of threshold quantities. Comparison of trends over time is also complicated given that 
there was negligible drug use prior to reform: and that the opening of the Czech Republic borders led 
to an inevitable rise in drug use and supply. For example, as noted by Zeman (2007, p. 50): “the 
period immediately after the fall of communism proved very favorable to the creation and stabilization 
of a ‘classic’ drug scene and drug markets similar to those found in Western countries.” It also led to 
more open recognition of behaviours that had previously been covert (Radimecký, 2007). 
Nevertheless, some clear observations can be made.  
First, there was some evidence of an increase in drug consumption following the 1990 reform and 
specifically, an increase in heroin use. In more recent times trends in drug use have been stable 
and/or increased in line with European Union trends. As summarised by Radimecký (2007, p. 16), 
“contrary to various media portrayals… the situation with regard to rates of drug use has not changed 
significantly since the change in political regimes at the end of 1989. The number of problem drug 
users in the Czech Republic has remained relatively stable over the long term”. Thus, there is little 
evidence that decriminalisation directly increased drug use in the Czech Republic. 
Second in relation to drug markets, post the 1990 reform drug markets both increased and became 
more visible. For example as noted by Zábranský (2004) “in major Czech cities, relatively small-scale 
open drug scenes have appeared in public places where users meet dealers – especially pervitin 
purveyors – but increasingly also those who deal in heroin.” There was also a subsequent increase in 
organised crime involvement in the pervatin (methamphetamine) trade involving the Russian outlaw 
motorcycle gangs (OMCGs), but this coincided with and has largely been attributed to the opening of 
the borders: not the reform per se. 
Third, demands on the CJS for possession-related offences have remained very low, particularly 
compared with other nations. For example, an analysis by Belackova et al (2017) of trends from 2002 
to 2012 showed that 72.4 per cent of use/possess offenders received administrative sanctions and 
there were only 0.02 court proceedings for use/possession per 1000 population and 0.001 people 
sentenced to prison for use/possession per 1000 population. The number of court proceedings 
involving use/possess offenders was also much lower than in other national contexts that did not have 
de jure decriminalisation. Specifically, there were 0.02 court proceedings for use/possession per 1000 
population in the Czech Republic, compared to 1.21 court proceedings per 1000 population in Florida 
(where drug possession remained a criminal offence). A comparison of drug policy in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia is also instructive here. Following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 2003, 
Slovakia penalised drug possession for personal use. Moreover, while it subsequently removed 
criminal penalties for possession of drugs in the amount of up to 10 doses in 2004 (on accession to 
the EU), analysis showed that this post-soviet country remained more punitive on paper and in 
practice. For example, analysis in 2010 showed that while some cases in Slovakia were disposed of 
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through fines rather than prison sentences, little use was made of diversion to treatment. In addition, 
many instances of inhumane treatment of people in custody for drug offences, and other violations of 
detainees’ rights were uncovered (Csete, 2012).  
Fourth, decriminalisation and the removal of stigma around drug use, facilitated the provision of harm 
reduction services and reduction in drug-related harms. As noted by Zábranský (2004):  
“It seems very likely that that the relatively early inception of Czech NGOs [non-government 
organisations] providing drug services and introducing new treatments and harm reduction 
services helps to explain the success of the Czechs in sustaining an extremely low 
prevalence rate for both HIV/AIDS. For example, the Czech rate was less than 0.1 per cent in 
2003, compared to the level of 30 per cent of HIV-positive IDUs in neighboring Poland… and 
1 to 34 per cent in the European Union … Regarding viral hepatitis C, the Czech rate in 2003 
was 30 per cent among intravenous drug users and in the general population as well … 
compared to ….     40-90 per cent in individual EU member states.”  
More generally as noted by Radimecký (2007, p. 16) even after the “tightening of drug legislation in 
1999 (introducing potential punishments for drug possession), fewer drug users are being processed 
through the CJS than are being handled through the system of social and health services. 
Specifically, all drug offences prosecuted numbered 2,357 in 2003, 232 of which were for drug 
possession alone. In contrast, 18,000 persons were treated in 2003, and these treatment participants 
accounted for about 60 per cent of all problem drug users.” 
To date the most comprehensive evaluation of decriminalisation in the Czech Republic was a 
government sponsored evaluation of the introduction of the 1999 reform (the most punitive of the four 
decriminalisation reforms). This was conducted by Zábranský, Mravčík, Gajdošíková, and Milovský 
(2001) and sought to test whether the introduction of the penalty for possession of illegal drugs of 
above a particular threshold would (1) reduce the availability of illegal drugs; and (2) reduce the 
prevalence of drug use; without increasing the negative health consequences related to illegal drugs 
and increasing the social costs. The evaluation concluded that the new law met none of the 
objectives. Instead, they found youth consumption increased. Demands on the CJS increased 
significantly. For example, the number of people arrested for use/possession increased from 0 in 
1998 to 235 in 2001, (with 85 people convicted and 28 imprisoned for use/possession) and the costs 
of CJS response increased by 37 million Czech crowns (or about U.S. $1 million). The reform was 
also found to reduce treatment seeking due to increased stigma of people who used drugs and 
increase arbitrary police enforcement and on the street police corruption (e.g. requests for information 
in exchange for turning a blind eye to possession). They thus concluded that the reform led to no 
additional benefits and that it had increased social costs and wasted resources that could otherwise 
have been used for better purposes.  
Outcome analyses in more recent times have showed that demands on the CJS have reduced, that 
there are no apparent indicators of arbitrary enforcement and drug use trends have largely 
remained stable, albeit with increased injecting of methamphetamine / pervatin. Importantly, the 
prevalence of drug-related harm – particularly overdose and drug-related HIV – have remained low 
and are still some of the lowest in the European Union. Overall this reform has thus been found to 
reduce CJS costs and sanctions for many (young) people who use drugs and to reduce barriers to the 
provision of harm reduction and treatment services (albeit not via direct referral as in some reforms, 
such as the Portuguese decriminalisation). The reform has also shown the importance of careful 
design of threshold limits for decriminalisation reforms to avoid discretionary enforcement and fear 
amongst people who use drugs.   
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Denmark 
Context 
As with all Scandinavian countries, Denmark has a civil law system, albeit with many common law 
traits. Denmark is also characterised by its comparatively strong welfare-oriented profile and 
egalitarian ethos.  
In 1955 the Danish Act on Euphoriant Substances made illicit drug possession a criminal offence 
punishable by up to two years imprisonment. But in the mid-1960s the patterns of drug use shifted 
beyond being a behaviour of a small socially deviant sub-group who resided in Copenhagen. Instead, 
there was a growth of a ‘new type of drug user’ who were young people, school children and students, 
artists, musicians and bohemians (Houborg, 2010). By the late 1960s, national surveys, academic 
studies and a public committee showed that exposure to drug use was increasingly routine and part of 
the everyday life amongst young people, albeit that those who developed drug problems were those 
who were more socially disadvantaged. Drug use thus came to be seen as a normal activity and drug 
‘abuse’ as a symptom of fundamental social problems (Houborg, 2017).  
Alternative mechanisms for dealing with simple possession offences 
From 1969 to 2004 Denmark depenalised possession of 
illicit drugs for personal use. The rationale for 
depenalisation was to avoid criminalising young people. 
More specifically there was recognition that drug use was 
a widespread but largely non-problematic phenomenon 
amongst young people and that treating it as a social 
issue was preferable to criminalisation and treating young 
people as deviants. As noted by Houborg (2010, p. 790) 
the Danish Government “did not wish to criminalise a 
large number of otherwise normal young people and risk 
alienating them from society.” As such the Attorney 
General issued guidelines to police, prosecutors and the 
courts to exempt possession of illicit drugs for personal 
use from penalties for a first offence and to instead issue 
warnings. Fines could be used for repeat offenders. 
Threshold limits were set: up to 10 grams of cannabis or 0.2 grams of heroin or cocaine. The target 
group were youth and first-time offenders and it was immaterial if it involved public or private use. 
Supplementing the depenalisation policy were broader welfare policies targeting drug demand and 
problematic drug use (via improving living conditions) and tougher penalties and enforcement of 
supply.  
Outcomes 
Analysis of the outcomes of the Danish depenalisation is limited; there is more published on the 
reversal of the reform in 2004 (discussed further below). From the mid-90s and until early 2000, there 
was a clear increase in experimental drug use in the general population, young adults and 
adolescents (15 and 16-year-olds) (EMCDDA, 2004b). By the early 2000s, the prevalence of 
cannabis use was amongst the highest in Europe. As outlined by Houborg (2017) “various studies 
and reports provided evidence of extensive drug use amongst young Danes and indicated that a new 
culture of intoxication was developing.” The extent to which this was attributable to the reform, versus 
broader European trends, is not clear. For example, much of the increase in stimulant use occurred in 
the context of the night-time economy and echoed that seen in other European countries including the 
UK, the Netherlands, France and Spain (EMCDDA, 2004a, 2004b). Police however argued that the 
increase was due in part to the reform and that the depenalisation had made legal control difficult and 
also undermined social controls about the acceptability of illicit drug use (Houborg, 2017).  
More generally the EMCDDA (2004b) report on Danish drug trends at the conclusion of the 
depenalisation indicated there had been a reduction or stabilisation in drug-related harms. 
Specifically:  
Denmark (1969-2004) 
Rationale: To avoid criminalising 
young people 
Mechanism: De facto – Attorney 
General advised police to issue 
warnings for personal possession 
Drugs: All drugs 
Threshold limits: Yes (e.g. 10 grams 
cannabis and 0.2 grams of heroin or 
cocaine) 
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• The number of cases of drug-related cases of hepatitis A, B and C reduced: such as from 49 
cases of drug-related Hepatitis C in 1993 to 2 in 2003.  
• The number of cases of drug-related HIV was stable.  
• The number of drug charges made by the CJS were stable or decreasing: from 18,604 in 
1993 to 14,316 in 2003.  
The main indicator of concern was drug-related deaths which had been stable in the 1980s (at around 
150 per year) but increased significantly in the 1990s (to around 250 per year from 1994 to 2003). 
Moreover, while most deaths in the 1980s occurred in Copenhagen they were more spread across 
the country.  
In 2004 the depenalisation was ended: under arguments that it sent the wrong message, the 
exception being for dependent drug users who continued to have options of warning due to the 
recognition they should not be punished for being dependent and that they would have few economic 
means to pay a fine (the typical sanction for possession). Houborg (2010, p.795) noted that the 2004 
reforms took place in a broader context of a new conservative Government and adoption of tough on 
crime penal policies, and “in light of these changes in the political culture in Denmark, it is hardly 
surprising that possession of illegal drugs for personal consumption would be re-penalized.”   
Analysis of the re-criminalisation by Møller (2010) showed there was a significant negative correlation 
between the number of seizures of cannabis and amount seized – indicating the increased focus on 
retail distribution may have displaced control of trafficking/wholesale offences. Møller argued that this 
is an indication of policy displacement with scarce police resources redirected to targeting use and 
possession rather than higher-level trafficking and wholesale distribution. It is important, however, to 
interpret this in the context of highly fluctuating seizure amounts on an annual basis. Note there were 
no significant findings for other drugs, including heroin, amphetamine and cocaine.  
Equally importantly, Møller (2010) found evidence of a clear increase in punishment that had occurred 
post re-penalisation. The number of fines for drug law misdemeanours was approximately three times 
higher in 2006 and 2007 than in 2000 and 2002: up from 2,950 in 2000 to 4,789 in 2004 to 7,950 in 
2008 (Møller, 2010).  Finally, he looked at ethnic bias in policing and found that the proportion of non-
Westerners who were given a fine for use / possession cannabis increased between 2000 and 2008 
from 2.6 to 6.8 per 1,000 citizens. In contrast, the proportion of Danish citizens and people of Western 
origin who were fined only increased from 1.6 to 2.4 per 1,000 citizens. This led him to conclude that 
re-penalisation increased ethnic bias in policing of people who use drugs in Denmark, due in 
large part to differential access to public space.  
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Netherlands 
Context 
The Netherlands has a civil law system. In 1953 possession of illicit drugs became a criminal offence, 
punishable with up to two years imprisonment, but drug use was rare until the late 1950s. Concern in 
relation to illicit drugs increased in the 1960s, as young people started experimenting with cannabis, 
LSD and amphetamines and the use of psychoactive substances in the Netherlands increased 
rapidly. Dutch law enforcement authorities initially responded forcefully leading to a spike in arrests 
(from 74 in 1966 to 544 in 1969), however, enforcement was found to be difficult, time consuming and 
ineffective and the “repressive approach” was widely criticised (Grund & Breeksema, 2017). In 1969 
the Public Prosecutor’s office shifted the focus of policing away from cannabis consumption towards 
trafficking of cannabis and ‘hard drugs’. Such an approach – known as the “Gedoogbeleid tolerance 
policy” – is consistent with a number of Dutch traditions. First, it is customary for Dutch police to act 
on the basis of the expediency principle, whereby laws and rules are only enforced when there are 
reasons to intervene (Uitermark, 2004). Second, there is a longstanding Dutch preference for 
“gedogen” or a pragmatic and minimalistic approach to difficult social problems. However, a further 
rise in heroin consumption sparked more explicit attention to optimal policy responses.  
It was in this context that two Government advisory committees were established, the Hulsman 
Commission and the Baan Commission, and became highly influential in shaping the future of the 
Dutch drug policy. Both emphasised the normalisation of use: that drugs are ‘a normal social 
problem’, hence the optimal approach for society is to depolarise and integrate people who use rather 
than exclude and punish. They also proposed separating drug markets based on their risk profiles, to 
reduce the exposure of young cannabis consumers to other illicit drugs.  
Alternative mechanisms for dealing with simple possession offences 
In 1976 the Netherlands introduced a formal written policy 
of depenalisation of adult possession of cannabis and a 
system of regulated cannabis supply, which eventually led 
to the establishment of ‘coffee shops’ where sale of 
cannabis is tolerated. Here we focus on the response to 
possession, rather than the coffee shops. Under the new 
reform, charges for the possession of up to 30 grams of 
cannabis would be dismissed (in accordance with a 
Gedoogbeleid 'tolerance policy') or be charged as a petty 
offence or misdemeanour (comparable with a traffic 
tickets) that would not result in a criminal record.                                                                           
A second (and lesser known) mechanism of response 
was provided to adults found in possession of other illicit 
drugs: namely diversion to treatment. Potential offenders 
are visited in police custody by social workers and 
referred to treatment. Here threshold limits are lower at 
0.5 grams.  
The central aim of Dutch drug policy was the prevention or 
alleviation of social and individual risks caused by drug 
use. This was premised on the belief that individual policy 
measures should reflect a rational response to those risks 
and the inadequacy of the criminal law to resolve aspects 
of the drug problem other than the trafficking of drugs. As 
such repressive measures are prioritised for drug 
trafficking (other than cannabis) rather than drug use. The 
Dutch policy has shifted over time. Of note, in 1995, the 
threshold limit of the amount of cannabis of which 
possession would be tolerated was reduced to 5 grams. 
Netherlands (cannabis) 
Rationale: To use criminal sanctions 
as a last resort 
Mechanism: De facto –
depenalisation (Gedoogbeleid 
'tolerance policy') 
Drugs: Cannabis  
Threshold limits: Yes, 30 grams 
cannabis (from 1976-1995), 5 grams 
(since 1995)   
Netherlands (hard drugs) 
Rationale:  
• Early intervention 
• Reduce drug-related harms 
Mechanism: De facto – diversion to 
treatment  
Drugs: Other illicit drugs  
Threshold limits: Yes, 0.5 grams of 
heroin or cocaine  
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Outcomes 
There is a large evidence-base on the Dutch drug policy, which shows that the rates of drug use in 
the Netherlands are similar or lower than other nations. For example, Chatwin (2016) found that the 
prevalence of cannabis use increased post the 1976 reform, however this increase was in line with 
broader European trends. For example, 25.7 per cent of the general population reported lifetime 
cannabis use, slightly above the European average of 21.7 per cent. Moreover, the Netherlands has 
the lowest rate of problematic drug use in the EU (Grund & Breeksema, 2017). The use of “hard 
drugs”, with the exception of ecstasy, is relatively low in the Netherlands, and cannabis users in the 
Netherlands report less use of other illicit drugs like cocaine, amphetamine, heroin and crack than 
those in  other countries (van Ooyen-Houben, 2017). Moreover, in 2013, the number of opiate users 
was 14,000; a 21 per cent reduction since 2009 and a much lower rate than in other European 
countries.  
Cross-national comparisons are particularly instructive here. Comparing Amsterdam to San Francisco 
in the United States, Reinarman, Cohen, and Kaal (2004) found the overall pattern of use was similar 
across both cities: with age of onset, age at first regular use, age at the start of their periods of 
maximum use nearly identical. But, contrary to expectations, the general population prevalence 
surveys (age 18 and above) showed significantly lower lifetime prevalence of cannabis use in 
Amsterdam (34.5 per cent), where it has been depenalised, than in San Francisco (62.2 per cent) 
where criminal sanctions for possession were still used.  
Another important cross-national comparison was undertaken by MacCoun and Reuter (2001). This 
study compared the prevalence of cannabis use over time in the Netherlands, USA and several 
European nations (including Denmark and the UK), taking into account two phases of Dutch cannabis 
policy: first, involving only depenalisation and second, involving depenalisation and the growth of 
commercialised coffee shops. During the first phase from 1970 to 1983, they found that Dutch lifetime 
prevalence of cannabis use was 3.6 per cent lower than that of the USA, but somewhat higher than 
that of some, but not all, of its neighbours (on average 5 percentage points higher). In relation to 
trends they showed that cannabis use was declining among Dutch adolescents in the years prior to 
the 1976 reform, which had little effect on levels of use during the first seven years of the new regime 
(i.e. no evidence of further reductions, but also no evidence of increase). During the second phase, 
from 1984 to 1996, lifetime prevalence of cannabis use increased consistently and sharply in the 
Netherlands. The US, Norway and Canada all experienced similar sharp increases in use from 1992 
to 1996, but only the Netherlands showed an increase from 1984 to 1992. This led the authors to 
conclude this rise was the consequence of the gradual progression from a passive depenalisation 
regime to the broader de facto legalisation involving commercialised coffee shops, which allowed for 
greater access and promotion (MacCoun & Reuter, 2001). This suggests that the depenalisation of 
possession of cannabis did not increase cannabis use, though commercialisation may have.  
Irrespective of the trends in use there is now a large amount of evidence showing that the Dutch 
policy is associated with fewer drug-related harms.  
• There have been declines in injecting drug use, and only 7 per cent of opiate users inject – 
the lowest in Europe. The Dutch model has resulted in a very low rate of AIDS infection 
contrasted with that found in the US (about 12 per cent of all dependent people and 25 per 
cent high-risk intravenous (IV) users in Amsterdam tested positive for HIV compared to at 
least 50 per cent HIV positive among IV users in the US) (Bullington, 1994). 
• There is also increased evidence of contact with health services. Specifically, because there 
is no overt threat presented by the authorities, health care workers in the Netherlands have 
been able to maintain close contact with about 70 per cent of local dependent people, as 
contrasted with a figure of 15 per cent in New York. Moreover, the low rates of drug injecting 
and risks of overdose and HIV have contributed to high rates of survival amongst people who 
use heroin in the Netherlands: with 81 per cent of clients in treatment for opiates aged 39 or 
over (Grund & Breeksema, 2017).   
• Finally, the rates of arrest and conviction are low in comparison with other European nations. 
For example, in 2005 there were 3 arrests per 1000 users compared to 44 per 1000 users in 
Austria and 34 per 1000 users in Germany (Grund & Breeksema, 2017).       
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Germany 
Context 
Germany is a federated country comprised of 16 states or Landers that enjoy a high level of 
autonomy in many areas of public policy (drug policy included). That said, as opposed to its Australian 
and US counterparts, the German federal government is exclusively responsible for enacting criminal 
laws, states mainly have responsibility for decisions around enforcement of laws(Pacula et al., 
2005)(Pacula et al., 2005)(Pacula et al., 2005)(Pacula et al., 2005). Germany has a civil legal system 
as well as a Constitution that guarantees rights to personal freedom, inviolability of the home, freedom 
of expression and equality before the law (Holzer, 2017). 
The Federal Narcotics Law enabled punishment of up to 4 years imprisonment for drug possession. 
During the 1960s illicit drug use and drug offences in Germany were rare. However, 1968 saw an 
exponential rise in consumption, drug offences and thereafter, drug-related deaths (Holzer, 2017). 
Then, despite the allocation of significant resources (particularly by law enforcement), the 1980s saw 
further increases in the availability of heroin, as well as drug-dependent people, drug-related harms 
and property crime. For example, from the early to late 1980s, the number of deaths in Germany 
caused by illicit drug use tripled to more than 2,000 mortality cases per year. Moreover, amongst 
those who were arrested, recidivism rates continued to climb. In combination, these factors increased 
levels of police activity and youthful resistance, producing a “revolving door effect” and drove 
increased attention to seeking alternative mechanisms for dealing with simple possession offences 
(Holzer, 2017). 
Alternative mechanisms for dealing with simple possession offences 
In 1992 the German Parliament introduced Section 31a 
BtMG, which partially depenalised consumption-related 
drug offences by giving public prosecutors the authority to 
decide when to prosecute defendants charged with 
consumption-related drug offences. Then, in 1994 the 
Federal Constitutional Court delivered a landmark ruling, 
that there was no ‘right to intoxication’ but made it 
obligatory for the prosecution to drop the case (nolle 
prosequi: no further action) when it involved possession 
of small amounts for personal use if there was no danger 
to third parties. One key rationale for the ruling was the 
belief that such offences would amount to excessive state 
intervention and thus seriously infringe upon the 
constitutional principle of proportionality. The ruling also 
allowed for the removal of a punishment that had already been pronounced in a court verdict if an 
offender underwent drug treatment in an inpatient treatment institution. 
However, the Federal Court left it up to the states to decide what constituted 'small amounts’. This has 
resulted in large variation. The first variation is whether this applies to cannabis or all illicit drugs, as 
while the ruling stated cannabis, many states extended this to other illicit drugs. The second variation 
is in threshold limits, which vary across states between 0.1–2 grams of heroin or cocaine; 6–30 grams 
of cannabis; and 10–30 ecstasy pills. The southernmost state insisted on very low limits (e.g. 6 grams 
of cannabis, 0.5 grams of heroin, 0.3 grams of cocaine, 0.2 grams of amphetamine and its 
derivatives), while other states (e.g. Berlin and Hamburg) adopted limits of between 10 and 30 grams 
of cannabis. A third variation is whether states allow dismissals for repeat offences – this is common 
in liberal states, but largely ruled out in conservative states unless in exceptional circumstances.  
The German approach to dealing with simple possession offences was based on harm reduction 
principles: concentrating repression by directing law enforcement efforts towards drug traffickers and 
smugglers rather than on users, and of offering “Help instead of Punishment,” Sect. 31a BtMG. These 
reforms occurred alongside a significant expansion in harm reduction in Germany: including the 
introduction of methadone maintenance, heroin assisted treatment and supervised injecting facilities.  
Germany 
Rationale: That it is unconstitutional 
to criminalise people who use drugs 
for simple possession alone 
Mechanism: De jure – Constitutional 
court decision  
Drugs: All  
Threshold limits: Yes, e.g. 6-30g of 
cannabis and 10-30 ecstasy pills 
39 
 
Outcomes 
In Germany, impacts on the CJS appear mixed. For some, the procedural decriminalisation has led 
police to increasingly abstain from proactive enforcement and even from reactively responding to 
such incidents, particularly cannabis and ecstasy. But, drug offences have risen in Germany: from 
122,240 in 1993 to 253,525 in 2013, two-thirds of which are for consumption alone (mainly cannabis) 
(Holzer, 2017). More generally the differences in interpretation have fuelled large variations in 
enforcement and justice by geography. For example, the proportion of unconditionally discontinued 
prosecutions ranged between 49 per cent (e.g. Bavaria) and over 90 per cent (e.g. Berlin), with further 
variance evident in the numbers that go to court (5 per cent of cases in Berlin compared with 30 per 
cent of cases in Bavaria) (Schäfer & Paoli, 2006). Data indicate that there is no correlation between 
the prosecution policy adopted and self-reported rates of cannabis consumption. Bollinger (2004) 
further notes that the Bavarian government sometimes instructed the Bavarian police to intensify 
cannabis enforcement. 
Germany has seen increased use of the inpatient treatment system. As Bollinger (2004, p. 501) 
noted “practically all perpetrators now accept or undergo treatment. The proportion of in to outpatient 
treatment was originally about 9 to 1, but that has now been reversed.” This has led to much greater 
and faster access to drug treatment.  
There is evidence of declines in drug-related harms particularly in relation to studies conducted post 
the first reform. For example, the number of newly registered heroin users in Frankfurt declined 
significantly from 903 in 1992 to 557 in 1993 after a consistent increase in the previous years 
(Fischer, 1995). Drug overdoses further decreased in Hamburg from 184 in 1991 to 135 in 1993. 
While the number of deaths caused by heroin use in Frankfurt in the 1980s rose by a rate of 50 per 
cent per year to a peak of 147 deaths in 1991, this trend was reversed: deaths related to heroin use 
decreased by almost 60 per cent to 68 in 1993. Drug-related crime in Frankfurt also declined 
significantly over the same period. The percentage of street robberies in Frankfurt that were 
committed by heroin users, as identified by the authorities, decreased from 35 per cent in 1991 to 8 
per cent in 1993. That said, the expansion of harm reduction services has clearly played a role in 
such trends. As such, the extent to which reductions in drug-related harm could be attributed to the 
law versus the expansion of harm reduction or other interventions remains unclear.  
Amongst German youth annual trends in lifetime cannabis consumption was stable pre-reform 
(16.3 per cent in 1989 and 1993), but almost doubled by 2004: to 31.3 per cent and has now 
stabilised at 25 per cent in 2015. Trends in last 12 month use also point to an increase from 1990 to 
2003 then a stabilisation. That said, Germany has lower rates of drug use, including problematic drug 
use, than many other European countries (Eastwood, Fox, & Rosmarin, 2016), as well as lower rates 
of HIV and drug-related overdose.  
The net result of the German reform is thus mixed, with clear reductions in the number of people 
prosecuted and reductions in drug-related harm in some regions, but also increased prosecution in 
others. While this in part reflects the federated context of the reform it also reinforces the potential 
divergence that can arise if reforms are interpreted in different ways or if there is opposition or a lack 
of support for reform.  
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Portugal  
Context 
Portugal’s legal and judicial system was based on Roman civil law, albeit contemporary Portugal has 
criminal, civil and administrative laws. It also has a constitution that guarantees human rights and 
freedom, including the right to safeguarding of health and guaranteed access to health care. The most 
relevant article of the Portuguese Constitution is article 64 on health care which states the 
Government has a duty, “to guarantee access by every citizen, regardless of his economic situation, 
to preventive, curative and rehabilitative medical care.” Portugal consists of 18 administrative regions, 
including Lisboa, which hosts the capital city Lisbon. Portugal also includes two autonomous regions, 
the Archipelagos of Azores and Madeira Islands, both located in the Atlantic Ocean.  
The main drug law preceding reform was Decree-Law 15/93. This law distinguished between 
consumption, trafficking-consumption and trafficking. Under this law, the maximum penalty for 
occasional or habitual consumers in possession of small quantities of drugs was three months 
imprisonment (Decreto-Lei n.° 15/93, de 22 de janeiro 1993). The penalty for possession of a larger 
quantity was up to one-year imprisonment. In practice, however fines were commonly used.  
Portugal has traditionally had a low prevalence of illicit drug use, albeit Portugal’s location on the 
south-western border of Europe means it is a gateway for drug trafficking. However, the context 
changed rapidly in the 1980s with the emergence of a public health and humanitarian crisis, 
surrounding injecting use of heroin, infectious diseases and open-air drug markets. For example, the 
number of drug-related AIDS cases increased from 47 in 1990 to 635 in 1999. In 1999, Portugal had 
the highest rate of drug-related AIDS cases in the EU and the second highest prevalence of HIV 
among injecting drug users (Hughes, 2017). Moreover, there were up to 5,000 people attending open 
air drug markets such as Casal Ventoso in central Lisbon on a daily basis, amongst whom 60 per cent 
were HIV positive, 74 per cent were HCV positive and many were homeless and socially 
marginalised.  
An expert committee was established by the Government to develop a new strategy and way forward. 
One of the key recommendations was to decriminalise drugs. This was based on a number of core 
principles, the most important of which were pragmatism and humanism: Pragmatism reflected the 
notion that the dogmatic policies of the past had not worked and humanism recognised the need to 
treat all people with respect and humanity and to take measures to integrate or re-integrate them into 
society, including by removing the barrier of the criminal law and by expanding prevention, harm 
reduction, treatment and social reintegration resources.  
Alternative mechanisms for dealing with simple possession offences  
On 1 July 2001, Portugal decriminalised the use, 
possession and acquisition of all illicit drugs, when deemed 
for personal use. The decriminalisation is a de jure reform, 
enacted through Law no. 30/2000. 
The definition of “one’s own consumption” is a quantity “not 
exceeding the quantity required for an average individual 
consumption during a period of 10 days” (Article 2(2)). The 
quantities delineated are 1 gram of heroin, 1 gram of 
ecstasy, 1 gram of amphetamines, 2 grams of cocaine, or 
25 grams of cannabis. The 2000 law is notable in its 
breadth—it includes all previously controlled psychoactive 
drugs and does not distinguish between public and private 
use. 
Since that time drug use became an administrative 
offence, with all detected people referred by police to a 
Commission for the Dissuasion of Drug Addiction (CDT). 
The CDTs are regional panels made up of three people, including lawyers, social workers and 
medical professionals. They are connected with a broader network of agencies, including drug 
Portugal 
• Rationale: Social integration 
of problematic drug users 
• Mechanism: De jure –
Possession became an 
administrative offence, with 
diversion to dissuasion 
committees and targeted 
referrals to treatment 
• Drugs: All 
• Threshold limits: Yes (10 
days’ supply e.g. 1g heroin, 
25g cannabis) 
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treatment; primary care; mental health; schools; employment; social services; and child protection. 
There is one CDT for each of the 18 regions of continental Portugal and 3 in the autonomous 
archipelago of the Azores.  
The CDTs conduct an interview with referred offenders to assess their treatment needs and explore 
the cause and circumstances of drug use and - where relevant - their mental health history.  The 
CDTs also assess whether there are any social issues such as in school, employment or housing 
(and refer affected people to relevant support agencies). The CDTs then decide on an appropriate 
ruling or sanction. They have a range of possible sanctions, including: warnings; community service; 
suspended sentence; bans on obtaining a firearms license; requiring regular attendance at a specified 
site (e.g. an employment service); and fines (these cannot be used for dependent users). However, 
their primary aim is to dissuade drug use and to encourage dependent users into treatment. In 
practice, most offenders are deemed non-dependent and receive a suspended sentence. For 
example, in 2013 the CDTs completed 7,528 rulings and 70 per cent involved suspended sentences 
for non-dependent users (EMCDDA, 2015). A further 12 per cent of rulings involved suspended 
sentences with a referral to treatment for dependent users and 11 per cent were ‘punitive’, of which 8 
per cent required periodic attendance at a site (EMCDDA, 2015).  
Decriminalisation is supported by a national drug strategy and action plan, which has as its central 
goals (i) to reduce use and (ii) to reduce the health and social consequences of use. The first iteration 
of these documents was adopted in May 1999 (National Strategy in the Fight Against Drugs (NDFAD) 
and led to an expansion in policies across multiple domains, including a range of harm reduction and 
social measures (such as needle syringe programmes, outreach teams, free hepatitis B vaccinations, 
shelters, guaranteed minimum wage and subsidies for employers to hire drug-dependent individuals). 
The new policy also coincided with improvements in social housing and the introduction of a 
guaranteed minimum income. 
Outcomes 
The major perceived success of the Portuguese reform has been its contribution to changes in public 
health problems, with significant referrals—particularly in the early years—by the CDTs of heroin 
users to treatment. For example, the overall numbers of drug users in treatment expanded in 
Portugal from 23,654 to 38,532 between 1998 and 2008 (Hughes & Stevens, 2010). Evaluation of the 
CDTs found that about a quarter of the participants were referred to specialised services in addictive 
behaviours, mainly Treatment Structures, and that for half of them this was their first contact with the 
structures (Carapinha, Guerreiro, & Dias, 2017). The largest increase in treatment was in outpatient 
opioid substitution therapy. 
Pombo and da costa (2016) further evaluated drug treatment involvement in the periods of pre-and 
post-drug policy reform and showed that treatment engagement increased by 94 per cent. Drug 
injection had decreased with heroin users smoking heroin rather than injecting it and HIV infection 
also decreased (28.0 per cent to 19.6 per cent) (Pombo & da costa, 2016). Moreover, the population 
of people who use drugs had aged and become better educated. This led them to conclude that the 
drug-use profile of heroin-addicted patients changed after the new policy on drugs was implemented 
with stable or reducing harms.  
Drug-related HIV infections decreased significantly between 2000 and 2009 from 1,400 to fewer than 
200 cases per year. Significant reductions in mortality for HIV, HCV and tuberculosis (TB) also 
occurred (Moreira, Trigueiros, & Antunes, 2007). The number of new diagnoses of HIV and AIDS has 
also declined. For example, between 2000 and 2008, the number of new cases of HIV reduced 
amongst people who use drugs from 907 to 267 and the number of new cases of AIDS reduced from 
506 to 108 (Hughes & Stevens, 2010). This was attributed primarily to expansion of harm reduction 
services, which may have been facilitated by the reduction in stigma around harm reduction services 
after the removal of criminal penalties. As of 2016, Portuguese trends in the total number of annual 
notifications of drug-related HIV infection cases had continued to decrease to 30 cases (EMCDDA, 
2017).  
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Between 2000 and 2005, the number of problematic drug users and the prevalence of injecting drug 
use also declined. For example, the rate of injecting drug users decreased from a mean of 3.5 people 
who inject drugs per 1,000 population aged 15–64 to 2.0. 
The number of drug-induced deaths in Portugal (defined according to ICD protocols) also decreased 
from the time of reform (Hughes & Stevens, 2015a). Following a large drop in drug-related deaths 
from 2001 to 2005, there has been a subsequent increase, although levels remain much lower than at 
the time of reform. Trends in relation to drug-induced deaths have showed consecutive increases in 
the last two years: but much lower than at the time of reform. In 2015 the rate of drug-induced 
mortality among adults (aged 15 to 64 years) was 5.8 deaths per million: much lower than the 2015 
European average of 20.3 deaths per million (EMCDDA, 2017). Given that heroin problems were the 
major driver of the reform, this reduction in overdose and opiate-related death was deemed a 
considerable achievement of both the decriminalisation and the broader drug strategy. 
There was also a significant reduction in the burden on the CJS. The number of people arrested for 
criminal offences related to drug offences reduced from over 14,000 offenders in 2000 to an average 
of 5,000-5,500 offenders per year in 2008 (with 6,000 sent to CDTs). Stakeholders thus argued that 
decriminalisation did as conjectured reduce the burden on the Portuguese CJS and enable police to 
refocus their attention on more serious offences, namely drug trafficking-related offences. It also led 
to a reduction in prison overcrowding (Hughes & Stevens, 2010). 
Trends in relation to drug use are complex as there were no general population data prior to the 
reforms. Between 2001 and 2007 the reported prevalence of lifetime drug use increased in Portugal 
for almost all illicit substances and amongst most age groups. But analysis of rates of discontinuation 
of drug use (the proportion of the population that reported ever having used a drug but opting not to in 
recent years) also increased, which suggests that the growth in lifetime reported use reflected 
predominantly short-term experimental use (Hughes & Stevens, 2015a). Trends moreover in recent 
use were stable (only a 0.3 per cent increase), and trends actually reduced amongst those aged 15-
24 – those most at risk of initiation. The most recent data on drug use among students, from the 2015 
European School Survey Project on Alcohol and Other Drug, showed lifetime use of cannabis and 
other illicit drugs among Portuguese students was slightly lower than the European average (based 
on data from 35 countries): with trends either stable or decreasing over time. This all indicates that the 
feared increase in drug use has not occurred and that net-harms may have reduced. 
Again cross-national analyses are particularly informative here. Hughes and Stevens (2012) 
combined stakeholder interviews with analysis of trends in Portugal, Spain and Italy in relation to drug 
use, drug-related harms, CJS and drug markets. This study concluded that post reform there were:  
• small increases in reported illicit drug use amongst adults albeit on par with Spanish and 
Italian trends;  
• reductions in illicit drug use among problematic drug users (in direct contrast to those trends 
observed in Spain and Italy); 
• reductions the burden of drug offenders on the CJS (in direct contrast to those trends 
observed in Spain and Italy); 
• reductions in illicit drug use among adolescents, at least since 2003;  
• increases in the uptake of drug treatment;  
• reductions in opiate-related deaths and infectious diseases;  
• increases in the amounts of drugs seized by the authorities; and 
• reductions the retail prices of drugs.  
This led to the conclusion that combining the removal of criminal penalties with the use of alternative 
therapeutic responses to dependent drug users may offers several advantages: reducing the burden 
of drug law enforcement on the CJS, while also reducing problematic drug use.  
Gonçalves, Lourenço, and da Silva (2015) evaluated the social costs of the reform including the 
strategy. They found a significant average reduction (12 per cent) in the social cost of drugs in the 5 
years following the NSFADs approval (2000 - 2004). In a longer timeframe (2000 - 2010), the social 
cost (average) reduction was more significant (18 per cent).  
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Jamaica 
Context 
The cultivation and consumption of cannabis have long had 
major economic and cultural importance in Jamaica (Emanuel, 
Haughton, & K’nife, 2018). For example, while cannabis use 
and cultivation in the Caribbean was made illegal in 1913, it 
remained popular amongst members of the Rastafari faith for 
religious and medical purposes. Moreover, in the 1940s, 
Jamaica was home to the first Ganja Enterprise and used to 
cultivate and transport cannabis to England during the Second 
World War. More recently, in 2014 the International Narcotics 
Control Board reported that Jamaica remains the largest illicit 
producer and exporter of cannabis in Central America and the 
Caribbean. Nevertheless, general population rates of 
cannabis/ganja use have tended to be lower than in North 
America (Younger-Coleman et al., 2017).  
Use has traditionally been concentrated amongst sub-
populations, particularly members of the Rastafari faith, and 
there have been ongoing concerns about the policing and enforcement of the cannabis laws and 
disproportionate impacts on such groups. For example, there have been many accounts of police 
brutality and shootings of people who use cannabis/ganga and the Jamaican police have been 
branded as operating a death squad trained to pursue extrajudicial strategies to fight the War on 
Drugs, especially in relation to religious minorities (Niaah, 2016). In 1999 the Government of Jamaica 
established a National Commission on ganja which discussed possible policy options of legalisation 
or decriminalisation (Emanuel et al., 2018). Twelve years later, the subject of amending the law in 
Jamaica re-emerged as a hot topic when a construction worker died in police custody three days after 
being arrested for the possession of a ganja spliff (Niaah, 2016).  
Alternative mechanisms for dealing with simple possession offences 
On 15 April 2015, the Government introduced de jure decriminalisation by replacement of criminal 
penalties with a civil fine for possession of small quantities of cannabis. The purpose of the reform 
was multiple including: efficiency (to reduce the backlog on the courts); human rights (to reduce 
conflict with rights to privacy); and to reduce the harm to young people from provision of a criminal 
conviction. Under the new law possession of 2 ounces or less of ganja is no longer an offence for 
which one can be arrested, charged and sent to court, and it will not result in a criminal record.  
However, the police may issue a ticket to a person in possession of 2 ounces or less of ganja, similar 
to a traffic ticket, and the person has 30 days to pay the sum of J$500 at any Tax Office. A person 
who is found in possession of 2 ounces or less and who is under the age of 18 years, or who is 18 
years or older and appears to the police to be dependent on ganja, will also be referred to the 
National Council on Drug Abuse for counselling, in addition to paying the ticket. The reform was part 
of a broader suite of changes. These included allowing members of the Rastafari faith to use and 
cultivate, once granted authorisation, cannabis for religious purposes, and the establishment of a 
court supervised drug treatment programme for persons dependent on cannabis and other 
substances who commit crimes such as theft as an alternative to imprisonment. Laws enabling past 
convictions for cannabis possession or use to be expunged were also passed. 
Outcomes 
Given the recency of the change, there are very few studies. But, a general population survey was 
conducted in 2016 (all data was collected between April and July) which examined knowledge and 
attitudes to the new law and drug use trends (Younger-Coleman et al., 2017). The survey found 
34.6 per cent of the population reported that they did not know of any of the changes recently made to 
the Dangerous Drugs Act. Knowledge appeared lower amongst the younger population with 52 per 
cent of those aged 12-17 and 40.4 per cent of those aged 18-24 aware of none of the changes, 
compared to 25.4 per cent amongst those aged 35-44. Nevertheless there was strong support for the 
change in regards to possession; 70 per cent of Jamaicans aged 12-65 years old agreed with being 
allowed to have limited amounts of cannabis for personal use (Younger-Coleman et al., 2017).  This 
Jamaica 
• Rationale: To reduce harm 
to people who use drugs 
from a criminal conviction 
• Mechanism: De jure –
Replacement of criminal 
penalties with a civil fine 
(‘fixed penalty notice’) of 
J$500 (€3.14) 
• Drugs: Cannabis only 
• Threshold limits: Yes, 2 
ounces 
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led these authors to conclude that the provisions appear to have public support but that more work 
needs to be done to educate the populace about the changes.  
The general population survey showed that in 2016, 18.0 per cent of the general population aged 12 
to 65 reported recent (last 12 month) cannabis use. Comparison of the findings from the 2001 and 
2016 survey showed a 6 per cent increase in last year cannabis use in the general population of 12-
55/65 year-olds (Younger-Coleman et al., 2017), but any increase appeared concentrated amongst 
older populations. Amongst those aged 10-17, last year cannabis use increased by less than 1 per 
cent. Across both surveys the prevalence of use of other illicit drugs such as cocaine was stable and 
very low (<1 per cent reported lifetime or past year use).  
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Australia  
Context  
Australia is a federated nation comprised of the Commonwealth of Australia and eight states and 
territories. Australia has a common law system, but this has evolved over time to include criminal, civil 
and administrative laws. The main legislative responsibility of the Commonwealth, in relation to drugs, 
is for border control (Customs Act 1901), and drug trafficking and manufacturing (Crimes (Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances) Act 1990). Responses to simple drug possess offences 
are largely the remit of states and territories.  
Most states prohibit the trafficking, cultivation, possession and consumption of substances including 
heroin, cocaine, cannabis and amphetamines, with maximum penalties for use or possession of 1 to 2 
years imprisonment. For example, the maximum penalty in Victoria for use or possession of an illicit 
drug is A$500 fine for cannabis or A$3,000 fine and/ or 1-year imprisonment for any other drug 
(McDonald & Hughes, 2017).  
Drug use in Australia is relatively high. For example, in 1993 the Australian national household survey 
showed that 37.1% of people aged 14 years and over had tried illicit drugs, mainly cannabis (24%) 
and 13.7% reported they had used an illicit drug in the last 12 months. Moreover, 7% of women and 
15% of men were weekly cannabis users.  
The first National Drug Strategy (the National Campaign Against Drug Abuse) was adopted in 1985, 
with the objective of harm minimisation; i.e. reducing harms without necessarily reducing use. This led 
to a practice (or at least rhetoric) of focusing criminal justice intervention on drug traffickers, rather 
than drug users. There has also been a commitment to a partnership approach to responding to illicit 
drugs, exemplified by the involvement of both health and law enforcement stakeholders in the peak 
body overseeing the National Drug Strategy.  
The diversion of offenders away from the CJS has long been part of Australian police practice, 
especially relating to youth offenders, but early programmes were ad hoc or relied on informal police 
discretion. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s programmes that targeted illicit drug offenders started to 
be introduced. The most well-known of these was the South Australian Cannabis Expiation Notice 
Scheme, introduced in 1987 (see below). Diversion became much more systematic and embedded 
into all states and territories after adoption of the Council of Australian Government Illicit Drug 
Diversion Initiative (IDDI); a national commitment, signed in 1999, to divert minor drug offenders away 
from the CJS into assessment, education and/or treatment programmes via both police and courts. 
The IDDI was accompanied by a national framework, principles of best practice for diversion and 
federal funding amounting to over A$310 million to enable an expansion of treatment places (Hughes 
& Hughes, 2007).  
The introduction and expansion of alternate mechanisms was driven by multiple factors. This included 
inquiries into cannabis such as the National Cannabis Taskforce in 1992 which highlighted the 
adverse consequences associated with the application of criminal penalties for cannabis possession 
for personal use, and a rise in the late 1990s of heroin and drug-related crime, an increasingly 
overburdened CJS, and increased research and an international therapeutic jurisprudence movement 
showing diversion could be a useful policy option (Hughes & Hughes, 2007).  
Alternative mechanisms for dealing with simple possession offences 
Australia has evolved a broad array of alternatives for drug-related offenders, including de jure and de 
facto reforms, as well as therapeutic and non-therapeutic options. For example, Hughes and Ritter 
(2008) conducted a review of all Australian drug diversion options, and showed that in 2007 there 
were 51 programmes provided across Australia: and that most states employed 5 or 6 different 
programmes. Two main types of alternative mechanisms for simple possession offences now operate.   
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Decriminalisation with civil penalties 
The first approach is decriminalisation with civil penalties. This is a de jure system that removes 
criminal penalties for possession for personal use of 50-100 grams (and cultivation of up to two 
plants) and provides offenders with the opportunity to avoid a criminal record through the payment of 
an expiation fee ($100-300). South Australia was the first state to introduce de jure decriminalisation 
of cannabis by a civil penalty scheme – in 1986 (enacted 1987), via the Cannabis Expiation Notice 
(CEN) scheme in the Controlled Substances Amendment Act 1986.  At the time, it was one of the first 
places in the world to introduce such a reform. The Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory 
followed suit in 1992 and 1996 respectively. Western Australia also introduced a civil penalty scheme 
in 2004, but this was repealed in 2008 following the election of a centre-right Government. A common 
feature of the Australian programmes (that differs from the US examples) is that they do not target 
first-time offenders alone. Instead, they provide unlimited opportunities for offenders to be expiated. 
Failure to pay the expiation fee may however result in criminal proceedings. 
Police diversion  
The second type of alternative used in Australia is police diversion. In most cases, this is a de facto 
system that offers police the option to refer detected offenders to education or treatment instead of 
laying criminal charges. Two main types of police diversion programmes operate. The first, a 
cannabis caution programme, is aimed at offenders detected using or possessing 10-50 grams 
cannabis. This leads to an “on the street” formal caution by police and referral to an education session 
or telephone service. The second, other drug diversion programmes, are aimed at offenders detected 
using or possessing small quantities of amphetamines, cocaine, ecstasy or heroin (1-10g) and lead to 
a police referral for an alcohol and other drug (AOD) assessment and brief intervention. The nature 
and intensity of the programmes vary. For example, in the New South Wales Cannabis Caution 
Program offenders are provided with a caution notice outlining the legal and health consequences of 
cannabis use and a phone number for a 24-hour Alcohol and Drug Information Service, albeit any 
contact to the information line is optional unless it is an offender’s second caution. In contrast, 
cannabis caution programmes in other states - including Queensland - require offenders to undertake 
a face-to-face assessment of their cannabis use and then receive education on the health effects of 
cannabis. The diversion programs for other illicit drugs typically involve a more intensive response: 
counselling, albeit this can vary between one to three sessions. All police diversion programmes have 
the option to impose sanctions for non-compliance, albeit this is rare in practice.  
 
Australia other drug diversion 
programmes (six states: ACT,  
NT, SA, Tas, Vic, WA) 
Rationale:  
• Early intervention  
• Reduce recidivism 
• Reduce harmful drug use 
Mechanism: De facto – referral 
for AOD assessment & brief 
intervention (typically 1-3 
counselling sessions) 
Drugs: All illict drugs / All except 
cannabis 
Threshold limits: Yes typically 1 
or 2g heroin or cocaine, but up to 
5g heroin & 10g ecstasy  
Australian Cannabis 
Caution programmes (four 
states: NSW, Qld, Vic, WA) 
Rationale: To educate people 
who use drugs about the 
legal and health 
consequences of cannabis 
use  
Mechanism: De facto – police 
“on the street” formal caution 
and referral to education 
session or telephone service   
Drugs: Cannabis 
Threshold limits: Yes 10-50g 
(varies by state) 
Australia Cannabis 
Expiation Schemes            
(three states: ACT, NT, SA)  
Rationale: To use criminal 
sanctions as a last resort 
Mechanism: De jure – 
replacement of criminal 
penalties with civil penalties 
($100-300) 
Drugs: Cannabis  
Threshold limits: Yes 50-
100g (varies by state) 
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All Australian diversion programmes have eligibility restrictions including on priors and concurrent 
offences and some also require offenders to admit an offence or admit guilt. Notably while most of the 
cannabis caution and drug diversion schemes are de facto – operating via police guidelines – there 
are three de jure diversion schemes that are based in law: the South Australian Police Drug Diversion 
Initiative (for all illicit drugs) and Queensland Police Diversion Program for Minor Drug Offences (for 
cannabis) and the Western Australian Cannabis Intervention Requirement (for cannabis).   
Outcomes 
Expiation 
The best studied cannabis expiation notice scheme in the South Australian Cannabis Expiation Notice 
Scheme. In the early years, two perverse effects were observed. First, net-widening as evidenced by 
a 2.5-fold increase in expiable cannabis offences: from 6,231 in 1987 to over 17,170 in 1996 (Christie 
& Ali, 2000). Second, low rates of compliance in paying the expiation notices. at 45%. The net 
widening was attributed to the greater ease with which CEN can be issued under the scheme, 
compared to the procedures for an arrest and charge that would be required for a prosecution. The 
low compliance rates was attributed to lack of knowledge of the law and financial difficulty 
experienced by a substantial proportion of those detected for minor cannabis offences. This led to 
more cannabis users incarcerated for non-payment of fines. In 1996, the South Australian 
Government responded by introducing new payment options, including payment by instalments and 
substitution of community service for fees and increased education about the reform. Such measures 
led to a reduction in net-widening and increased payment (Eastwood et al., 2016).  
In spite of the early perverse effects, the scheme was found more cost-effective for dealing with 
minor cannabis offences. For example, in the 1995/96 the total cost was estimated to be A$1.24m 
and revenue from CEN fees, fines and costs was A$1.68m. In contrast, the total cost of the prohibition 
approach was estimated to be A$2.01 million, while revenue from fines and levies was estimated to 
be A$1.0 million (Ali et al., 1999).  
Comparisons of cannabis users who had received an expiation versus a conviction in South Australia 
and Western Australia respectively showed that decriminalisation with civil penalties was associated 
with significant social benefits, including fewer negative employment problems such as a loss of a 
job and less relationship disruption. The WA convicted group were also more likely to identify negative 
episodes of involvement with the CJS which they thought were related to their cannabis offence, such 
as further police enquiries or questioning. 
There is some contestation about the impacts on drug use. For example, Damrongplasit et al. (2010) 
used the 2001 National Drug Strategy Household Survey to assess the impact of cannabis 
decriminalisation policy on cannabis smoking prevalence in Australia. They concluded that on 
average, living in a decriminalised state significantly increases the probability of smoking cannabis, by 
16.2%. However, Donnelly et al (1995) used four household drug-use surveys and showed that while 
there was a national increase in self-reported lifetime cannabis use between 1985 (26%) and 1995 
(36%), with a greater degree of increase in South Australia than in the average of other Australian 
states and territories, the SA increase is unlikely due to the CEN system, because (1) similar 
increases occurred in Tasmania and Victoria, where there was no change in the legal status of 
cannabis use; (2) there was no differential change in weekly cannabis use in South Australia as 
compared with the rest of Australia, and (3) there was no greater increase in cannabis use among 
young South Australian adults aged 14 to 29 years (the group most likely to take up use). Finally, 
Cameron and Williams (2001) found that holding all else equal, the probability that an individual used 
cannabis was 2.0 percentage points higher if the individual lived in South Australia, but that the 
increase was temporary and dissipated over time:  
“Cannabis participation was not higher in South Australia in 1988 than in the other states. 
However, it was significantly higher in 1991 and 1993 (by 4.5 and 3.3 percentage points 
respectively). The probability of participating then dropped in 1995 to the same level in the 
other states. The effect of introducing a more legal regime has only a transient effect on 
cannabis use. In particular, 7 years after decriminalisation of cannabis in South Australia, the 
probability of an individual from South Australia using cannabis is no different than an 
individual from one or the other Australian states, all else being equal” (Cameron & Williams, 
2001, p. 31) 
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Importantly, they also found that the increase reflected delayed exit of older consumers (aged 30 and 
over): not an increase amongst young people.  
 
Moreover, analysis of prevalence of use in other states has shown stable trends or reductions. Of 
note the Northern Territory has historically reported high rates of cannabis use well exceeding all 
other states in Australia. However, rates of cannabis consumption in the state have fallen significantly 
since 1998 – two years after the introduction of decriminalisation – with reported use in that year of 
36.5 per cent of the population, meaning that prevalence has more than halved in the last 17 years (to 
17.1 per cent in the past year), supporting the evidence that the ending of criminal sanctions does not 
lead to an increase in use (Eastwood et al., 2016).  
 
Police diversion 
Cannabis cautioning programmes have been found to reduce number of people convicted for 
cannabis use or possession. For example, Baker and Goh (2004) found that the NSW Cannabis 
Cautioning Program led to 2,658 fewer persons convicted with a principal offence of cannabis by the 
local courts in the three years since the introduction of the Scheme, compared with the three years 
prior to the Scheme.  
The burden on the CJS also reduced, as evidenced by 5,241 fewer sole cannabis charges dealt with 
by the local courts in the three years since the introduction of the scheme compared with the three 
years prior to the scheme. As such it was estimated that over the first three years of the scheme the 
police saved over 18,000 hours, or over $400k and the local courts have saved at least $800k and 
probably more than $1m (Baker & Goh, 2004). Analysis of the Queensland Police Drug Diversion 
Program also showed that over the first two years this led to a 28% reduction in the number of minor 
illicit drug possession charges being prosecuted through the courts (Hales, Mayne, Swan, Alberti, & 
Ritter, 2004). 
A more recent analysis by Belackova et al (2017) showed further evidence of reductions in the burden 
on the CJS. Over the period 2002 to 2012, 31.53% of all cannabis use/possess offences in NSW 
received a caution, and few proceeded to court or were imprisoned for this offence alone. For 
example, there were 1.10 court proceedings for use/possession per 1000 population (Belackova et 
al., 2017). This was lower than in a nation with a prohibitionist context (Florida): 1.21 per 1000 
population, but higher than in a nation with de jure decriminalisation (Czech Republic): 0.02 per 1000 
population. One apparent reason is the reach of the programme: as the Czech Republic diverts more 
than double the proportion of use/possess offenders away from criminal sanction: 72.44% versus 
31.53% in NSW (Belackova et al., 2017).  
The Australian drug diversion programmes have led to a large increase in treatment referrals in 
Australia. For example, in the 10 years to 2012-13, the number of treatment episodes provided to 
clients referred from diversion programmes more than doubled, whereas numbers of treatment 
episodes of other clients were about constant (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2014). 
Moreover, clients referred from police or court diversion programmes received 27,405 treatment 
episodes in 2012-13, accounting for 18% of all treatment episodes provided by all Australian alcohol 
and other drug treatment agencies. Diversion clients have also been shown to be a distinct group who 
otherwise do not access the system. For example, they are younger (25% aged 10–19 compared with 
11% amongst clients not-diverted). The increase in treatment uptake is particularly significant as 
Shanahan et al (2017) found that respondents detected for cannabis use or possession in Australia 
had high levels of dependence and other health problems. For example, 50% of those detected by 
police were daily cannabis users compared to only 12.8% in the general population of cannabis users 
(measured using the 2013 National Drug Strategy Household Survey).  
That said, it is also clear that not all reforms are equally likely to lead to treatment uptake. For 
example, over the first three years of the scheme the NSW Cannabis Caution Program led to only 63 
persons calling the Alcohol Drug Information Service helpline after receiving a caution – or 0.7% of 
the 9235 cautions that were issued. This was attributed to the voluntary nature of the reform. In 
contrast, a total of 10,623 offenders were referred by police to the Diversion Coordination Service of 
the Queensland Police Drug Diversion Program for education and assessment, of whom 81% 
complied (Hales et al., 2004).  
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Some studies (especially those with high treatment exposure) have shown that diversion programs 
are associated with reductions in harmful drug use. For example, the Queensland Police Drug 
Diversion Program found that use of cannabis regularly reduced from 95% at baseline to 74% at the 3 
month follow-up: a rate that was sustained at 6 month follow-up (Hales et al., 2004). However, a 
national cost-effectiveness and outcomes study by Shanahan et al (2017) that compared pre-post 
impacts of three forms of diversion (caution, cannabis expiation and warning) versus a traditional 
criminal justice response for minor cannabis offenders found that all programmes led to a small 
overall reduction in the number of days cannabis was used and in the number of other illicit drugs 
used the previous month, but there was no added benefit (or cost) from diversion versus a traditional 
criminal justice sanction.  
Like Australian cannabis expiation schemes, cannabis diversion programmes have been associated 
with social benefits. Shanahan et al (2017) showed that those receiving a diversion for cannabis 
possession versus charge reported fewer employment problems, with those in the charge group 
significantly more likely to report a change in employment status e.g. a termination and to directly 
attribute this to their police encounter. They also reported less disruptive relationships with family and 
friends. Moreover, those diverted to had more positive perceptions of police legitimacy (23.9% 
compared to 14.9% for those charged). This suggests that diversion may have flow on effects for 
police beyond reducing CJS costs.   
Cost-effectiveness analysis of both cannabis expiation and cannabis caution programmes showed 
both were significantly cheaper than a traditional criminal justice response (charge). Cannabis 
diversion cost six to 15 times less than a criminal charge (Shanahan et al., 2017). The charge group's 
mean cost was the highest (A$1,918), reflecting additional police and court activities, with the next 
most expensive being the caution group, following by expiation.  
 
Payne et al (2008) conducted a national evaluation of rates of reoffending post the IDDI 
programmes. This showed that rates varied across the states and territories reflecting differing 
eligibility criteria and programme design, but that there were significant reductions in the rates of 
reoffending across all diversion programmes. Reductions were particularly noted in relation to 
individuals who had a prior offending history, amongst whom between 53 per cent and 66 per cent 
recorded fewer offences in the 18 months after diversion. The majority of first-time or non-recent 
offenders diverted under the national IDDI also did not reoffend (between 70 per cent and 86 per 
cent).  
The Australian studies have, however, also highlighted the importance of careful design of eligibility 
criteria. For example, in 2014 Hughes et al (2014) evaluated police and court diversion programme in 
the ACT, showing that at the time, police diversion for drugs other than cannabis were restricted due 
to low threshold limits (2 ‘ecstasy’ pills or 0.5 pure grams of heroin, amphetamine or cocaine). As a 
consequence, police were diverting 70.9% of cannabis offenders but only 0-7.9% of other illicit drug 
use/possess offenders, which meant that many offenders were missing out on diversion opportunities. 
Threshold limits have since been lifted and diversion rates increased. For other design considerations 
see Hughes et al. (in press).   
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USA 
Context 
The USA has a common law system. As a federated system with large devolved powers to the 50 
states, and large differences in demography, inequalities, health and judicial systems, the USA 
presents a very diverse set of experiences in responding to illicit drugs.  
Drug use was relatively rare in the 1940s and 1950s in the USA, but following dramatic changes in 
the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s with the spread of cannabis, the heroin epidemic, the explosion in 
cocaine initiation and the spread of crack and street markets, it now has amongst the highest rates of 
use and drug-related harms in the world. In 1970 then President Richard Nixon declared a ‘war on 
drugs’ and signed the Controlled Substances Act that confirmed the prohibited the use, possession, 
manufacturing and importation of illicit drugs and classified cannabis as a Schedule I drug alongside 
heroin and cocaine. Almost immediately, alternative mechanisms - particularly for cannabis - started 
to be discussed. For example, the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse 
recommended in 1972 that criminal penalties for the private possession and use of cannabis be 
eliminated and that states decriminalise public possession (but not use) (Logan, 2014). 
In spite of a number of reforms in the 1970s (see below), the USA is renowned for having the highest 
rates of arrests and imprisonment of drug offenders in the world. This has contributed to significant 
collateral consequences, including the erosion of civil liberties, over-policing, high rates of conviction 
and imprisonment of largely black and minority populations and an estimated cost to the criminal 
justice and legal systems of over one trillion dollars in the past four decades (Caulkins, Reuter, Iguchi, 
& Chiesa, 2005). This has continued to spark many considerations of alternative policy options.  
Alternative mechanisms for dealing with simple possession offences 
The USA has developed three broad types of mechanisms of response. The first is depenalisation. 
For example, in Los Angeles county a low‐priority initiative mandates that minor cannabis possession 
offences be the lowest enforcement priority for local law enforcement agencies, with the goal of 
saving police time to focus on other more serious crime. While there are some differences in the 
specific laws implemented in each jurisdiction, there are a few common components, namely that it: 
operates through a de facto approach (not in law), targets minor cannabis possession offences only 
(and excludes felony drug crimes), is only for adults and for offences committed in private (DeAngelo, 
Gittings, & Ross, 2018). 
The second approach is police diversion. This is again a de facto system that involves diversion to 
treatment or diversion to other types of non-criminal sanctions. For example, one scheme was the 
1994 Baltimore "pre-booking diversion" where an arrest was initially made but no formal charges were 
filed. This was targeted at possession of all illicit drugs. Under the leadership of Commissioner of 
Public Health, Peter Beilenson (1992-2005), a "Treatment on Request" policy was adopted, defined 
as the provision of detoxification and drug treatment services to people who use drugs within 24 
hours. Publicly funded treatment slots, including those for residential-based and outpatient facilities, 
detoxification centers and methadone maintenance, were doubled from about 4,100 to almost 8,000 
by the end of the 1990s. They were made available through a quasi-independent agency: Baltimore 
Substance Abuse Systems (Goetz & Mitchell, 2006). Such an approach developed in the context of 
high rates of heroin and cocaine use, linked to high level of violence in Baltimore's drug markets, 
which drew attention to how to break drug/crime connection. Another pre-booking scheme operated in 
San Francisco from 1998 (Goetz & Mitchell, 2006).  
Amore recent programme, launched in 2011, is the Seattle Police Department programme – law 
enforcement assisted diversion (LEAD). This provides for the voluntary diversion of low-level drug 
(and prostitution) offenders from criminal prosecution (Collins, Lonczak, & Clifasefi, 2015b). LEAD 
was developed in response to the calls of Washington State legislators to identify evidence-based 
programmes for drug offenders. The primary goal was to reduce recidivism, but it also sought to 
reduce use of the CJS and improve psychosocial, housing and quality-of-life outcomes for drug 
offenders. It provides case management, access to drug treatment, legal services and other social 
supports (including referrals to job training and housing assistance).   
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A final diversion programme of note is prosecutor-led diversion programme that provide individualised 
alcohol and other drug (AOD) education, treatment and social services, as well as requiring 
community service. Such programmes focus on reducing costs of the CJS, as well as rehabilitation 
and increasing community engagement. Some have a pre-filing model (diverting cases before and in 
lieu of initiating a criminal court case), eight adopt a post-filing model (after the court process is 
underway), and four programmes enrol different participants either pre- or post-filing (i.e. a mixed 
model).  
The third approach is decriminalisation. This is a de jure system that removes criminal penalties for 
possession for personal use, often with use of civil penalties instead. As noted by Logan (2014, pp. 
326-327), the “laws have been motivated by a variety of factors. In addition to the cost associated with 
incarcerating individuals convicted of possessing cannabis, and a desire to loosen government control 
over victimless crimes more generally, decriminalisation advocates point to major racial disparities in 
arrest and conviction rates, and the long-term negative consequences of continued criminalization for 
individuals (including collateral consequences such as lost access to student loans and housing).” All 
states with decriminalisation have been for cannabis only, and most involve possession of up to an 
ounce of cannabis (28 grams).  
In the 1970s there were 11 “decriminalisation states”. The first such reform was introduced in Oregon 
in 1973. It was then followed by Colorado, Alaska and Ohio in 1975; California, Maine and Minnesota 
in 1976; Mississippi, New York and North Carolina in 1977; and Nebraska in 1978. Alaska then 
followed suite in 1996. One challenge is that as outlined by Pacula et al. (2003) it is “impossible to 
uniquely identify the so-called decriminalisation states using the statutes.” For example, they noted 
that California and North Carolina retained cannabis possession as a criminal offence at that point in 
time. (California then expanded to proper decriminalisation on 1 October 2010). Some also limited the 
removal of criminal penalties to one offence only. This has led Pacula et al. (2003) to conclude that 
some were more examples of depenalisation than decriminalisation. As of 2017, there are 20 US 
states with a proper decriminalisation in practice, defined as the removal of criminal penalties for 
possession of up to an ounce (personal communication with Rosalie Pacula on 6 September 2018). 7    
 
 
 
  
  
                                                     
7 The 20 decriminalisation states as of 2017 (defined as removal of criminal penalties for possession of up to one ounce of 
cannabis) are: AK, CO, CA, ME, MS, NE, NY, OH, OR, NV, MA, CT, RI, WA, VT, MD, DE, IL, NK, MO. Two others are often 
called decriminalisation states but are not (MN & NC), as they retain the criminal misdeameanour offence for possession of 
cannabis albeit without the threat of jail time.  
USA Depenalisation 
(e.g. LA County) 
Rationale: To save 
police time to focus on 
more serious offences 
Mechanism: De facto – 
guidance to police 
officers to treat 
possession as ‘lowest 
priority’  
Drugs: Cannabis  
Threshold limits: No  
USA Diversion (e.g. 
LEAD) 
Rationale: To 
support/treat/rehabilitate 
instead of punish (?) 
Mechanism: De facto – 
referral to 
education/treatment/social 
services instead of charge  
Drugs: All illicit drugs  
Threshold limits: No  
USA Decriminalistion  
(e.g. Ohio, Mississippi 
and Rhode Island) 
Rationale: To reduce the 
burden on the CJS and to 
reduce collateral 
consequences to people 
who use drugs 
Mechanism: De jure – 
with civil penalties 
Drugs: Cannabis  
Threshold limits: Varies 
by state but one ounce is 
the norm  
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Outcomes 
Most of the research to date has focused on the decriminalisation schemes, rather than 
depenalisation or diversion. Moreover, as has been well documented by Pacula et al (2005; 2014) a 
key finding has been that many of the apparent decriminalisation schemes were not applied in 
practice. There can be gaps between the policy and the practice.  
Depenalisation 
While depenalisation programmes sought to save police time to focus on more serious crime, 
research has shown that impacts have been mixed. For example, Ross and Walker (2017) and more 
recently DeAngelo et al. (2018) both showed that as intended the adoption of a low‐priority initiative 
caused a reduction in the number of arrests for misdemeanour cannabis offences. This effect was not 
statistically significant at conventional levels, but was statistically significant when the sample was 
restricted to the largest cities with populations above 100,000. However, there was no evidence of 
benefit for other crimes: “We do not find that adoption of a low‐priority initiative caused a statistically 
significant reduction in any type of violent or property crime. In fact, the only statistically significant 
effect we obtain is that adoption of the low‐priority initiative increases some crime rates, specifically 
robbery and burglary in large cities. We do not find a statistically significant effect of the law on the 
clearance rate for violent and property crimes” (DeAngelo et al., 2018). Moreover, analysis showed 
evidence of displacement: namely that there was a sharp increase in cannabis arrests in the non-
adopting jurisdictions after the implementation of the low priority initiative.  
Diversion 
Local evaluations  of diversion suggested benefits were realised in getting more people into 
treatment and reducing HIV infections (Goetz & Mitchell, 2006). However, numbers of imprisoned 
drug offenders in Maryland continued to rise and the scheme was ended by the mayor in 1999. 
Impacts of the San Francisco pre-booking scheme were more limited as Goetz and Mitchell (2006) 
noted the programme was hampered by arguments between police and health over funding, leading 
to only four people entering the scheme during the first year.  
The most efficacious diversion programme in the USA appears to be the law enforcement assisted 
diversion programme. Research conducted by the University of Washington in Seattle has shown a 
58 per cent reduction in recidivism among LEAD participants when compared against a 
comparative group that went through the traditional CJS, and that the LEAD group had 87 per cent 
lower odds of at least one prison incarceration subsequent to evaluation entry (Collins et al., 2015b). 
Participants were also significantly more likely to obtain housing, employment and legitimate income 
in any given month subsequent to their LEAD referral (i.e., during the 18-month follow-up) compared 
to the month prior to their referral (i.e., baseline). Moreover, there were observed statistically 
significant reductions for the LEAD group compared to the control group on average yearly criminal 
justice and legal system utilisation and associated costs. For example, while from pre- to post-
evaluation entry, LEAD participants showed substantial cost reductions (-US$2,100), control 
participants showed cost increases (+US$5,961). That said, evaluators also found some 
implementation challenges, as some police were disinclined to use the diversion system (on the 
grounds it could be harmful and enabling to people who use drugs). This lead to fewer diverted than 
expected (Collins, Lonczak, & Clifasefi, 2015a). Moreover, during the first 6 months of LEAD, diverted 
individuals were disproportionately white and female and it was only in the second 6 months that 
more black men (the target group) were diverted. This again shows the importance of implementation 
and getting police support for such programmes, particularly if they are discretionary to use.  
Decriminalisation 
Studies in relation to the CJS impacts of US decriminalisation with civil penalties have diverse 
findings. For example, Males and Buchen (2014) compared decriminalisation in California (2011), 
Connecticut (2011) and Massachusetts (2009) for all age groups against impacts of legalisation of 
cannabis in Washington State and Colorado for people aged 21 and over. They found that all states 
that introduced decriminalisation saw large declines in cannabis arrests: an average decrease of 72 
per cent in rates of arrest for cannabis compared to a 7 per cent decrease for states that undertook no 
reform. But they found that the extent of decline varied, as evidenced by declines in cannabis arrests 
of 90, 86 and 67 per cent in Massachusetts, California and Connecticut respectively. Grucza et al 
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(2018) conducted a longitudinal difference-in-difference analysis of data on arrests and youth 
cannabis use (from the Youth Risk Behaviour Survey) of five states that passed decriminalisation 
measures between the years 2008 and 2014: Massachusetts (decriminalised in 2008), Connecticut 
(2011), Rhode Island (2013), Vermont (2013), and Maryland (2014). They showed that 
decriminalisation was associated with an immediate and strong reduction in the rate of drug-related 
arrests for youth and adults; the risk of arrest more than halved for both groups.  
In contrast, Pacula et al. (2005) found that states that have eliminated the criminal status of 
possession offences involving amounts of one ounce or less of cannabis did not have systematically 
lower arrests per capita than those states retaining the criminal status. Several of the states, including 
New York and Louisiana, had larger per capita arrest rates in most years than the national average 
across states. They thus concluded that the enforcement of cannabis laws was not highly correlated 
with the criminal status of cannabis possession offences. Logan (2014) also outlined specific 
examples where the decriminalisation states have significant increases in arrest, noting that arrests 
for cannabis possession have skyrocketed in number in recent years and that several states adopting 
decriminalisation have some of the nation's highest per capita arrest rates for possession: particularly 
in New York and Chicago. For example, there had been a 2,461 per cent increase in cannabis 
possession arrests in New York since the late 1990s and that despite strenuous public criticism, and 
concern voiced by Governor Cuomo, possession arrests continued unabated. Logan (2014, p. 330) 
attributed this to implementation programmes, including lack of “police buy-in”. For example, “In Flint, 
Michigan… city police and state troopers publicly proclaimed their intent to make possession arrests 
despite voters’ strong endorsement of a ballot decriminalisation initiative” (Logan, 2014, p.331). 
Added to that was continuation of police performance monitoring systems that incentivise police 
officers to make arrests. 
Findings further vary in relation to drug use. For example, Grucza et al (2018) difference-in-difference 
analysis (of recent decriminalisation states) found that decriminalisation was not associated with any 
increase in the past-30 day prevalence of cannabis use. Significant declines in prevalence were 
observed for Rhode Island and Vermont. Decriminalisation had no impact on measures of availability, 
perceived risk, or disapproval/stigmatisation of cannabis use. In contrast, Pacula et al’s (2003) cross-
sectional analysis found youths living in decriminalised states are 2 per cent more likely to use 
cannabis both in the past year and in the past month, although the finding with respect to annual use 
was not statistically significant at conventional levels and Yulia (2011) found that in decriminalised 
states, users consume cannabis on average 11 days per year more than their counterparts living in 
non-decriminalisation states. Finally, Miech et al. (2015) analysis of the California decriminalisation 
found youth cannabis use increased at a significantly greater rate in California as compared to the 
other U.S. states following decriminalisation. For example, amongst 12th graders in both 2012 and 
2013 the prevalence of any cannabis use in the past 30 days was proportionately about 25 per cent 
higher in California as compared to the other states. 
Pacula et al. (2003) suggest some reasons for the differences in studies. These include: studies may 
be comparing apples and oranges (due to the large variance in what “decriminalisation states” 
actually mean); failures of authors to control for other reforms that have occurred in “non-
decriminalisation states”; and the fact that public knowledge of decriminalisation is imperfect. A latter 
study demonstrated this latter issue by finding from population surveys in various states that “the 
percentages who believe they could be jailed for marijuana possession are quite similar in both states 
that have removed … penalties and those that have not” (MacCoun, Pacula, Reuter, Chriqui, & 
Harris, 2009). 
Pacula et al (2003) looked at how decriminalisation policies have been operationalised, and what 
additional implementation elements might influence outcomes. This study found that that prevalence 
of lifetime and recent cannabis use among young people is very sensitive to the statutory penalties 
imposed. That is, higher minimum jail times were statistically associated with lower prevalence rates. 
Specifically, a one-day increase in statutorily imposed minimum jail time is associated with a 7 to 9 
percentage point reduction in annual cannabis prevalence and a 4 percentage point reduction in 
thirty-day prevalence (Pacula et al., 2003). This suggests that states that ruled out all forms of 
imprisonment were associated with higher prevalence of use. They offer two explanations for these 
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findings: “First, formal decriminalization statutes may be an indicator of a larger social acceptance of 
marijuana use within the state. Second, they might be an indicator of greater public knowledge (or 
advertisement) of the reduced penalties associated with possession of marijuana.” They acknowledge 
“our data are insufficient to explore these two alternative hypotheses” (Pacula et al, 203, p.26). The 
later finding by MacCoun et al (2009), lends support to the first hypothesis (that decriminalisation 
follows social acceptance of cannabis use) than the second (that awareness of punishments deters 
use). 
In relation to the link between alternatives and non-drug crime, Huber, Newman, and LaFave (2016) 
used state panel data on recorded crime rates from 1970 to 2012 to examine the relationship between 
cannabis control policies and non-cannabis crime. They found a link between medical marijuana laws 
and reduced violent crime, but no or unfavourable changes for states that had removed criminal 
penalties for cannabis without providing a legal avenue to supply. In these states, they found an 
increase in crimes they regard as related to the cannabis market (e.g. robbery and burglary). They 
speculate that this is due to the continuation or increase of the illicit market when criminal sanctions 
are removed without enabling legal supply. Their study is vulnerable to the criticism that it uses police-
recorded crime (a notoriously unreliable measure of underlying crime rates). Its authors do not 
consider the possibility that recording of other crimes increased as police shifted their attention from 
cannabis possession to other offences. They support their speculation with the funding that there was 
no increase in recorded crimes that they consider not to be related to the cannabis market (e.g. 
murder and theft of motor vehicles).    
A number of studies have found that decriminalisation is associated with increased risks of drug 
driving. These studies, however, are subject to similar problems in comparing states and attributing 
differences to decriminalisation to those identified by Pacula et al (2003). For example, Lee et al. 
(2018) found that there is a general association between the change in cannabis laws, except for 
medical legalisation, and an increase in fatal crashes involving cannabis. For example, cannabis-
related crashes significantly increased in Massachusetts – a decriminalisation state - compared with 
their comparison states. Moreover, Huber et al. (2016) found that the odds of a driver being THC 
positive is 17 per cent higher in jurisdictions that have decriminalised cannabis. Finally, Pollini et al 
(2015) found a significant post-decriminalisation increase in cannabis-positive driving among fatally 
injured drivers but no significant changes in THC-positive driving among night-time weekend drivers. 
In contrast, Males and Buchen (2014) found that cannabis decriminalisation in California has not 
resulted in harmful consequences for teenagers, such as increased crime, drug overdose, driving 
under the influence, or school dropout. In fact, California teenagers showed improvements in all risk 
areas after reform. For example, post reform there was a 20 per cent reduction in overdose in 
California compared with a 4 per cent increase in the rest of the USA, moreover there was a 25 per 
cent reduction in California compared with a 14 per cent reduction in the rest of the US for property 
crime. It should be noted that this finding is confounded by the different nature of the heroin market, 
with a higher prevalence of Mexican ‘black tar’ heroin in California, which is more rarely contaminated 
with fentanyl.  
Evidence in relation to substitution between alcohol and drugs is also conflicting. For example, 
Yulia (2011) found decriminalisation has a positive significant impact on the alcohol consumption. 
People living in states which have decriminalised cannabis are 4.2 per cent more likely to consume 
alcohol last month than people living in non-decriminalised ones. In contrast, Thies and Register 
(1993) examined whether the decriminalisation of cannabis in eleven states has affected self-reported 
usage of alcohol, cannabis or cocaine. In their analysis, decriminalisation did not significantly impact 
either the choice or frequency of use of drugs, either legal (alcohol) or illegal (cannabis and cocaine). 
They concluded that the demand for drugs is highly inelastic with respect to incremental changes in 
the legal sanctions for possession of small amounts of cannabis. On the other hand, Chaloupka and 
Laixuthai (1997) found that amongst high school seniors, where cannabis was decriminalised, 
consume alcohol less frequently and are less likely to engage in heavy drinking than those in states 
where cannabis possession was still criminalised. Moreover, they conducted simulations to shows 
that moving from a policy where cannabis is criminalised to one where cannabis is decriminalised 
everywhere (nationwide) would increase the number of alcohol abstainers in the past year by nearly 
12 per cent, while reducing the number frequent drinkers in the past year by almost 11 per cent. 
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Two PhD theses analysed impacts on racial bias in law enforcement. Crouch (2015) found that 
decriminalisation in Massachusetts decreased the black-white gap in juvenile arrests by 192.0 per 
100,000 for cannabis possession and by 14.57 per 100,000 for cannabis sales. There was also 
evidence that decriminalisation also reduces the black-white arrest-rate gap for other crimes including 
the sale of cannabis and non-cannabis drugs for adults and juveniles and theft-related crimes for 
adults. Overall, the results are consistent with a shift in police resources away from poor black 
neighborhoods after decriminalisation of cannabis in Massachusetts. Munslow (2017) also found 
decriminalisation has a significant effect for all ethnic groups and that black arrest rates decrease 
more than 4 times as much as whites due to decriminalisation.  
Finally, Pacula et al. (2010) examined price changes in relation to a number of variables, including 
decriminalisation policies. They found that both decriminalisation and conditional discharge is 
positively associated with price. As economists, they note that this price increase could be explained 
by decriminalisation increasing demand for cannabis, or by it increasing risk for sellers (as police shift 
their attention from buyers). 
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Chapter five: Policy learnings across the 
reforms 
In this chapter we look at lessons across the nine countries, about the a) types of reforms that can be 
undertaken to simple possession, b) the programme logic or theory of how each operates and c) the 
lessons about positive and potential negative impacts of each. To do this we firstly use Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA), which is a theoretically driven method for testing sets of relationships 
between cases (Rihoux, 2006; Schneider & Wagemann, 2010).  
QCA of alternatives for dealing with simple possession offences 
Aim  
The aim was to use QCA to produce an empirically-based, theoretically informed typology of 
alternatives for dealing with simple possession offences, based on the mechanisms and targets that 
currently operate.  
  
Mechanisms  
This analysis is based on a matrix of the different mechanisms of alternatives reviewed in the nine 
countries chosen for the review. Three dimensions of comparison were chosen as they offer the most 
theoretically interesting and policy-relevant modes of comparison between alternatives. These 
dimensions are:  
1. Whether the alternative is de jure (rather than de facto).  
2. Whether the alternative provides pathways to an intervention (e.g. education, treatment 
assessment or social services).  
3. Whether the alternative provides for the imposition of a civil or administrative penalty (e.g. 
fine, suspension of licence).  
The combination of dimensions 2 and 3 enables this comparison to identify a fourth, logically 
implicated dimension of whether the alternative provides any sanction at all (if the answer to both 2 
and 3 is no, then there is no sanction provided for).  
  
The matrix of 26 different alternatives found in these nine countries was created by scoring each 
alternative as either 0 (no) or 1 (yes) on each of these three dimensions. This matrix was then used to 
create a ‘truth table’, showing which combinations of the dimensions actually exist in these 
alternatives. Out of eight possible combinations of these dimensions, six were found to exist in 
practice. This is partly because there are two ‘missing’ combinations that are probably logically, 
legally impossible. These are the combinations of de facto change with the imposition of civil 
sanctions, either with or without diversionary measures. There would need to be a legal basis for such 
civil sanctions.  
 
Table 9 shows the six combinations and the examples that exemplify these types.  
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Table 9: Typology of alternate approaches to dealing with simple possession drug offences 
Type Legal 
basis 
Pathways to 
education / 
therapy / social 
services 
Administrative/ 
civil sanction 
Examples 
Depenalisation De facto No No Netherlands Gedoogbeleid 
'tolerance policy' (cannabis 
only), US police 
‘deprioritisation’, UK 
cannabis and khat warnings, 
Denmark warnings 
Police diversion 
(de facto) 
De facto Yes No Police diversion schemes in 
seven Australian states, 
Netherlands diversion (hard 
drugs only), English police 
diversion schemes in 
Durham, West Midlands and 
Avon, US LEAD programme, 
Baltimore pre-booking 
scheme   
Police diversion 
(de jure) 
 
De jure Yes No South Australian Police Drug 
Diversion Initiative and 
Queensland Police Drug 
Diversion Program (police 
mandated by law to offer 
diversion to treatment) 
Decriminalisation 
with no sanctions 
attached 
De jure No No Germany (by virtue of 
Constitutional ruling) and 
Vermont USA (since 2018) 
Decriminalisation 
with civil or 
administrative 
sanctions 
De jure No Yes Czech Republic, Jamaica, 
Cannabis Expiation Notice 
schemes in three Australian 
states (ACT, SA, NT), many 
US states (e.g. Ohio, 
Mississippi, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island)  
Decriminalisation 
with targeted 
diversion to 
health / social 
services 
De jure Yes Yes Portugal and several US 
states (Maryland, 
Connecticut & Nebraska)  
 
Targets  
We subsequently tried creating a truth table based on three dimensions of the targets of these 
alternatives. These dimensions were:  
1. Whether the alternative targets cannabis only or includes other drugs.  
2. Whether the alternative is available for adults only (rather than including minors)  
3. Whether the alternative includes a threshold amount for the weight of drugs.  
 
No clear pattern emerged from this truth table, in terms of groups of alternatives or 
jurisdictions. Instead it appears each of these factors (what could be classed as eligibility 
characteristics) can be utilised with each model. Herein, we therefore look at our six ideal types of 
responses to drug possession and then take into account the factors that may affect the reach or 
intensity of response in our assessment of outcomes. For example, a programme that applies to all 
illicit drugs may have more reach than one for only cannabis. Alternatively, one that has variable 
implementation will have less intensity than one with consistent implementation.  
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Programme logics and advantages and disadvantages of each approach 
Herein, we outline the programme logics and known outcomes for each approach. A programme logic 
(also known as outcome model, or logic model,) sets out what a project will do, how it will do it and 
what needs to be delivered to achieve the desired outcomes (McLaughlin & Jordan, 1999; 2004). It 
makes explicit the relationships between inputs, activities, outputs and outcomes. Establishing the 
programme logic is important for programme development and evaluation design as it helps to 
determine “for whom” and “in what circumstances” a programme works (Pawson, 2006). It also helps 
to build a common understanding about expectations and identify any assumptions or flaws in 
thinking before programmes are introduced (Funnell & Rogers, 2011). Programme logic has been 
found particularly useful in criminal justice settings where many programmes have been introduced 
and achieved less than desired impacts or even counterproductive impacts (Welsh & Harris, 2016).   
Model 1: Depenalisation  
The first approach – depenalisation – has been used in many parts of the world, including Denmark, 
the Netherlands, England and Wales and the USA. Under depenalisation, the goal is to avoid 
criminalising young people and to save police time to focus on more serious criminal activity. This is 
based on the belief that traditional policing approaches are ineffective and that police could better 
allocate their resources to more serious crime (be that drug trafficking or other offences). Implicit in 
this approach is also the belief that people detected for drug possession do not warrant criminal 
sanctions, nor do they warrant any other form of sanction. (One variant is that they only warrant 
sanction if they continue to offend).8 This reflects the theories of Stanley Cohen and the concerns that 
however well-intentioned, social control risks funnelling offenders into “different nets” or “deeper nets” 
(Cohen, 1979). As such, “doing nothing” or “doing little” may be the best approach for people who 
possess drugs. It also reflects the idea that the imposition of a sanction for drug possession is 
disproportionate as it may cause more harm than the actual use of that drug.  
 
The programme theory for this approach is outlined in Table 10. The theory contends that if police 
switch to doing little or nothing to people who possess drugs for personal use (e.g. issuing warnings 
instead of arrests), police, prosecutors and the courts will have more time to focus on other activities 
(e.g. serious crime) and there will be fewer people who use drugs who are arrested or convicted for 
possession alone. In turn, this will save the CJS money, lead to more effective resource allocation, 
and improve the livelihoods of people who use drugs, including their ability to gain employment 
without the collateral consequences of a drug conviction.  
                                                     
8 Here we note the cannabis warning system in England and Wales which offers a partial model of depenalisation. Here 
depenalisation is provided only for the first one or two detections of cannabis possession. Subsequent detections lead to arrest. 
 
Denmark (1969-2004) 
Rationale: To avoid 
criminalising young 
people 
Mechanism: De facto 
– Attorney General 
advised police to issue 
warnings for personal 
possession 
Drugs: All drugs 
Threshold limits: Yes 
(e.g. 10 grams 
cannabis and 0.2 
grams heroin) 
Netherlands (soft 
drugs) 
Rationale: To use 
criminal sanctions as a 
last resort 
Mechanism: De facto – 
depenalisation 
(Gedoogbeleid 
'tolerance policy') 
Drugs: Cannabis  
Threshold limits: Yes, 
30 grams cannabis 
(from 1976-1995), 5 
grams (since 1995)   
England & Wales: 
Cannabis (and khat) 
warning 
Rationale: To save 
police time to focus on 
more serious offences 
Mechanism: De facto 
– police directed to 
issue on-street 
warnings, rather than 
arrest 
Drugs: Cannabis and 
khat 
Threshold limits: No  
USA LA County 
Rationale: To save 
police time to focus 
on more serious 
offences 
Mechanism: De facto 
– police directed to 
make enforcement of 
cannabis possession 
their ‘lowest priority’  
Drugs: Cannabis  
Threshold limits: No  
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 Table 10: Programme logic – depenalisation  
Programme aim: To ensure that people are not criminalised for simple possession alone 
and to allow police more time to focus on more serious criminal activity, while minimising 
any form of sanction or intervention by police. 
Problem 
statement  
Inputs Process Outputs  Outcomes 
Criminalising 
people for drug 
possession alone is 
disproportionate 
and costly. But, any 
alternative system 
of responses is 
also potentially 
disproportionate 
and costly.  
New procedure 
(police or 
prosecutorial)  
 
Police training 
  
Police do little or 
nothing (e.g. they 
may issue 
warnings instead 
of arresting 
offenders for 
simple 
possession)  
 
 
Offenders contact 
with the CJS is 
reduced  
 
Fewer people are 
convicted 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduce/avoid 
collateral 
consequences of 
convictions (e.g. 
on employment)  
 
Reduce burden 
on the CJS and 
cost 
 
Increase policing 
of serious crime  
 
Increase 
voluntary 
treatment uptake 
Advantages and disadvantages 
As outlined in Table 11 a key advantage of depenalisation is that it is simple to implement, as it 
requires no changes in laws. Particularly in the Irish context it would not necessitate the adoption of 
civil or administrative sanctions. There is also little risk of over-burdening other systems such as 
treatment. There is evidence from Netherlands and Denmark that this approach can reduce demands 
on police, courts and prison. There is some evidence that this may also increase access to drug 
treatment and harm reduction services (via voluntary means). 
There are some disadvantages of this approach. Firstly, impacts on drug use appear to be variable. 
For example, evidence from the depenalisation model adopted in the Netherlands suggested that 
there was no or limited impact on use. In Denmark police argued depenalisation directly increased 
use of stimulants, as it sent the wrong message and undermined social controls about the 
acceptability of illicit drug use (Houborg, 2017). That said, no increase in cannabis use has been 
attributed to the partial depenalisation in England and Wales. Risks of justice by geography have also 
been observed in some US contexts, where programmes reduced cannabis arrests in specific areas 
but led to increased targeting in other areas (DeAngelo et al., 2018). Finally, the Lambeth experiment, 
showed that depenalisation can lead to net-widening. In Lambeth, there was a  61% increase in 
recorded cannabis possessions, in spite of no other evidence of change in cannabis prevalence 
(Adda et al., 2014). Such studies suggest that depenalisation can be shaped by level of police support 
for the reform and by performance targets. The latter was particularly shown in the UK as net-
widening reversed after the government stopped using targets for sanction detections to manage 
police performance (Shiner, 2015). This suggests that if adopted, top down leadership is required as 
well as guidance about the purpose and benefits of the reform.  
Table 11: Advantages and disadvantages from depenalisation  
Advantages Disadvantages 
• Simple to achieve and few 
implementation costs 
• Reduces convictions of PWUD  
• Risk of net-widening  
• Risk of a sense of impunity 
• Risk of increasing drug use 
• Reduces demands on and costs to the 
CJS (unless net-widening) 
• Risk of differential application / justice 
by geography  
• May reduce other more serious crimes  
• Avoids over-burdening other services   
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Model 2: Police diversion (de facto) 
The second approach – de facto police diversion – has been used in Australia, England, the 
Netherlands and the USA. There are two main approaches. The first is therapeutic diversion: where 
offenders are directed to education/assessment/treatment programmes (e.g. Australian models and 
Dutch Early Intervention Approach for hard drugs). The second has a broader diversionary approach: 
diversion to social and/or reintegration options as well as in some instance health programs (e.g. US 
LEAD programme and West Midlands Turning Point Programme).  
As outlined in Table 12 the programme logic of this approach contends that drug use is often more of 
a health or social issue than a criminal justice issue and as such police should not be arresting people 
for simple possession alone. It is also argued that police are one of the main gatekeepers who come 
into contact with people who possess drugs, and as such that they should play a role in fostering early 
intervention by referring offenders to services that they may not otherwise access. As such the key 
goal is to redirect people who use drugs away from the traditional criminal justice response and into 
other services that may be more beneficial. This can include alcohol and other drug 
education/treatment system or social systems (e.g. employment, training). Implicit in this approach is 
the notion that referring people who possess drugs to the health or social services will increase their 
knowledge and skills (e.g. awareness of the harms from drug use or resilience), address needs (e.g. 
treatment or employment) and/or reduce their likelihood of reoffending. This draws on three proven 
approaches to AOD dependence and offender management: first, the efficacy of drug treatment; 
second, the importance of seeing the law as an agent of change that can be therapeutic or anti-
therapeutic – and the proven benefits of employing a more therapeutic non-adversarial approach 
(Wexler, 2011); and third, the efficacy of offender rehabilitation that targets risk, need and responsivity 
(Andrews et al., 1990). Diversion programmes can also retain the deterrent threat of prosecution. As 
per Lammy (2017) the “hypothesis is that police can prevent crime by a combined treatment, holding 
a prosecution over the offender.”  
USA Diversion 
(e.g. LEAD) 
Rationale: To 
support/treat/ 
rehabilitate instead 
of punish  
Mechanism: De 
facto – referral to 
education/ 
treatment/ social 
services instead of 
charge  
Drugs: All illicit 
drugs  
Threshold limits: No  
Australia (five 
states) 
Rationale: Early 
intervention, reduce 
recidivism and 
reduce harmful drug 
use 
 
Mechanism: De facto 
– referral for 
assessment & brief 
intervention  
Drugs: All illict drugs 
or all except 
cannabis 
Threshold limits: Yes 
(typically 1 or 2g 
heroin or cocaine) 
Netherlands (hard 
drugs)  
Rationale: Early 
intervention with drug 
dependent offenders 
and to reduce harmful 
drug use 
 
Mechanism: De facto – 
visit by social worker in 
police custody and 
referral to treatment 
Drugs: Other illicit drugs 
Threshold limits: Yes 
0.5g heroin or cocaine  
England (e.g. West 
Midlands Turning 
Point Programme)  
Rationale: To reduce 
cost and recidivism 
(and increase access 
to all racial groups) 
Mechanism: De facto 
– police divert minor 
offenders to structured 
interventions eg 
treatment, mental 
health, and/or social 
services  
Drugs: All (and other 
petty offences) 
Threshold limits: No  
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Table 12: Programme logic – police diversion (de facto) 
Programme aim: To redirect people who use drugs away from the traditional criminal justice 
response and into health or social services, and thereby provide opportunities to intervene 
early, to build knowledge/skills and to reduce recidivism and drug-related harm 
Problem 
statement  
Inputs Process Outputs  Outcomes 
Drug use is more of 
a health or social 
issue than a 
criminal justice 
issue. Criminalising 
people for drug 
possession alone is 
disproportionate 
and costly, but 
turning a blind eye 
is also not the right 
approach. Police 
should thus divert 
offenders to health 
or social services 
New procedure 
(police or 
prosecutorial), 
including rules 
around 
eligibility e.g. 
drug types and 
TQs  
 
Police training 
 
AOD 
education/ 
treatment or 
other social 
supports 
 
  
Police switch to 
referring people 
instead of 
arresting for 
possession alone  
 
 
Quicker police 
interactions for 
simple 
possession  
 
Fewer people are 
convicted 
 
More referrals to 
health or social 
services  
 
 
 
 
Reduce/avoid 
collateral 
consequences of 
convictions (e.g. 
on employment)  
 
Reduce burden 
on CJS and cost 
 
Increase 
knowledge/skills 
amongst people 
who use drugs 
 
Reduce drug-
related harms 
 
Advantages and disadvantages 
The evidence reviewed suggests there are many advantages from de facto police diversion (see 
Table 13). For example, most programmes led to more offenders accessing treatment and/or other 
services (e.g. AIHW, 2014; Goetz and Mitchell, 2016), albeit the types of services accessed varied 
according to the specific mechanism. For example, the LEAD programme tended to lead to access to 
employment/training services (Collins et al., 2015b), whereas the Australian programmes to treatment 
or education services. Moreover, many showed evidence of increased knowledge acquisition and 
skills as well as reduction in drug-related harms, including reductions in intravenous use and high-
frequency use. 
There were also clear reductions in recidivism from many programmes. For example, research 
conducted by the University of Washington in Seattle has shown a 58% reduction in recidivism among 
LEAD participants when compared against a similar group that went through the traditional CJS entry 
(Collins et al., 2015b). Payne et al (2008) showed similar reductions in recidivism from police drug 
diversion in the Australian context: 53% to 63% reductions. Reductions in demand on the CJS have 
also been observed from most programmes. For example the English Turning Point programme 
yielded 68% fewer court cases than those cases that were prosecuted in the usual way for all crimes 
(Lammy, 2017).  
 
Police diversion, even when de facto, requires establishing a new system of responding, including 
new police procedures that define any eligibility criteria for access, such as if there are limits on the 
number of opportunities someone can be referred and if non-compliance will be followed up. Referral 
pathways also need to be established: will it be done by police or by offenders, and online or via 
telephone, as well as any new service provision (e.g. drug treatment). Importantly, the theory of this 
approach is that the setup costs of the programmes and ongoing costs for service provision will be 
cost-effective, as they will reduce drug-related harms and recidivism. Studies from Australia, England 
and the USA largely show that they are (Shanahan et al., 2017). For example as noted in the English 
context, “despite the costs associated with the structured interventions” the Turning Point programme 
led to “a saving of around £1,000 per case” (Lammy, 2017, p. 28). 
Finally, while in general police diversion has been associated with large increases in access to 
treatment (or social services) there are two noted exceptions in our review. The first was the NSW 
Cannabis Caution programme, which led to only 0.7% uptake of drug education (Baker and Goh, 
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2004). The second was the Dutch Early Intervention Approach that showed that only 1,590 persons 
out of the target group of 4,582 offenders in police custody or pre-trial detention were visited by a 
social worker from the Early Intervention team, and only 30% of those visited chose a treatment 
option, and even fewer actually entered treatment (Stevens et al. 2005). This suggests that 
therapeutic benefits of de facto police diversion may be less if it is “voluntary” for people who use 
drugs to attend and/or if the services provided are not attractive to the target group.  
The main disadvantages are firstly, the potential for this to be more resource intensive at least initially, 
for both the police/justice system and for treatment or social systems. Arguably more importantly is 
that given this is a discretionary model it may lead to inequitable application. This can lead to specific 
sub-groups of offenders (particularly ethnic minorities) less likely to be diverted, or to geographic 
variation in coverage, as was exemplified by the NSW Cannabis Caution programme (NSW Auditor 
General, 2011).  
There are several issues to consider for best practice implementation of de facto police diversion. The 
first is resourcing - if services are not properly funded or there are delays it will affect referral 
numbers, compliance and outcomes. Second, is the challenge in building mutual understanding and 
expectations between police and new service providers about the purpose of any diversion. 
Experience from the Australian context suggests this can take time, but that conflict is minimised if a 
harm reduction rather than abstinence goal is employed (Hughes et al., 2014). Third, given the 
discretionary nature of de facto programs, feedback mechanisms to police about the “worth” of 
diversion, such as from program evaluations can be vital. This is particularly important in the early 
years to build support and reduce any cultural resistance (Hughes et al, in press). Finally, careful 
design of any adopted eligibility criteria, such as threshold limits on amount of drug that can be 
possessed, rules around prior offences, limits on programme entry, or rules around requirements to 
admit an offence, is important to ensure any criteria do not adversely limit access to specific 
categories of groups (such as ethnic minorities) or exclude whole groups (Hughes et al, 2014; in 
press).  
Table 13: Advantages and disadvantages from police diversion (de facto)  
Advantages Disadvantages 
• Reduces convictions of PWUD 
• Increases access of offenders to 
treatment/mental health/social services  
• May be resource intensive (in short 
term) for police/justice system 
• Assessment and early intervention • Increases costs for other services  
• Addresses offender needs e.g. access 
to AOD treatment, employment or legal 
(dependent on model) 
• Given this is discretionary there may be 
specific groups of offenders who ‘miss 
out’ e.g. people of minority backgrounds 
• Reduces costs of criminal justice • Access may vary by region e.g. regional 
versus metropolitan areas • Reduces drug-related harms e.g. high 
frequency use 
• Reduces recidivism 
 
Model 3: Police diversion (de jure) 
A de jure model of police diversion has a similar programme logic to Model 2, namely that drug use is 
often more of a health or social issue than a criminal justice issue and that police can play a critical 
early intervention role (increasing knowledge about drugs or fostering behavioural change) by 
referring people who possess drugs onto health or social services (see Table 14). The key difference 
to Model 2 is that de jure diversion adopts a legislated approach to ensure that police are required to 
offer police referral to all in the target groups. This seeks to overcome some of the known challenges 
with Model 2 in which police retain discretion. Implicit in this approach is thus the belief that all people 
who possess drugs should be given the same opportunity of a health/social response. Examples of 
note are the South Australian Police Drug Diversion Initiative, the Queensland Police Diversion 
Program and the Western Australian Cannabis Intervention Requirement. 
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Table 14: Programme logic – police diversion (de jure) 
Programme aim: To redirect people who use drugs away from the traditional criminal justice 
response and into drug health or social services, while ensuring that all offenders are given 
the same opportunity to build knowledge, reduce recidivism and reduce drug-related harm  
Problem statement  Inputs Process Outputs  Outcomes 
Drug use is more of 
a health or social 
issue than a criminal 
justice issue. Hence 
people who use 
drugs should be 
directed to such 
services. But, de 
facto diversion will 
lead to bias and 
inconsistent 
application.  
New 
procedure 
(police or 
prosecutorial), 
including 
rules around 
eligibility e.g. 
drug types 
and TQs  
 
Police training 
 
AOD 
education/ 
treatment  
Police switch to 
referring people 
instead of 
arresting for 
possession alone  
 
 
Quicker police 
interactions for 
simple possession  
 
Fewer people are 
convicted  
 
More referrals of 
offenders to health 
or social services  
 
 
 
 
Reduce/avoid 
collateral 
consequences of 
convictions for all 
detected 
offenders who 
meet criteria (e.g. 
on employment)  
 
Reduce burden 
on CJS and cost 
(more so than 
Model 2) 
 
Increase 
offender’s 
knowledge/skills 
 
Reduce drug-
related harms. 
 
Equitable 
response to all 
PWUD 
Advantages and disadvantages 
One challenge in assessing the impacts of this policy option is that there are few examples. Two of 
the de jure schemes implemented in Australia – the Queensland Police Drug Diversion Program and 
the South Australian Police Drug Diversion Program – show very high treatment referrals and 
compliance and evidence of reduction in drug-related harms. For example, analysis of 10 years of 
provision of the South Australian Police Drug Diversion Initiative showed that 13,627 people had been 
diverted over that period, with 80% fulfilling the requirements and individuals who complied with their 
diversions were significantly less likely to reoffend. The Queensland Police Drug Diversion Program 
also led to 10,623 referrals for education and assessment: the highest rate of referral for a 
programme of its type in Australia, of whom 81% complied (Hales et al., 2004). Arguably the major 
advantage is that by removing discretion there are less likely to be specific groups of offenders who 
miss out (such as people of minority backgrounds). This can thus significantly increase access 
(Hughes et al, in press). 
Table 15: Advantages and disadvantages from police diversion (de jure)  
Advantages  Disadvantages 
• Reduces convictions of PWUD 
• Removes discretion that may limit 
access in de facto approaches 
• May be resource intensive for 
police/justice system 
• Increases access to all offenders to 
treatment/mental health/social services  
• Increases costs for treatment services 
• Address offender needs e.g. access to 
AOD treatment 
• May lead to “frequent fliers” entering the 
programme on repeated occasions  
• Reduces costs of criminal justice 
• Reduces drug-related harms  
• Reduces recidivism  
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Disadvantages are that this requires legislation and it is more resource intensive, both for treatment 
sectors as well as police/justice to manage referrals and compliance. The South Australian 
programme has also observed that while the majority of people receive only a single diversion (72.8 
per cent) there are some “frequent flyers”: 4 per cent had four or more diversions and one offender 
had 32 diversions, which can lead to allegations of the scheme being “soft”. It is also increasingly 
clear that even a de jure scheme will limit diversion access if the eligibility criteria are narrow. Of note, 
while the Queensland Police Drug Diversion Program has enabled very high levels of diversion of 
cannabis use/possess offenders, the programme is only open to people who use cannabis. This, 
coupled with the absence of any other illicit drug diversion programme, means that this state 
continues to have increasing rates of detections and people sent to court for minor possession alone 
(Hughes et al, in press).  
A key unknown is whether this type of reform would be cost-effective if applied to all illicit drugs. For 
example, the South Australian Police Drug Diversion Initiative operates alongside the South 
Australian Cannabis Expiation Notice scheme which offers a cheaper and faster response to the 
lionshare of people detected for simple possession offences.  
Model 4: Decriminalisation with no sanctions attached 
The fourth model is decriminalisation with no sanctions attached. 
The main such example is Germany, although Vermont, USA, 
adopted a similar approach in their 2018 legalisation of possession 
of cannabis for personal use. As outlined in Table 16 the 
programme logic of this approach is that drug possession should 
not be a crime, and that rather than setting up any alternate system 
or merely depenalising the offence, the best response is complete 
removal of the offence from the law. This has clear similarities with 
Model 1 (depenalisation), but this approach is legislated, in the aim 
of humanising the person, reducing stigma, sending a clear signal 
to society and overcoming any issues that may arise from a 
discretionary model. Reduction in stigma is conjectured to increase 
voluntary service uptake: more so than under Model 1 due to the 
legislative nature of the reform, which would tend to make it more 
widely known.  
Table 16: Programme logic – decriminalisation with no sanctions attached 
Programme aim: To send a signal that drug possession is not a crime and to ensure that 
people are not criminalised or sanctioned for simple possession alone. Also seeks to save 
police time to focus on more serious criminal activity.  
Problem statement  Inputs Process Outputs  Outcomes 
Criminalising people 
for drug possession 
alone is 
disproportionate and 
costly. Any 
alternative system of 
responses including 
mere depenalisation 
is also potentially 
inequitable and 
disproportionate, so 
the best response is 
to remove the 
offence from the law.   
Legislative 
change 
(removal 
criminal 
penalties for 
possession) 
 
Public 
education 
  
Police cease 
arresting people 
for simple 
possession 
alone 
 
 
Offenders contact 
with the CJS is 
ceased  
 
No new people are 
convicted  
 
Police attend to 
other crimes 
 
 
 
 
 
Eliminate 
collateral 
consequences of 
convictions (e.g. 
on employment)  
 
Reduce burden 
on CJS and cost 
 
Increase policing 
of serious crime  
 
Reduce stigma  
 
Increase 
voluntary 
treatment uptake 
Germany 
Rationale: That it is 
unconstitutional to 
criminalise personal users 
Mechanism: De jure – 
Constitutional court decision  
Drugs: All  
Threshold limits: Yes, 6-30 
grams cannabis and 10-30 
ecstasy pills 
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Advantages and disadvantages 
There is limited evidence-base on this approach and one reform (in Vermont) has only just 
commenced. Analysis of the German reform suggests this approach may lead to some benefits, 
including reductions in reliance on the CJS for simple possession offences, and reductions in drug-
related harms such as overdose and problematic drug use. For example, the number of newly 
registered heroin users in Frankfurt declined significantly from 903 in 1992 to 557 in 1993 after a 
consistent increase in the previous years (Fischer, 1995). More generally, Germany has lower rates of 
drug use, including problematic drug use, than many other European countries (Eastwood et al., 
2016), as well as lower rates of HIV and drug-related overdose. These rates have causes other than 
drug laws, including economic wellbeing, systems of healthcare and social support. The constitutional 
decision has been inconsistently applied at the local level, and there is little published in English on its 
implementation or effects on drug use and related harms. 
 
Overall, as outlined in Table 17, this suggests there may be positive benefits: of both reducing 
demands on the CJS and reducing drug-related harms via reducing barriers to treatment seeking and 
humanising people who use drugs. Decriminalisation with no sanctions attached is arguably simpler 
to implement than other legislative reforms (Models 5 and 6). This is particularly in the Irish context, 
as it does not require new civil or administrative systems to be set up. It also avoids the need for any 
new systems of referral or ongoing monitoring of offender compliance to be established.  
 
A key disadvantage, as evident in some German regions, is that this may be seen as giving a “free 
go” and hence may have less support of the police and/or differential application (justice by 
geography). That said, it remains unclear whether such effects were a by-product of the German 
experience, as opposed to an inevitable consequence of this model. Access to services is not directly 
facilitated via this model, which may affect the potential gains and the application/reach of the model. 
Best practice implementation may thus necessitate top down police leadership and investment in 
public education.  
 
Table 17: Advantages and disadvantages from decriminalisation with no sanctions attached  
Advantages Disadvantages 
• Eliminates convictions for possession 
alone 
• Reduces stigma of people who use 
drugs 
• Little evidence of effect on prevalence 
and frequency of drug use.  
• Reduces legal possibility to intervene in 
problematic drug use. 
• Reduces costs of criminal justice  
• Reduces barriers to harm reduction and 
treatment seeking 
• Reduces drug-related harms e.g. high 
frequency use 
• Simple to achieve and few set up costs 
(albeit more complex than Model 1) 
 
Model 5: Decriminalisation with civil or administrative sanctions  
Decriminalisation with civil or administrative sanctions operates in a number of countries, including the 
Czech Republic, Australia, USA and Jamaica. The programme logic for this approach is that drug 
possession should not be a crime, but it also should not just be ignored (see Table 18). Treating it as 
a lesser offence, similar to a driving / motor vehicle violation, thus provides the opportunity for the 
state to still sanction the behaviour, but without the risk of providing criminal convictions that may 
have adverse impacts on the future of people who use drugs. This model makes use of low level 
sanctions rather than therapeutic interventions. For example, it could be argued that it is better in 
some circumstances to charge a fine or to restrict a license than to send a person to treatment: 
particularly for relatively low risk activities like cannabis use.  
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Table 18: Programme logic – decriminalisation with civil/administrative sanctions 
Programme aim: To ensure that people are not criminalised for simple possession alone, 
while also recognising that complete removal of sanctions may send the wrong signal and 
thus to institute a new and alternate system. This also seeks to save police time to focus on 
more serious criminal activity.  
Problem 
statement  
Inputs Process Outputs  Outcomes 
Drug possession 
should not be a 
crime, but it 
shouldn’t just be 
ignored as this 
may send the 
wrong message 
people for drug 
possession and 
lead to new 
harms.   
Legislative 
change (new 
civil/administrative 
law) 
 
New system to 
response e.g. pay 
a fine online  
 
Public education 
  
Police switch to 
issuing 
civil/admin 
sanctions 
instead of 
arresting 
offenders 
 
 
Quicker police 
interactions for 
simple possession  
 
No new people or 
fewer people are 
convicted 
(dependent upon 
model) 
 
Offenders pay civil 
penalties  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduce collateral 
consequences of 
convictions (e.g. 
on employment)  
 
Reduce burden 
on CJS and cost 
 
Increase policing 
of serious crime  
 
Reduce stigma 
but also send a 
message that it is 
a sanctionable 
offence 
 
Increase revenue  
 
Advantages and disadvantages 
When well implemented decriminalisation with civil/administrative sanctions has been found to be 
faster for police and to lead to a reduced burden on the CJS. For example, demands on the Czech 
Republic CJS for possession have remained very low: particularly compared against other nations, 
including those with police diversion alone (Belackova et al., 2017). Decriminalisation with 
civil/administrative sanctions is also associated with social benefits for offenders from the removal of 
convictions, including employment prospects and housing stability (Ali et al, 1998; Shanahan et al, 
2017). More generally, there is evidence that decriminalisation with civil/administrative sanctions can 
facilitate the provision of harm reduction and treatment services and reduce drug-related harms 
Czech Republic  
Rationale: To use 
criminal sanctions as 
a last resort 
Mechanism: De jure –
administrative offence 
Drugs: All  
Threshold limits: Yes 
(currently 1.5 gram of 
heroin and 10 grams 
of cannabis) 
Jamaica 
Rationale: Reduce 
harm to users 
(including from a 
criminal conviction) 
Mechanism: De jure –
Replacement of 
criminal penalties with 
a civil fine (‘fixed 
penalty notice’) of 
J$500 (€3.14) 
Drugs: Cannabis only 
Threshold limits: Yes 
(2 ounces) 
USA Decriminalistion  
(e.g. Ohio, 
Mississippi and 
Rhode Island) 
Rationale: To reduce 
the burden on the 
criminal justice system 
& to reduce collateral 
consequences to 
people who use drugs 
Mechanism: De jure – 
with civil penalties 
Drugs: Cannabis  
Threshold limits: Yes, 
one ounce is the norm 
Australia civil 
penalty schemes 
(three states: ACT, 
NT, SA)  
Rationale: To use 
criminal sanctions as 
a last resort 
Mechanism: De jure –
with civil penalties 
Drugs: Cannabis  
Threshold limits: Yes 
50-100 grams (varies 
by state) 
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(although the benefit is realised by the removal of stigma around service access as opposed to via 
direct referral as in some reforms, such as Models 2, 3 or 6). The benefits of reducing stigma for 
service access were particularly apparent in the natural experiments in Czech Republic where both 
harm reduction services and people who use drugs noted that the tightening of the reform reduced 
service access (Zábranský et al. 2001). Most schemes have found drug use trends have remained 
stable or reduced. Of note, Gruzia et al. (2018) found decriminalisation was not associated with any 
increase in the past-30 day prevalence of cannabis use among adolescents and instead significant 
declines in prevalence were observed for Rhode Island. 
However, outcomes have been less positive in some contexts. For example, Pacula et al (2003) 
found youths living in US decriminalised states were 2% more likely to use cannabis both in the past 
year and in the past month, and that states that ruled out all forms of imprisonment were associated 
with a higher prevalence of use. Moreover, some recent US studies have noted increases in drug 
driving in states with decriminalisation with civil penalties. Examples of net widening have also been 
observed, particularly in the early years of the South Australian Cannabis Expiation Notice that 
resulted in a 2.5-fold increase in detections. (Similar experiences occurred in New York and Chicago).  
Two aspects of these findings should be noted, following the work of Pacula et al (2003), MacCoun et 
al (2009) and Logan (2014). One is that many people are not aware what sanctions apply to cannabis 
possession in their state. The other is that many states that have formally decriminalised actually 
have higher rates of arrest for low level drug offences than state that have not decriminalised. This 
means that findings on the effects of decriminalisation on cannabis use in US states are ‘fairly weak’ 
as well as being ‘inconsistent’ (MacCoun et al 2009). 
Importantly, the more recent reforms in the US have been associated with more positive outcomes. 
For example, Gruzia et al (2018) analysis of five states in the USA that passed decriminalisation 
measures between the years 2008 and 2014 found the reforms were associated with an immediate 
and strong reduction in the rate of drug-related arrests for youth and adults, including reductions in 
most cases by 50% or more. But this nevertheless shows that there may be some unintended 
consequence of this approach particularly if the approach is not well implemented.   
The research suggests that it is important to consider the impacts of an expiation system on groups 
who have financial difficulty. For example, in the South Australian Cannabis Expiation Notice scheme 
people who were unemployed could not comply with the new expiation scheme. This suggests that 
two requesite elements for effective implementation include allowing for different avenues to pay (e.g. 
via commmunity service) and ensuring easy systems of payment (e.g. online). Moreover, reforms that 
continue to retain the option of prison penalties (for repeat offenders) will inherently reduce the 
number of people who will avoid a conviction. Full implementation as per the examples from the 
Czech Republic and Australia would thus appear to offer much greater potential benefit.  
Table 19: Advantages and disadvantages from decriminalisation with civil/administrative 
sanctions  
Advantages Disadvantages 
• Reduce convictions for PWUD  
• Faster for police 
• Need a civil/administrative system  
• Need a system for payment 
• Very cheap to run (particularly with new 
revenue) 
• Alternate system may not be fair for all 
i.e. advantages wealthy people 
• Social benefits for offenders from 
reducing conviction e.g. increased 
employment prospects 
• Risk of net-widening as “easy” for police 
• Risk of increased drug use and driving 
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Model 6: Decriminalisation with targeted diversion to health / social 
services 
A sixth model and alternative is decriminalisation with targeted diversion to health/social services. The 
clearest example of this is the Portuguese decriminalisation, where all drug possession offenders are 
referred to dissuasion committees and then problematic drug users are referred to drug treatment and 
other social services. A handful of states in the USA have also adopted targeted diversionary 
elements as part of their approach to decriminalisation of cannabis. The key mechanism that 
differentiates this approach from Model 2 and 3 is that intensive responses are aimed at high-risk 
offenders.  
 
The extent of application in the US examples differs but each are instructive. The first example is 
Maryland, which in 2014 made possession of up to 10 grams of cannabis a civil offence only 
(sanctionable with a $100-500 fine). Maryland retained the option to divert offenders to 
education/assessment and/or treatment for youth aged less than 21 and repeat adult offenders 
(defined as third time offenders). The goal was to identify those with or at risk of a substance abuse 
disorder and to encourage treatment uptake. The second example is Connecticut, which in 2011 
made possession of less than half an ounce (14 grams of cannabis) a civil offence (sanctionable with 
a $150-500 fine). Here for a second offence, the court must make an evaluation and if the 
court decides the person is drug dependent, prosecution may be suspended, and the person ordered 
to complete a drug abuse treatment programme. The final example is Nebraska, which in 1978 made 
a first offence involving possession of up to an ounce of marijuana a civil infraction punishable by a 
$300 fine — and a possible drug education course — instead of jail time.  Under this reform any 
subsequent possession offences could lead to imprisonment.  
As outlined in Table 20 the programme logic for this approach is that society can and should deal with 
drug possession outside the criminal law. However, there should be options for the employment of 
health/social services instead of criminal sanction for those who need it. This model is about 
recognising that most people will use drugs in non-problematic ways, but for a minority there may be 
broader drivers and hence more complex needs. Hence, removing criminal penalties whilst also 
providing targeted options for diversion to health/social services is a more effective hybrid system that 
offers the potential to firstly, reduce the harms from giving people a criminal conviction for simple 
possession alone, secondly reduce the burden on the CJS, and thirdly, assess and potentially treat or 
provide social supports to ‘high-risk offenders’. A final but important part of this programme logic that 
differentiates it from some of the other therapeutic diversionary models (Model 2 and 3) is the notion 
that only high-risk offenders should be referred to treatment: either based on age, or number of times 
they have been seen, or assessment of offender’s needs by independent panels (Portugal). This thus 
offers the potential to avoid any potential increase in drug use that may occur after removing criminal 
penalties albeit in a more targeted way. 
Portuguese decriminalisation 
Rationale: Social integration of 
problematic drug users 
Mechanism: De jure – Possession became 
an administrative offence, with diversion to 
dissuasion committees and targeted 
referral of drug dependent offenders to 
treatment  
Drugs: All 
Threshold limits: Yes (10 days supply e.g. 
1 gram of heroin, 25 grams of cannabis) 
Maryland decriminalisation (2014) 
Rationale:  
• Reduce collateral consequences of a 
cannabis conviction  
• Early intervention for high-risk pops 
Mechanism: De jure – Possession became a 
civil offence ($100-500), but with diversion to 
education, assessment &/or treatment for 
youth and repeat offenders 
Drugs: Cannabis 
Threshold limits: Yes (10 grams) 
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Table 20: Programme logic - decriminalisation with targeted diversion to health/social services 
Programme aim: To ensure that people are not criminalised for simple possession alone, 
while also recognising that drug use can be a potentially harmful behaviour and/or symptom 
of broader health or social problems, and thus that governments ought to use the point of 
detection as a means by which to screen and address high-risk offender needs (be it 
treatment or other needs) 
Problem statement  Inputs Process Outputs  Outcomes 
Criminalising people 
for drug possession 
alone is 
disproportionate and 
costly. It also 
exacerbates harms 
amongst the minority 
of people who are 
problematic drug 
users. But referring 
all offenders to the 
drug treatment 
system is also not 
required. We need 
therefore a targeted 
response.  
New law (civil 
or 
administrative)  
 
Screening and 
assessment 
procedures for 
high risk 
offenders  
 
Alcohol and 
other drug 
(AOD) 
treatment  
 
Other services 
as relevant 
through 
brokerage 
(e.g. 
employment 
services) 
  
  
Low risk 
offenders receive 
non-criminal 
response (civil 
penalties or 
suspended 
sanctions etc.)  
 
High-risk 
offenders are 
referred to AOD 
assessment and 
treatment  
Low risk 
offenders avoid 
convictions  
 
High risk 
offenders avoid 
convictions and 
have AOD needs 
met 
 
Agencies (e.g. 
AOD treatment 
agencies) are not 
burdened  
 
Holistic response 
 
Offenders have 
increased access 
to AOD/other 
services (if and 
when required) 
 
Avoid collateral 
consequences of 
convictions (e.g. 
on employment)  
 
Improve social 
integration  
 
Reduce in AOD 
dependence 
 
Reduce in drug-
related harms  
 
Reduce burden 
on CJS and cost 
 
 
Advantages and disadvantages 
As outlined in Table 21 studies have found that decriminalisation with targeted diversion to 
health/social services are associated with lower rates of regular or problematic drug use. For 
example, Grucza et al. (2018) showed that post reform both Maryland and Connecticut had lower 
rates of regular use, defined as 10 or more times in the past 30 days: 8.1% and 8.9% respectively, 
compared to 10.3% to 11.1% for decriminalisation states employing civil penalties alone. Moreover, 
the prevalence of any cannabis use in the last 30 days in Maryland were similar to non-decriminalised 
states: 20.5% compared to 19.5% for non- decriminalised states and 23-25.8% for the decriminalised 
states employing civil penalties only. Moreover, the Portuguese decriminalisation was followed by 
reduced illicit drug use among problematic drug users and adolescents, as well as significant 
reductions in drug-related harms including opiate-related deaths and infectious diseases (Hughes & 
Stevens, 2010; Hughes & Stevens, 2015b). The evaluation of the Portuguese model by Pombo and 
da costa (2016) showed that drug treatment engagement increased by 94% from pre to post reform 
and that drug injection had decreased with heroin users smoking heroin rather than injecting it. HIV 
infection decreased, too from 28.0% to 19.6%. It is important, however, to consider the contribution of 
more general changes to welfare and healthcare systems in contributing to these improvements 
(Hughes & Stevens, 2010). 
Studies have also shown that such reforms tend to lead to a reduction in the burden on the CJS. For 
example, Grucza et al (2018) showed that post reform the arrest rate in Maryland fell 42% for youth 
(aged 18 and under) and 35% for adults. The trend was less than in non-therapeutic decriminalisation 
states, where there was an average reduction of 75% in decriminalisation states for youth and 78% 
for adults. This was attributed to Maryland having the lowest threshold amount for the lowest level of 
possession offence (10 grams, compared to 28 grams). Nevertheless, the significant declines were 
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very much in line with the intended programme logic. Connecticut also observed declines in arrest 
rates for cannabis possession, specifically a 51% reduction for youth and 70% for adults (Grucza et 
al., 2018). Moreover, Portugal saw significant reductions in burden of drug offenders on the CJS, with 
falls in arrests, imprisonment and prison overcrowding (Hughes & Stevens, 2010).  
More generally, analysis of the Portuguese reform has shown increased access to specialised 
services for high-risk offenders, although most offenders are dealt with through more minor methods 
(suspended proceedings). For example, evaluation of the CDTs found that about a quarter of the 
participants were referred to specialised services in addictive behaviours, mainly treatment structures, 
and for half of them this was the first contact with these structures (Carapinha et al., 2017). 
Importantly, taking into account the new services the approach also reduced social costs. For 
example, Gonçalves et al. (2015) found social cost of drugs reduced by 12% in the first 5 years and 
by 18% in the longer term (10 years).  
However, in relation to the Nebraska reform, Sugg (1981) concluded that there was a small but 
insignificant increase in the number of adults arrested each month and a small but insignificant 
decrease in the number of minors arrested each month. For adults the mean number of charges filed 
increased after the new law went into effect (from 26.7 to 36.2) but not significantly. Sugg (1981, p. 
64) concluded:  
On the whole, it appears that the decriminalisation law per se has not significantly lessened 
enforcement efforts of the legal actors involved with the law. The actual frequency of arrests 
and citations by police officers has not decreased, nor has the frequency of judge’s ruling 
defendants not guilty increased. And while there is some evidence from the police survey that 
a minority of officers feel that they have reduced their enforcement efforts in this area, this 
possible reduction is offset by a very large increase in the enforcement efforts on the part of 
the prosecuting attorney. That is to say, more of the cases brought to the county attorney's 
office are actually prosecuted. In this sense it can be said that decriminalisation has had an 
overall effect of enhancing the enforcement of the law against marijuana possession.  
More recently Nebraska has one of the highest marijuana arrest rates in the USA. This suggests that 
decriminalisation with targeted diversion will have limited capacity to reduce the burden on the CJS or 
increase offender access or reduce drug-related harm if it remains within a framework of coercive 
control. Requesite elements for good implementation include: an administrative or civil legal basis; 
streamlined / non-resource intensive referral pathway; efficious treatment options; police training 
about new procedures; public education about the new law; and well designed eligibility criteria e.g. 
threshold quantities that are established high enough to fit typical patterns of possession in Ireland. 
Table 21: Advantages and disadvantages from decriminalisation with diversion to health/social 
services  
Advantages Disadvantages 
• Holistic response system based on 
need: “low” versus “high-risk” 
• Requires new infrastructure including 
new administrative legal basis and new 
referral pathways 
• Increases access of high-risk offenders 
to treatment/mental health/social 
services 
• Some increased costs for other services 
(but much lower than in Model 3) 
• Reduces problematic drug use 
• Reduces drug-related harms e.g. 
overdose, HIV and Hepatitis C 
• Reduces burden on the CJS 
• Reduces costs 
• Increases social reintegration 
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Blended models 
A final consideration is that a jurisdiction may adopt multiple different models. These could then be 
applied in different areas or by different police agencies, to different drugs, or to different target 
groups (e.g. children/adults, occasional/frequent users). For example, in the USA there is 
depenalisation in LA County, diversion in Seattle and Baltimore and decriminalisation with civil 
penalties in Ohio, Mississippi and Rhode Island. In the UK, Scotland has a different approach to 
depenalisation (e.g. cannabis warnings) to that in England and Wales, where different police force 
areas place different priorities on the enforcement of laws against drug possession. And some areas 
in England (e.g. Durham, Bristol, and the West Midlands) have introduced diversion schemes, while 
others have not. 
Different models can also be applied within the same area as shown in the Netherlands and many 
states of Australia as well as in some parts of England and Wales. Examples are summarised in 
Table 22. For example, across the Netherlands there are dual models of depenalisation of cannabis 
and de facto police diversion for other illicit drugs. Moreover, in Australia, five states/territories employ 
two models. The types differ. For example, Victoria has two de facto police diversion programmes 
targeting different drug types, with a less intense programme for cannabis than for other illicit drugs. 
Moreover, three states/territories have decriminalisation with civil penalties for cannabis, but de facto 
or de jure police diversion for other illicit drugs (or cannabis and other illicit drugs), which allows 
different mechanisms of response for different drug types. A further Australian example is that of 
Tasmania, which provides multiple models within the one programme: first time cannabis 
use/possession leads to a warning, whereas a third-time cannabis use/possession offence or first 
time other illicit drug use/possession leads to a therapeutic intervention and treatment. Finally, 
England and Wales offer yet another example of dual models, as while depenalisation of cannabis is 
offered across all regions, some regions such as Durham and Avon in Bristol also have de facto 
police diversion for other drugs.  
Table 22: Countries/regions operating two models within the same geographic area 
Location Model 1 Model 2 
Netherlands Depenalisation (cannabis) Police diversion (de facto) (other 
illicit drugs) 
England & Wales Depenalisation (cannabis) Police diversion (de facto) (other 
drugs [in a few areas e.g. Durham 
and Avon) 
Portugal Decriminalisation with targeted 
diversion to health/social services 
[includes diversion to health/social 
services within the model] 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
Decriminalisation with civil penalties 
(cannabis) 
Police diversion (de facto) 
(cannabis and other illicit drugs) 
Northern Territory Decriminalisation with civil penalties 
(cannabis) 
Police diversion (de facto) 
(cannabis and other illicit drugs) 
South Australia  Decriminalisation with civil penalties 
(cannabis) 
Police diversion (de jure) (other 
illicit drugs) 
Victoria Police diversion (de facto) (cannabis) Police diversion (de facto) (other 
illicit drugs) 
Western Australia  Police diversion (de jure) (cannabis) Police diversion (de facto) (other 
illicit drugs)  
 
Importantly, the Dutch and Australian approaches have now operated for many years. This shows 
that adopting a dual model can enable different objectives to be achieved at the same time, such as 
targeting different groups, or reserving scarce resources for those who most need it (high-needs 
offenders). As such it can offer a more comprehensive system but also a more cost-effective system. 
For example, in the ACT Hughes et al, (2014) showed that police use of a civil fine (de jure 
decriminalisation with civil penalties) was cheaper than referral for an alcohol and other drug 
assessment and brief intervention. Combining two models of de jure decriminalisation with civil 
penalties for cannabis possession with a therapeutic programme of police diversion for possession of 
cannabis or other illicit drugs improves the cost-effectiveness of the system, over and above sending 
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everyone to treatment. It also affords people who use cannabis the choice in this case over what 
system they prefer: alcohol and other drug assessment or payment of a civil penalty.  
As outlined above the Portuguese model of decriminalisation with diversion includes processes for 
combining different approaches within the same approach. The de jure decriminalisation applies to all 
types of illicit drugs. Everyone who is found to be in possession of small quantities is referred to a 
local CDT (commission for the dissuasion of addiction). The CDTs act as a mechanism of triage; 
assessing the needs of each person and deciding on appropriate intervention. For occasional users of 
cannabis, there is usually no sanction or intervention (suspension of proceedings). For repeat 
offences by people who are considered not to be dependent on drugs, the CDT can impose a fine. 
For people who are considered to have a drug problem, the CDT can refer to local treatment 
agencies.  
Lessons on ‘best practice’ approaches when multiple models are applied include the following. First, if 
different programmes are offered it is important to have a clear understanding about the goals of 
each. Second, rather than having very different rules for different programmes, clear and harmonised 
eligibility criteria and systems can make it easier for police. One example of a non-streamlined system 
is Western Australia, where police are required to carry two different books to use the different 
programmes and where eligibility criteria have differed between the two programmes. An advantage 
of the Portuguese approach or indeed the Tasmanian diversionary response is that it incorporates 
streamlining and harmonisation across types of drugs and people who use drugs within the one 
system. 
Concluding remarks 
In summary, this report has outlined an array of policy options that could be taken be Ireland, each of 
which offers potential benefits: including for people who possess drugs, for the CJS, for taxpayers and 
for other service providers. Given what is known about the drug problem in Ireland, including relatively 
high levels of both cannabis and heroin use, with an interrelationship between unemployment and 
problematic drug use, a mixed approach (combining a few of the models outlined) may be the 
preferred approach. The Irish government could, for example, reduce the burden of criminalisation on 
people who use drugs by applying both depenalisation of the most minor drug possession offences 
and decriminalisation with targeted diversion for those offenders who are more likely to need it. On 
the basis of the available evidence, this would pose a minimal risk of increasing drug use (and so may 
have little effect on serious organised crime or drug driving), would reduce costs in the CJS, and 
would provide additional pathways into treatment for people who need it (while not overburdening the 
treatment system with people who do not need it).  
Any alternative approach to dealing with simple drug possession comes with risks. The research in 
this area is complex, incomplete and not capable of providing definitive answers about what the 
outcome of any given approach will be in the Irish context. The current approach also entails risk, 
including that costs and burdens are placed on citizens (taxpayers and people who use drugs) that 
are not justified by effects in reducing social and health harms. We hope this report will help to inform 
discussion in Ireland on how the best balance of risks and burdens can be achieved.  
73 
 
References  
ACMD. (2016). Reducing opioid-related deaths in the UK. London: Home Office. 
Adda, J., McConnell, B., & Rasul, I. (2014). Crime and the Depenalization of Cannabis Possession: 
Evidence from a Policing Experiment. Journal of Political Economy, 122(5), 1130-1202.  
Ali, R., Christie, P., Lenton, S., Hawks, D., Sutton, A., Hall, W., & Allsop, S. (1999). The social impacts 
of the cannabis expiation notice scheme in South Australia. Canberra: Department of Health 
and Aged Care. 
An Garda Síochána. (2006). Adult Cautioning scheme. Dublin. 
Andrews, D. A., Zinger, I., Hoge, R. D., Bonta, J., Gendreau, P., & Cullen, F. T. (1990). Does 
correctional treatment work? A clinically relevant and psychologically informed meta-analysis. 
Criminology, 28(3), 369-404. 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. (2014). Alcohol and other drug treatment and diversion 
from the Australian CJS: 2012-13. Canberra: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. 
Babor, T., Caulkins, J., Edwards, G., Fischer, B., Foxcroft, D., Humphreys, K., … Strang, J. (2010). 
Drug Policy and the Public Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Babor, T. F., & et al. (2018). Drug Policy and the Public Good. 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Baker, J., & Goh, D. (2004). The cannabis cautioning scheme three years on: An implementation and 
outcome evaluation. Sydney: New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. 
Bates, G. (2017). The drugs situation in Ireland: an overview of trends from 2005 to 2015 . Liverpool: 
Liverpool John Moores University, Centre for Public Health. 
Belackova, V., Ritter, A., Shanahan, M., & Hughes, C. E. (2017). Assessing the concordance between 
illicit drug laws on the books and drug law enforcement: Comparison of three states on the 
continuum from "decriminalised" to "punitive". International Journal of Drug Policy, 41, 148-
157 
Belackova, V., & Stefunkova, M. (2018). Interpreting the Czech drug decriminalization: The glass is 
half full–Response to Cerveny, J., Chomynova, P., Mravcik, V., & van Ours, JC (2017). 
Cannabis decriminalization and the age of onset of cannabis use. International Journal of 
Drug Policy, 52, 102-105.  
Bollinger, L. (2004). Drug law and policy in Germany and the European community: Recent 
developments. Journal of Drug Issues, 34(3), 491-509.  
Breen, J. (2010). Secondary Effects of Imprisonment: The New Direction of Prison Research. Irish 
Probation Journal, 7(September), 46–64. 
Brunet, J. R. (2002). Discouragement of Crime through Civil Remedies: An Application of a 
Reformulated Routine Activities Theory. Western Criminology Review, 4. 
Bullington, B. (1994). War and peace: Drug policy in the United States and the Netherlands. Crime, 
Law and Social Change, 22(3), 213-238.  
Cambell, L. (2005). Garda Diversion of Young Offenders: An Unreasonable Threat to Due Process 
Rights? Irish Journal of Applied Social Studies Est, 6(1), 13–26.  
Cameron, L., & Williams, J. (2001). Cannabis, alcohol and cigarettes: substitutes or complements? 
Economic Record, 77(236), 19-34.  
Carapinha, L., Guerreiro, C., & Dias, L. (2017). Effects of dissuasion intervention, based on 
commissions for the dissuasion of drug addiction activity 2017. Lisbon: SICAD. 
Carew, A. M., & Comiskey, C. (2018). Treatment for opioid use and outcomes in older adults: a 
systematic literature review. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 182, 48–57.  
Caulkins, J. P., & Reuter, P. (2009). Towards a harm-reduction approach to enforcement. Safer 
Communities, 8(1), 9–23. 
Caulkins, J. P., Reuter, P. H., Iguchi, M. Y., & Chiesa, J. (2005). How goes the “War on Drugs”? An 
assessment of the U.S. drug problems and policy. Santa Monica: RAND. 
CBI. (2018). Outline of the Administrative Sanctions Procedure. Dublin: Central Bank or Ireland. 
Chaloupka, F. J., & Laixuthai, A. (1997). Do youths substitute alcohol and marijuana? Some 
econometric evidence. Eastern Economic Journal, 23(3), 253-276.  
Chatwin, C. (2016). Mixed messages from Europe on drug policy reform: The cases of Sweden and 
the Netherlands. Journal of Drug Policy Analysis, 11(1).  
Christie, P., & Ali, R. (2000). Offences under the Cannabis Expiation Notice scheme in South 
Australia. Drug and Alcohol Review, 19(3), 251-256.  
CLCAC. (2013). Draft Criminal Code and Commentary. Dublin: Criminal Law Codification Advisory 
Committee. 
74 
 
Cohen, S. (1979). The punitive city: notes on the dispersal of social control. Contemporary crises, 
3(4), 339-363.  
Cohen, S. (1985). Visions of Social Control. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Collins, S. E., Lonczak, H. S., & Clifasefi, S. L. (2015a). LEAD program evaluation: Criminal  justice  
and  legal system utilization  and  associated  costs. Washington: University of Washington. 
Collins, S. E., Lonczak, H. S., & Clifasefi, S. L. (2015b). LEAD program evaluation: Recidivism report. 
Washington: University of Washington. 
Comiskey, C. (2018). Reducing Harm, Supporting Recovery: A partnership and evidence informed 
approach to developing the new Irish national drug strategy Catherine. In 12th Annual 
Conference of the International Society for the Study of Drug Policy. Vancouver. 
Connolly, J. (2006). Drugs and crime in Ireland. Dublin: Health Research Board. 
Conway, V., Daly, Y., & Schweppe, J. (2010). Irish Criminal Justice: Theory, Practice and Procedure. 
Dublin: Clarus Press. 
Crouch, R. W. (2015). Essays on drug and alcohol policies in the United States. PhD Thesis, 
University of Houston.    
Csete, J. (2012). A balancing act: policymaking on illicit drugs in the Czech Republic. New York:: 
Open Society Foundations. 
Damrongplasit, K., Hsiao, C., & Zhao, X. Y. (2010). Decriminalization and Marijuana Smoking 
Prevalence: Evidence From Australia. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 28(3), 344-
356.  
DeAngelo, G. J., Gittings, R. K., & Ross, A. (2018). Police incentives, policy spillovers, and the 
enforcement of drug crimes. Review of Law & Economics, 14(1).  
Department of Health (2017) Reducing harm, supporting recovery: a health-led response to drug and 
alcohol use in Ireland 2017—2025. Dublin: Department of Health. 
DJELR. (2010). Review of the drug treatment court. Dublin: Department of Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform. 
Donnelly, N., Hall, W., & Christie, P. (1995). The effects of partial decriminalisation on cannabis use in 
South Australia, 1985 to 1993. Australian Journal of Public Health, 19(3), 281-287.  
Eastwood, N., Fox, E., & Rosmarin, A. (2016). A quiet revolution: Drug decriminalisation policies in 
practice across the globe (2nd ed.). London: Release. 
Elvik, R. (2013). Risk of road accident associated with the use of drugs: A systematic review and 
meta-analysis of evidence from epidemiological studies. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 60, 
254–267.  
Emanuel, M. A., Haughton, A. Y., & K’nife, K. a. (2018). Policy analysis and implications of 
establishing the Caribbean Cannabis Economy (CCE): lessons from Jamaica. Drugs and 
Alcohol Today, 18(2), 99-107. 
EMCDDA. (2004a). Annual report 2004: The state of the drugs problem in the European Union and 
Norway. Lisbon: EMCDDA. 
EMCDDA. (2004b). Denmark: New development, trends and in-depth information on selected issues. 
Lisbon: EMCDDA. 
EMCDDA. (2015). National Report 2014: Portugal. Lisbon: EMCDDA. 
EMCDDA. (2017). Drug trafficking penalties across the European Union a survey of expert opinion. 
Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction. 
EMCDDA. (2017). Portugal, Country Drug Report 2017. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union. 
EMCDDA. (2018). Ireland drug report. Lisbon: European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction. 
Fischer, B. (1995). Drugs, communities, and ''harm reduction'' in Germany: The new relevance of 
''public health'' principles in local responses. Journal of Public Health Policy, 16(4), 389-411.  
Funnell, S. C., & Rogers, P. J. (2011). Purposeful program theory: Effective use of theories of change 
and logic models (Vol. 31). San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons. 
Fitzgerald, G., & McFadden, D. (2011). Filling a gap in Irish competition law enforcement: the need for 
a civil fines sanction. Dublin: The Competition Authority. 
Galski, T., Williams, J. B., & Ehle, H. T. (2000). Effects of opioids on driving ability. Journal of Pain 
and Symptom Management, 19(3), 200–208. 
Garda Bureau of Community Engagement. (2017). 2016 Annual Report of the Committee Appointed 
to Monitor the Effectiveness of the Diversion Programme. Dubin. 
Goetz, B., & Mitchell, R. E. (2006). Pre-arrest/booking drug control strategies: Diversion to treatment, 
harm reduction and police involvement. Contemporary drug problems, 33(3), 473-520.  
Goldstein, P. (1985). The drugs-violence nexus: A tripartite framework. Journal of Drug Issues, 15, 
75 
 
493–506. 
Gonçalves, R., Lourenço, A., & da Silva, S. N. (2015). A social cost perspective in the wake of the 
Portuguese strategy for the fight against drugs. International Journal of Drug Policy, 26(2), 
199-209.  
Griffiths, P., Strang, J., & Singleton, N. (2016). Report of the Rapid Expert Review of the National 
Drug Strategy. Dublin: Department of Health. 
Grucza, R., Vuolo, M., Krauss, M., Plunk, A., Agrawal, A., Chaloupka, F. J., & Bierut, L. (2018). 
Cannabis decriminalization: A study of recent policy chane in five U.S. states. International 
Journal of Drug Policy, 59, 67-75. 
Grund, J.-P. C., & Breeksema, J. J. (2017). Drug policy in the Netherlands. In R. Colson & H. 
Bergeron (Eds.), European Drug Policies: The Ways of Reform (pp. 128-148). New York: 
Routledge. 
Hales, J., Mayne, M., Swan, A., Alberti, S., & Ritter, A. (2004). Evaluation of Queensland Illicit Drug 
Diversion Initiative (QIDDI) Police Diversion Program. Kent Town, SA: Health Outcomes 
International Pty Ltd and Turning Point Alcohol and Drug Centre,. 
Health Service Executive. (2017). Central Treatment List Summary Report for period 01 December to 
31 December 2016. Dublin: Health Service Executive. 
Heap, V. (2014). Transforming anti-social behaviour: ASBOs, injunctions and cross-cutting criminal 
justice concerns. British Journal of Community Justice, 12(3), 67–79. 
Herbert, A., Gilbert, R., Cottrell, D., & Li, L. (2017). Causes of death up to 10 years after admissions 
to hospitals for self-inflicted, drug-related or alcohol-related, or violent injury during 
adolescence: a retrospective, nationwide, cohort study. The Lancet, 390(10094), 577-587.  
Holzer, T. (2017). German drug policy. In R. N. Colson & H. Bergeron (Eds.), European Drug Policies: 
The Ways of Reform: (pp. 100-113): Routledge, United Kingdom. 
Houborg, E. (2010). Control and welafre in Danish drug policy. Journal of Drug Issues, 40(4), 783-
804.  
Houborg, E. (2017). Danish drug policy. In R. N. Colson & H. Bergeron (Eds.), European Drug 
Policies: The Ways of Reform: (pp. 73-86): Routledge, United Kingdom. 
Hourigan, N., Morrison, J. F., Windle, J., & Silke, A. (2018). Crime in Ireland north and south: Feuding 
gangs and profiteering paramilitaries. Trends in Organized Crime, 21(2), 126–146.  
HRB. (2017). Drug treatment in Ireland. Dublin: Health Research Board. 
Huber, A., Newman, R., & LaFave, D. (2016). Cannabis Control and Crime: Medicinal Use, 
Depenalization and the War on Drugs. B E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 16(4), 35.  
Hughes, C. (2017). Portuguese drug policy. In R. N. Colson & H. Bergeron (Eds.), European Drug 
Policies: The Ways of Reform: (pp. 164-181). Routledge, United Kingdom.  
Hughes, C., Seear, K., Ritter, A., & Mazerolle, L. (in press). Criminal justice responses relating to 
personal use and possession of illicit drugs: The reach of Australian drug diversion programs 
and barriers and facilitators to expansion. A report for the Commonwealth Department of 
Health. Sydney: NDARC, UNSW. 
Hughes, C., & Ritter, A. (2008). Monograph No. 16: A summary of diversion programs for drug and 
drug-related offenders in Australia DPMP Monograph Series. Sydney: National Drug and 
Alcohol Research Centre. 
Hughes, C., Shanahan, M., Ritter, A., McDonald, D., & Gray-Weale, F. (2014). Monograph No. 25: 
Evaluation of the ACT drug diversion programs DPMP Monograph Series Sydney: National 
Drug and Alcohol Research Centre. 
Hughes, C. E. (2007). Evidence-based policy or policy-based evidence? The role of evidence in the 
development and implementation of the Illicit Drug Diversion Initiative. Drug and Alcohol 
Review, 26(4), 363-368.  
Hughes, C. E., & Stevens, A. (2010). What Can We Learn From The Portuguese Decriminalization of 
Illicit Drugs? British Journal of Criminology, 50(6), 999-1022.  
Hughes, C. E., & Stevens, A. (2015). A resounding success or a disastrous failure: Re-examining the 
interpretation of evidence on the Portuguese decriminalisation of illicit drugs. In M. W. Brienen 
& J. D. Rosen (Eds.), New Approaches to Drug Policies: A Time for Change (pp. 137-162). 
London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Kilmer, B., & Reuter, P. (2009). Prime Numbers: Doped. Foriegn Policy Analysis. 
Kruithof, K., Davies, M., Disley, E., Strang, L., & Ito, K. (2016). Study on alternatives to coercive 
sanctions as response to drug law offences and drug- related crimes. Brussels: European 
Commission. 
Lammy, D. (2017). The Lammy Review: An independent review into the treatment of, and outcomes 
for, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic individuals in the CJS. London: Cabinet Office. 
76 
 
Lee, J., Abdel-Aty, A., & Park, J. (2018). Investigation of associations between marijuana law changes 
and marijuana-involved fatal traffic crashes: A state-level analysis. Journal of Transport & 
Health.  
Li, G., Brady, J. E., & Chen, Q. (2013). Drug use and fatal motor vehicle crashes: A case-control 
study. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 60, 205–210.  
Logan, W. A. (2014). After the cheering stopped. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, 24(2).  
LRC. (2016). Accessibility, consolidation and online publication of legislation. Dublin: Law Reform 
Commission. 
Lurigio, A. J., & Schwartz, J. A. (1999). The nexus between drugs and crime: theory, research and 
practice. Federal Probation, 63, 67–72. 
MacCoun, R., & Reuter, P. (2001). Evaluating alternative cannabis regimes. British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 178, 123-128.  
Males, M., & Buchen, L. (2014). Reforming Marijuana Laws: Which Approach Best Reduces the 
Harms of Criminalization? A Five-State Analysis. San Francisco: Center on Juvenile and 
Criminal Justice. 
McAra, L., & McVie, S. (2005). The usual suspects? Street-life, young people and the police. Criminal 
Justice, 5(1), 5–36. 
McDonald, D., & Hughes, C. (2017). Chapter 11: Drug laws and regulations. In A. Ritter, T. King & N. 
Lee (Eds.), Drug Use in Australian Society (pp. 223-246). South Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press. 
McLaughlin, J. A., & Jordan, G. B. (1999). Logic models: a tool for telling your programs performance 
story. Evaluation and Program Planning, 22(1), 65-72.  
McLaughlin, J. A., & Jordan, G. B. (2004). Using logic models Handbook of practical program 
evaluation (Vol. 2, pp. 7-32). San Francisco: Wiley. 
Miech, R. A., Johnston, L., O’Malley, P. M., Bachman, J. G., Schulenberg, J., & Patrick, M. E. (2015). 
Trends in use of marijuana and attitudes toward marijuana among youth before and after 
decriminalization: The case of California 2007–2013. International Journal of Drug Policy, 
26(4), 336-344.  
Mitchell, O. (2016). The effect of drug arrest on subsequent drug offending and social bonding. 
Journal of Crime and Justice, 39(1), 174–188. 
Møller, K. (2010). Policy Displacement and Disparate Sanctioning from Policing Cannabis in 
Denmark. Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention, 11(2), 135-
150.  
Moreira, M., Trigueiros, F., & Antunes, C. (2007). The evaluation of the Portuguese drug policy 1999-
2004: the process and the impact on the new policy. Drugs and Alcohol Today, 7(2), 14-25.  
Munslow, D. (2017). Marijuana decriminalization and police enforcement of heroin and cocaine drug 
crimes.   
Murphy, L., Farragher, L., Keane, M., Galvin, B., & Long, J. (2017). Drug-related intimidation The Irish 
situation and international responses: an evidence review. Dublin: Health Research Board. 
NACDA. (2016). Prevalence of drug use and gambling in Ireland and drug use in Northern Ireland. 
Dublin: National Advisory Committee on Drugs and Alcohol (NACDA). 
Niaah, J. A. H. (2016). Ganja terrorism and the healing of the nation. In B. C. Labate, C. Cavnar & T. 
Rodrigues (Eds.), Drug Policies and the Politics of Drugs in the Americas (pp. 227-243). 
Cham: Springer International Publishing. 
Nguyen, H., & Reuter, P. (2012). How Risky Is Marijuana Possession? Considering the Role of Age, 
Race, and Gender. Crime & Delinquency (Vol. 58).  
O’Donnell, I. (2005). Crime and Justice in the Republic of Ireland. European Journal of Criminology, 
2(1), 99–131. 
O’Mahony, P. (2008). The Irish War on Drugs: The Seductive War on Drugs. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
O’Malley, T. (2013). Living without Guidelines. In A. Ashworth & J. V. Roberts (Eds.), Sentencing 
Guidelines. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
O’Reilly, M. F. (2014). Opening Doors or Closing Them?: The Impact of Incarceration on the 
Education and Employability of Ex-Offenders in Ireland. Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 
53(5), 468–486.  
O’Sullivan, E., & O’Donnell, I. (2003). Imprisonment and the crime rate in Ireland. Economic and 
Social Review, 34(1), 33–64. 
Pacula, R. L., Chriqui, J. F., & King, J. (2003). Marijuana Decriminalization: What does it mean in the 
United States? : National Bureau of Economic Research. 
77 
 
Pacula, R. L., Kilmer, B., Grossman, M., & Chaloupka, F. J. (2010). Risks and prices: The role of user 
sanctions in marijuana markets. The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 10(1).  
Pacula, R. L., MacCoun, R., Reuter, P., Chriqui, J., Kilmer, B., Harris, K., . . . Schäfer, C. (2005). What 
does it mean to decriminalize marijuana? A cross-national empirical examination Substance 
Use: Individual Behaviour, Social Interactions, Markets and Politics (pp. 347-369): Emerald 
Group Publishing Limited. 
Pacula, R. L., & Sevigny, E. L. (2014). Marijuana liberalization policies: why we can't learn much from 
policy still in motion. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 33(1), 212-221.  
Pawson, R. (2006). Evidence-based policy: A realist perspective. London: SAGE. 
Payne, J., & Gaffney, A. (2012). How much crime is drug or alcohol related? Self-reported attributions 
of police detainees. Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, (439), 1–6. 
Payne, J., Kwiatkowski, M., & Wundersitz, J. (2008). Police drug diversion: a study of criminal 
offending outcomes. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 
Pierce, M., Millar, T., Robertson, J. R., & Bird, S. M. (2018). Ageing opioid users’ increased risk of 
methadone-specific death in the UK. International Journal of Drug Policy, 55, 121–127.  
Pollini, R. A., Romano, E., Johnson, M. B., & Lacey, J. H. (2015). The impact of marijuana 
decriminalization on California drivers. Drug and alcohol dependence, 150, 135-140.  
Pombo, S., & da costa, N. F. (2016). Heroin addiction patterns of treatment-seeking patients, 1992-
2013: Comparison between pre-and post-drug policy reform in Portugal. Heroin Addiction and 
Related Clinical Problems, 18(6), 51-60.  
Potier, C., Laprévote, V., Dubois-Arber, F., Cottencin, O., & Rolland, B. (2014). Supervised injection 
services: What has been demonstrated? A systematic literature review. Drug and Alcohol 
Dependence, 145, 48–68.  
Radimecký, J. (2007). Rhetoric versus practice in Czech drug policy. Journal of Drug Issues, 37(1), 
11-44.  
Reinarman, C., Cohen, P. D. A., & Kaal, H. L. (2004). The limited relevance of drug policy: Cannabis 
in Amsterdam and in San Francisco. American Journal of Public Health, 94(5), 836-842. 
Rihoux, B. (2006). Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and related systematic 
comparative methods: Recent advances and remaining challenges for social science 
research. International Sociology, 21(5), 679-706.  
Rogeberg, O., & Elvik, R. (2016). The effects of cannabis intoxication on motor vehicle collision 
revisited and revised. Addiction, 111(8), 1348–1359.  
Ross, A., & Walker, A. (2017). The impact of low-priority laws on criminal activity: Evidence from 
California. Contemporary Economic Policy, 35(2), 239-252.  
RSA. (2017). Anti Drug Driving. Retrieved August 17, 2018, from www.rsa.ie/en/RSA/Road-
Safety/Campaigns/Current-road-safety-campaigns/Anti-Drug-Driving/ 
Saul, J. E., Willis, C. D., Bitz, J., & Best, A. (2013). A time-responsive tool for informing policy making: 
rapid realist review. Implementation Science, 8(1), 103.  
Schäfer, C., & Paoli, L. (2006). Drogenkonsum und Strafverfolgungspraxis: Eine Untersuchung zur 
Rechtswirklichkeit der Anwendung des § 31 a BTMG und anderer. Berlin: 
Opportunitätsvorschriften auf Drogenkonsumentendelikte. 
Schisler, R. E., Groninger, H., & Rosielle, D. A. (2012). Counseling patients on side effects and 
driving when starting opioids. Journal of Palliative Medicine, 15(4), 484–485.  
Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C. (2010). Standards of good practice in qualitative comparative 
analysis (QCA) and fuzzy-sets. Comparative Sociology, 9(3), 397-418.  
Shanahan, M., Hughes, C., & McSweeney, T. (2017). Police diversion for cannabis offences: 
Assessing outcomes and cost-effectiveness. Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 
No. 532.   
Stevens, A. (2010). Drugs, crime and public health: The political economy of drug policy. Routledge-
Cavendish.  
Stevens, A., Berto, D., Heckmann, W., Kerschl, V., Oeuvray, K., Ooyen van, M., . . . A., U. (2005). 
Quasi-compulsory treatment of drug dependent offenders: An international literature review. 
Substanec Use & Misuse, 40(3), 269-283.  
Suggs, D. L. (1981). A qualitative and quantitative analysis of the impact of Nebraska's 
decriminalization of marijuana. Law and Human Behavior, 5(1), 45-71.  
Thies, C. F., & Register, C. A. (1993). Decriminalization of marijuana and the demand for alcohol, 
marijuana and cocaine. The Social Science Journal, 30(4), 385-399.  
Tolan, G. (2014). Increasing the Potential for Diversion in the Irish CJS: The Role of the Garda 
Síochána Adult Cautioning Scheme. Irish Journal of Applied Social Studies Est, 14(1), 60–71.  
78 
 
Uitermark, J. (2004). The origins and future of the Dutch approach towards drugs. Journal of Drug 
Issues, 34(3), 511-532.  
van Ooyen-Houben, M. M. (2017). The Dutch Coffee Shop System, Tensions and Benefits. Mich. St. 
Int'l L. Rev., 25, 623.  
Warburton, H., Turnbull, P., & Hough, M. (2005). Occasional and Controlled Heroin Use. Not a 
Problem? York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
Watson, T. M., & Mann, R. E. (2016). International approaches to driving under the influence of 
cannabis: A review of evidence on impact. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 169, 148–155.  
Welsh, W. N., & Harris, P. W. (2016). Criminal Justice Policy and Planning: Planned Change. New 
York: Routledge. 
Wexler, D. (2011). From Theory to Practice and Back Again in Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Now 
Comes the Hard Part Monash University Law Review, 37, 33-42.  
Wong, G., Greenhalgh, T., Westhorp, G., Buckingham, J., & Pawson, R. (2013). RAMESES 
publication standards: realist syntheses. BMC medicine, 11(1), 21.  
Working Group on Alternatives to Prosecution. (2016). Report to the Criminal Justice Strategic. 
Dublin: Department of Justice and Equality. 
Yulia, C. (2011). The effect of marijuana decriminalization on alcohol, marijuana and cocaine 
consumption. Central European University.    
Younger-Coleman, N., Cumberbatch, C., Campbell, J., Ebanks, C., Williams, D., & O’Meally, V. 
(2017). Jamaica National Drug Use Prevalence Survey 2016 - Technical Report for the 
OAS/CICAD & NCDA. Kingston, Jamaica: National Council on Drug Abuse. 
Zábranský, T. (2004). Czech drug laws as an arena of drug policy battle. Journal of Drug Issues, 
34(3), 661-686.  
Zábranský, T., Mravčík, V., Gajdošíková, H., & Milovský, M. (2001). Impact Analysis Project of New 
Drugs Legislation. Summary Final Report. Prague, Tišnov: National Drug Commission Czech 
Republic. 
Zeman, P. (2007). Legislation and practice concerning prosecution of drug offenses in the Czech 
Republic. Journal of Drug Issues, 37(1), 45-72.  
 
 
 
  
79 
 
Appendix A: Reference list for studies 
coded, by country (n = 158) 
International (cross-country) (12) 
Belackova, V., Ritter, A., Shanahan, M., & Hughes, C. E. (2017). Assessing the concordance between 
illicit drug laws on the books and drug law enforcement: comparison of three states on the 
continuum from “decriminalised” to “punitive”. International Journal of Drug Policy, 41, 148-
157.  
Brewster, D. (2017). Culture(s) of control: Political dynamics in cannabis policy in England & Wales 
and the Netherlands. European Journal of Criminology, 14(5), 566-585.  
Bullington, B. (1994). War and peace: Drug policy in the United States and the Netherlands. Crime, 
Law and Social Change, 22(3), 213-238.  
Chatwin, C. (2016). Five steps towards a more effective global drug policy What is to Be Done About 
Crime and Punishment?: Towards a 'Public Criminology' (pp. 197-221). 
Eastwood, N., Fox, E., & Rosmarin, A. (2016). A quiet revolution: Drug decriminalisation policies in 
practice across the globe Drugs, the Law and Human Rights (Second ed.). United Kingdom. 
Grund, J. P. C., Stern, L. S., Kaplan, C. D., Adriaans, N. F. P., & Drucker, E. (1992). Drug use 
contexts and HIV consequences: The effect of drug policy on pattenrs of everyday drug use in 
Rotterdam and the Bronx. British Journal of Addiction, 87(3), 381-392.  
Reinarman, C. (2009). Cannabis policies and user practices: Market separation, price, potency, and 
accessibility in Amsterdam and San Francisco. International Journal of Drug Policy, 20(1), 28-
37. doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2007.11.003 
Reinarman, C., Cohen, P. D. A., & Kaal, H. L. (2004). The limited relevance of drug policy: Cannabis 
in Amsterdam and in San Francisco. American Journal of Public Health, 94(5), 836-842. 
doi:10.2105/ajph.94.5.836 
Simons-Morton, B., Pickett, W., Boyce, W., Ter Bogt, T. F., & Vollebergh, W. (2010). Cross-national 
comparison of adolescent drinking and cannabis use in the United States, Canada, and the 
Netherlands. International Journal of Drug Policy, 21(1), 64-69.  
Single, E., Christie, P., & Ali, R. (2000). The impact of cannabis decriminalisation in Australia and the 
United States. Journal of Public Health Policy, 21(2), 157-186. doi:10.2307/3343342 
Smiley, E. (2016). Marijuana & other drugs: Legalize or decriminalize. Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L., 33, 
825.  
Swenson, G., & Crofts, T. (2005). Reforms to minor cannabis offences in the United Kingdom & 
Western Australia. Web journal of current legal issues [online]. Available from: http://webjcli. 
ncl. ac. uk/2005/issue1/swensen1. html# _Toc97029037 [Accessed 3 June 2008].  
 
Australia (29) 
Abel, S. (1997). Cannabis policy in Australia and New Zealand. Drug and Alcohol Review, 16(4), 421-
428. doi:10.1080/09595239700186821 
Ali, R., Christie, P., Hawks, D., Sutton, A., Hall, W., & Allsop, S. (1998). The social impacts of the 
Cannabis Expiation Notice Scheme in South Australia: Summary report. Retrieved from  
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. (2014). Alcohol and other drug treatment and diversion 
from the Australian CJS: 2012-13. Retrieved from Canberra:  
Baker, J., & Goh, D. (2004). The cannabis cautioning scheme three years on: An implementation and 
outcome evaluation. Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. 
Bretteville-Jensen, A. L., & Williams, J. (2011). Decriminalization and initiation into cannabis use. 
Retrieved from  
Cameron, L., & Williams, J. (2001). Cannabis, alcohol and cigarettes: Substitutes or complements? 
Economic Record, 77, 19-34.  
Christie, P., & Ali, R. (2000). Offences under the Cannabis Expiation Notice scheme in South 
Australia. Drug and Alcohol Review, 19(3), 251-256.  
Damrongplasit, K., Hsiao, C., & Zhao, X. Y. (2010). Decriminalization and marijuana smoking 
prevalence: Evidence from Australia. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 28(3), 344-
356. doi:10.1198/jbes.2009.06129 
Donnelly, N., Hall, W., & Christie, P. (1995). The effects of partial decriminalisation on cannabis use in 
South Australia, 1985 to 1993. Australian Journal of Public Health, 19(3), 281-287.  
80 
 
Donnelly, N., Hall, W., & Christie, P. (2000). The effects of the Cannabis Expiation Notice System on 
the prevalence of cannabis use in South Australia: Evidence from the National Drug Strategy 
Household Surveys 1985-95. Drug and Alcohol Review, 19(3), 265-269. 
doi:10.1080/713659382 
Fetherston, J., & Lenton, S. (2007). Effects of the Western Australian cannabis infringement notice 
scheme on public attitudes, knowledge and use: Comparison of pre-and post change data: 
Curtin University of Technology, National Drug Research Institute. 
Hales, J., Mayne, M., & Swan, A. (2004). Evaluation of the Queensland Illicit Drug Diversion Initiative 
Police Diversion program: Final report. 
Hall, W. (1997). The recent Australian debate about the prohibition on cannabis use. Addiction, 92(9), 
1109-1115.  
Hughes, C. E. (2007). Evidence-based policy or policy-based evidence? The role of evidence in the 
development and implementation of the Illicit Drug Diversion Initiative. Drug and Alcohol 
Review, 26(4), 363-368. doi:10.1080/09595230701373859 
Hughes, C. E., & Ritter, A. (2008). A summary of diversion programs for drug and drug-related 
offenders in Australia: National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre Sydney. 
Hughes, C. E., Shanahan, M., Ritter, A., McDonald, D., & Gray-Weale, F. (2013). Evaluation of 
Australian Capital Territory drug diversion programs: National Drug and Alcohol Research 
Centre. 
Hyshka, E. (2009). Turning failure into success: What does the case of Western Australia tell us about 
Canadian cannabis policy-making? Policy Studies, 30(5), 513-531. 
doi:10.1080/01442870902899962 
Lenton, S. (2004). Pot, politics and the press: Reflections on cannabis law reform in Western 
Australia. Drug and Alcohol Review, 23(2), 223-233. doi:10.1080/09595230410001704226 
Lenton, S. (2012). Shifting the market? Pre-post differences in accessing and growing cannabis under 
the West Australian Cannabis Infringement Notice scheme. Paper presented at the 
International Society for the Study of Drug Policy University of Kent.  
Lenton, S., & Allsop, S. (2010). A tale of CIN: The Cannabis Infringement Notice scheme in Western 
Australia. Addiction, 105(5), 808-816.  
Lenton, S., Humeniuk, R., Heale, P., & Christie, P. (2000). Infringement versus conviction: The social 
impact of a minor cannabis offence in South Australia and Western Australia. Drug and 
Alcohol Review, 19(3), 257-264. doi:10.1080/713659365 
Mazerolle, L., Soole, D., & Rombouts, S. (2007). Drug law enforcement: A review of the evaluation 
literature. Police quarterly, 10(2), 115-153.  
McDonald, D., & Hughes, C. E. (2017). Chapter 11: Drug laws and regulations. In A. Ritter, T. King, & 
N. Lee (Eds.), Drug use in Australian society (pp. 223-246). South Melbourne: Oxford 
Univeristy Press. 
McGeorge, J., & Aitken, C. K. (1997). Effects of cannabis decriminalization in the Australian capital 
territory on university students' patterns of use. Journal of Drug Issues, 27(4), 785-794.  
Payne, J., Kwiatkowski, M., & Wundersitz, J. (2008). Police drug diversion: A study of criminal 
offending outcomes: Australian Institute of Criminology AIC Reports Research and Public 
Policy Series No. 97. Canberra. 
Shanahan, M., Hughes, C., & McSweeney, T. (2017). Police diversion for cannabis offences: 
Assessing outcomes and cost-effectiveness. Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal 
Justice(532), 13.  
Sutton, A. (2000). Cannabis law and the young adult user: reflections on South Australia's cannabis 
expiation notice system. International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 28(2), 147-162.  
Sutton, A., & Hawks, D. (2005). The Cannabis Infringement Notice scheme in Western Australia: A 
review of policy, police and judicial perspectives. Drug and Alcohol Review, 24(4), 331-336. 
doi:10.1080/09535230500263947 
Sutton, A., & McMillan, E. (2000). Criminal justice perspectives on South Australia's Cannabis 
Expiation Notice procedures. Drug and Alcohol Review, 19(3), 281-286. 
doi:10.1080/713659380 
 
Czech Republic (13) 
Belackova, V., & Stefunkova, M. (2018). Interpreting the Czech drug decriminalization: The glass is 
half full – Response to Cerveny, J., Chomynova, P., Mravcik, V., & van Ours, JC (2017). 
Cannabis decriminalization and the age of onset of cannabis use. International Journal of 
Drug Policy, 52, 102-105.  
81 
 
Cecho, R., Baska, T., Svihrova, V., & Hudeckova, H. (2017). Legislative norms to control cannabis 
use in the light of its prevalence in the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary. 
Central European Journal of Public Health, 25(4), 261-265. doi:10.21101/cejph.a5019 
Červený, J., Chomynova, P., Mravčík, V., & van Ours, J. C. (2017). Cannabis decriminalization and 
the age of onset of cannabis use. International Journal of Drug Policy, 43, 122-129.  
Csete, J. (2012). A balancing act: policymaking on illicit drugs in the Czech Republic. Retrieved from 
New York:: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/A_Balancing_Act-03-
14-2012.pdf 
EMCDDA. (2018). Czech Republic drug report 2018. Retrieved from Lisbon:  
Mravčík, V., Grohmannová, K., Chomynová, P., Nečas, V., Grolmusová, L., Kiššová, L., . . . 
Jurystová, L. (2012). Annual Report: The Czech Republic – 2011 Drug Situation. Retrieved 
from Prague:  
Radimecký, J. (2007). Rhetoric versus practice in Czech drug policy. Journal of Drug Issues, 37(1), 
11-44.  
Zábranský, T. (2004). Czech drug laws as an arena of drug policy battle. Journal of Drug Issues, 
34(3), 661-686.  
Zábranský, T., Mravčík, V., Gajdošíková, H., & Milovský, M. (2001). Impact analysis project of new 
drugs legislation. Summary final report. Retrieved from Prague, Tišnov: 
https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/czech_evaluation_2001_pad_en.pdf 
Zábranský, T., Radimecký, J., Mravcík, V., Gajdošíková, H., Petroš, O., Korcišová, B., . . . Kuda, A. 
(2002). Výrocní zpráva o stavu ve vecech drog 2001 (Czech Republic – Drug Situation 2001). 
Retrieved from Prague & Lisbon:  
Zeman, P. (2007). Legislation and practice concerning prosecution of drug offenses in the Czech 
Republic. Journal of Drug Issues, 37(1), 45-72.  
Zeman, P., Stefunkova, M., & Tranvickova, I. (2015). Drogova kriminalita a trestni zakonik (Drug 
Offences and the Penal Code). Retrieved from Praha: English summary available here: 
http://www.ok.cz/iksp/en/docs/s426.pdf 
Zeman, P., Štefunková, M., & Trávníčková, I. (2017). Increase in figures on drug offences in the 
Czech Republic: An epidemic of drug crime or something else? Česká kriminologie (Czech 
Criminology), 2(1), 1-13.  
 
Denmark (6)  
EMCDDA. (2004). Denmark: New development, trends and in-depth information on selected issues. 
Retrieved from Lisbon:  
Houborg, E. (2010). Control and welfare in Danish drug policy. Journal of Drug Issues, 40(4), 783-
804.  
Houborg, E. (2017). Danish drug policy European Drug Policies (pp. 73-86): Routledge. 
Jepsen, J., & Laursen, L. (2002). Denmark country report. In D. Ballotta, N. Dorn, B. De Ruyver, C. 
Black, K. Van Impe, & T. Vander Beken (Eds.), Prosecution of drug users in Europe. Lisbon, 
Portugal: EMCDDA. 
Møller, K. (2010). Policy displacement and disparate sanctioning from policing cannabis in Denmark. 
Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention, 11(2), 135-150. 
doi:10.1080/14043858.2010.502014 
Vibeke, F. (2008). Danish drug policy: Shifting from liberalism to repression. Drugs and Alcohol 
Today, 8(2), 26-33.  
 
Germany (5)  
Bollinger, L. (2002). German country report Prosecution of drug users in Europe: varying pathways to 
similar objectives EMCDDA. 
Bollinger, L. (2004). Drug law and policy in Germany and the European community: Recent 
developments. Journal of Drug Issues, 34(3), 491-509. doi:10.1177/002204260403400302 
Fischer, B. (1995). Drugs, communities, and ''harm reduction'' in Germany: The new relevance of 
''public health'' principles in local responses. Journal of Public Health Policy, 16(4), 389-411. 
doi:10.2307/3342618 
Holzer, T. (2017). German drug policy. In R. N. Colson & H. Bergeron (Eds.), European Drug Policies: 
The Ways of Reform: (pp. 100-113): Routledge, United Kingdom. 
82 
 
Körner, H. H. (2004). From blind repression to a thoughtful, differentiated,“four-column strategy”. 
Journal of Drug Issues, 34(3), 577-586.  
 
Jamaica (3)  
Emanuel, M. A., Haughton, A. Y., & K’nife, K. (2018). Policy analysis and implications of establishing 
the Caribbean Cannabis Economy (CCE): Lessons from Jamaica. Drugs and Alcohol Today.  
Niaah, J. A. H. (2016). Ganja terrorism and the healing of the nation Drug Policies and the Politics of 
Drugs in the Americas (pp. 227-243): Springer. 
Younger-Coleman, N., Cumberbatch, C., Campbell, J., Ebanks, C., Williams, D., & O’Meally, V. 
(2017). Jamaica National Drug Use Prevalence Survey 2016: Technical report for the 
OAS/CICAD & NCDA. Retrieved from Kingston, Jamaica:  
 
Netherlands 
Chatwin, C. (2016). Mixed messages from Europe on drug policy reform: The cases of Sweden and 
the Netherlands. Journal of Drug Policy Analysis, 11(1).  
Grund, J. P., & Breeksema, J. (2013). Coffee shops and compromise: Separated illicit drug markets in 
the Netherlands. New York: Global Drug Policy Program, Open Society Foundations. 
Grund, J. P., & Breeksema, J. J. (2017). Drug policy in the Netherlands. New York: Routledge. 
James, J. (2016). Dealing with drug-seeking behaviour. Australian Prescriber, 39(3), 96-100.  
Korf, D. J. (2002). Dutch coffee shops and trends in cannabis use. Addictive behaviors, 27(6), 851-
866.  
MacCoun, R. (2011). What can we learn from the Dutch cannabis coffeeshop system? Addiction, 
106(11), 1899-1910.  
MacCoun, R., & Reuter, P. (2001). Evaluating alternative cannabis regimes. British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 178, 123-128. doi:10.1192/bjp.178.2.123 
Monshouwer, K., Van Laar, M., & Vollebergh, W. A. (2011). Buying cannabis in 'coffee shops'. Drug 
and Alcohol Review, 30(2), 148-156. doi:10.1111/j.1465-3362.2010.00268.x 
Spapens, T., Müller, T., & van de Bunt, H. (2014). The Dutch drug policy from a regulatory 
perspective. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 21(1), 191-205. 
doi:10.1007/s10610-014-9249-3 
Stevens, A., Berto, D., Heckmann, W., Kerschl, V., Oeuvray, K., Ooyen van, M., . . . A., U. (2005). 
Quasi-compulsory treatment of drug dependent offenders: An international literature review. 
Substanec Use & Misuse, 40(3), 269-283. doi:10.1081/JA-200049159 
Uitermark, J. (2004). The origins and future of the Dutch approach towards drugs. Journal of Drug 
Issues, 34(3), 511-532.  
van Kalmthout, A., & Derks, J. (2002). The Netherlands country report. In D. Ballotta, N. Dorn, B. De 
Ruyver, C. Black, K. Van Impe, & T. Vander Beken (Eds.), Prosecution of drug users. Lisbon, 
Portugal: EMCDDA. 
van Ooyen-Houben, M., & Kleemans, E. (2015). Drug policy: The "Dutch Model". In M. Tonry (Ed.), 
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, Vol 44 (Vol. 44, pp. 165-226). Chicago: Univ 
Chicago Press. 
van Ooyen-Houben, M. M. J., Bieleman, B., & Koff, D. J. (2016). Tightening the Dutch coffee shop 
policy: Evaluation of the private club and the residence criterion. International Journal of Drug 
Policy, 31, 113-120. doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2016.01.019 
 
Portugal (20) 
Adam, C., & Raschzok, A. (2017). Cannabis policy and the uptake of treatment for cannabis-related 
problems. Drug and Alcohol Review, 36(2), 171-177. doi:10.1111/dar.12401 
Cabral, T. S. (2017). The 15th anniversary of the Portuguese drug policy: Its history, its success and 
its future. Drug Science, Policy and Law, 3, 2050324516683640.  
EMCDDA. (2011). Drug policy profiles: Portugal. Retrieved from Luxembourg:  
Felix, S., & Portugal, P. (2015). Drug decriminalization and the price of illicit drugs. Retrieved from 
Germany  
Félix, S., Portugal, P., & Tavares, A. (2017). Going after the addiction, not the addicted: The impact of 
drug decriminalization in Portugal. Retrieved from  
83 
 
Gesaworld SA. (2013). External evaluation of the National Strategy for the Fight Against Drugs 2005-
2012 (PNCDT). Retrieved from Lisbon  
Gonçalves, R., Lourenço, A., & da Silva, S. N. (2015). A social cost perspective in the wake of the 
Portuguese strategy for the fight against drugs. International Journal of Drug Policy, 26(2), 
199-209.  
Greenwald, G. (2009). Drug decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons for creating fair and successful 
drug policies.  
Hughes, C. (2017). Portuguese drug policy. In R. N. Colson & H. Bergeron (Eds.), European Drug 
Policies: The Ways of Reform: (pp. 164-181). Routledge, United Kingdom  
Hughes, C. E., & Stevens, A. (2007). The effects of decriminalization of drug use in Portugal: Oxford: 
Beckley Foundation  
Hughes, C. E., & Stevens, A. (2010). What can we learn from the Portuguese decriminalization of 
illicit drugs? British Journal of Criminology, 50(6), 999-1022. doi:10.1093/bjc/azq038 
Hughes, C. E., & Stevens, A. (2015). A resounding success or a disastrous failure: re-examining the 
interpretation of evidence on the Portuguese decriminalization of illicit drugs New Approaches 
to Drug Policies (pp. 137-162). London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kundrod, K. (2015). Decriminalization of drugs in Portugal: A controversial experiment for public 
health.  
Laqueur, H. (2015). Uses and abuses of drug decriminalization in Portugal. Law and Social Inquiry, 
40(3), 746-781. doi:10.1111/lsi.12104 
Moreira, M., Trigueiros, F., & Antunes, C. (2007). The evaluation of the Portuguese drug policy 1999-
2004: The process and the impact on the new policy. Drugs and Alcohol Today, 7(2), 14-25. 
doi:10.1108/17459265200700012 
Pombo, S., & da Costa, N. F. (2016). Heroin addiction patterns of treatment-seeking patients, 1992-
2013: Comparison between pre- and post-drug policy reform in Portugal. Heroin Addiction 
and Related Clinical Problems, 18(6), 51-60.  
Quintas, J., & Arana, X. (2017). Decriminalization: Different models in Portugal and Spain Dual 
Markets: Comparative Approaches to Regulation (pp. 121-143). 
Quintas, J., & Paulo Fonseca, E. (2002). Portugal country report. In D. Ballotta, N. Dorn, B. De 
Ruyver, C. Black, K. Van Impe, & T. Vander Beken (Eds.), Prosecution of drug users in 
Europe. Lisbon, Portugal: EMCDDA. 
van Beusekom, I., van het Loo, M. V., & Kahan, J. P. (2002). Guidelines for implementing and 
evaluating the Portuguese drug strategy. Retrieved from 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1508.html 
van het Loo, M. V., van Beusekom, I., & Kahan, J. P. (2002). Decriminalization of drug use in 
Portugal: The development of a policy. Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 582, 49-63.  
 
United Kingdom (11)  
Acevedo, B. (2007). Creating the cannabis user: A post-structuralist analysis of the re-classification of 
cannabis in the United Kingdom (2004–2005). International Journal of Drug Policy, 18(3), 
177-186. doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2006.11.008 
Adda, J., McConnell, B., & Rasul, I. (2014). Crime and the depenalization of cannabis possession: 
Evidence from a policing experiment. Journal of Political Economy, 122(5), 1130-1202. 
doi:10.1086/676932 
Braakmann, N., & Jones, S. (2014). Cannabis depenalisation, drug consumption and crime: Evidence 
from the 2004 cannabis declassification in the UK. Social Science & Medicine, 115, 29-37. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.06.003 
Hamilton, I., Lloyd, C., Hewitt, C., & Godfrey, C. (2014). Effect of reclassification of cannabis on 
hospital admissions for cannabis psychosis: A time series analysis. International Journal of 
Drug Policy, 25(1), 151-156. doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2013.05.016 
Herbert, A., Gonzalez-Izquierdo, A., McGhee, J., Li, L., & Gilbert, R. (2017). Time-trends in rates of 
hospital admission of adolescents for violent, self-inflicted or drug/alcohol-related injury in 
England and Scotland, 2005-11: Population-based analysis. Journal of Public Health, 39(1), 
65-73. doi:10.1093/pubmed/fdw020 
Kelly, E., & Rasul, I. (2014). Policing cannabis and drug related hospital admissions: Evidence from 
administrative records. Journal of Public Economics, 112, 89-114. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.01.008 
84 
 
Lammy, D. (2017). The Lammy review: An independent review into the treatment of, and outcomes 
for, Black, Asian and minority ethnic individuals in the CJS. HM Government.  
MORI Social Research & The Police Foundation. (2002). Policing the possession of cannabis: 
Residents ’ views on the Lambeth experiment. Retrieved from London: 
http://www.csdp.org/research/reportonpolicingthepossessionofcannabis.pdf 
Shiner, M. (2015). Drug policy reform and the reclassification of cannabis in England and Wales: A 
cautionary tale. International Journal of Drug Policy, 26(7), 696-704. 
doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2015.03.009 
Slothower, M., Neyroud, P., Hobday, J., Sherman, L., Ariel, B., Neyroud, E., & Barnes, G. The 
Turning Point project: Implementation and 2-year outcomes. Cambridge: Univesity of 
Cambridge. 
Ward, J. (2013). Punishing drug possession in the Magistrates' Courts: Time for a rethink. European 
Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 19(4), 289-307. doi:10.1007/s10610-012-9191-1 
 
United States (46) 
Albany LEAD Programme. (2017). One year anniversary report. Retrieved from 
https://www.albanyny.gov/Libraries/APD/2017_Albany_LEAD_First_Year_Report_--_FINAL-
2.sflb.ashx 
Banys, P. (2016). Mitigation of marijuana-related legal harms to youth in California. Journal of 
Psychoactive Drugs, 48(1), 11-20. doi:10.1080/02791072.2015.1126770 
Bedard, L., Prost, S. G., & Smith, T. E. (2017). Civil citations for cannabis possession: Alternatives to 
arrest for adolescent substance use. Child and Adolescent Social Work Journal, 34(5), 461-
466. doi:10.1007/s10560-016-0487-8 
Chaloupka, F. J., & Laixuthai, A. (1997). Do youths substitute alcohol and marijuana? Some 
econometric evidence. Eastern Economic Journal, 23(3), 253-276.  
Collins, S. E., Lonczak, H. S., & Clifasefi, S. L. (2015). LEAD program evaluation: Criminal  justice  
and  legal system utilization and associated  costs. Retrieved from Washington:  
Collins, S. E., Lonczak, H. S., & Clifasefi, S. L. (2015). LEAD program evaluation: Recidivism report. 
Retrieved from Washington:  
Crouch, R. W. (2015). Essays on drug and alcohol policies in the United States.    
Cuskey, W. R., Berger, L. H., & Richardson, A. H. (1978). The effects of marijuana decriminalization 
on drug use patterns: A literature review and research critique. Contemp. Drug Probs., 7, 491.  
Deangelo, G. J., Gittings, R. K., & Ross, A. (2018). Police incentives, policy spillovers, and the 
enforcement of drug crimes. Review of Law and Economics, 14(1). doi:10.1515/rle-2016-0033 
DeSimone, J., & Farrelly, M. C. (2003). Price and enforcement effects on cocaine and marijuana 
demand. Economic Inquiry, 41(1), 98-115.  
Devine, J., Kusbit, D., Nimalasuriya, S., Tu, L., & VeghGaynor, G. (2015). Marijuana decriminalization: 
Should Pittsburgh follow Philadelphia’s lead?  
Friedman, S. R., Cooper, H. L. F., Tempalski, B., Keem, M., Friedman, R., Flom, P. L., & Des Jarlais, 
D. C. (2006). Relationships of deterrence and law enforcement to drug-related harms among 
drug injectors in US metropolitan areas. Aids, 20(1), 93-99. 
doi:10.1097/01.aids.0000196176.65551.a3 
Friedman, S. R., Pouget, E. R., Chatterjee, S., Cleland, C. M., Tempalski, B., Brady, J. E., & Cooper, 
H. L. F. (2011). Drug arrests and injection drug deterrence. American Journal of Public 
Health, 101(2), 344-349. doi:10.2105/ajph.2010.191759 
Gettman, J. B. (2005). Crimes of indiscretion: Marijuana arrests in the United States. 
Goetz, B., & Mitchell, R. E. (2006). Pre-arrest/booking drug control strategies: Diversion to treatment, 
harm reduction and police involvement. Contemporary Drug Problems, 33(3), 473-520. 
doi:10.1177/009145090603300307 
Grucza, R., Vuolo, M., Krauss, M., Plunk, A., Agrawal, A., Chaloupka, F. J., & Bierut, L. (2018). 
Cannabis decriminalization: A study of recent policy chane in five U.S. states. International 
Journal of Drug Policy, 59, 67-75. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2018.06.016 
Hamzeie, R., Thompson, I., Roy, S., & Savolainen, P. T. (2017). State-level comparison of traffic 
fatality data in consideration of marijuana laws. Transportation Research Record(2660), 78-
85. doi:10.3141/2660-11 
Huber, A., Newman, R., & LaFave, D. (2016). Cannabis control and crime: Medicinal use, 
depenalization and the war on drugs. B E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 16(4), 35. 
doi:10.1515/bejeap-2015-0167 
85 
 
Johnson, J. K. (2015). Do state liberalized marijuana policies affect adolescent marijuana and alcohol 
use? A state-level analysis: Brandeis University, The Heller School for Social Policy and 
Management. 
Johnston, L. D., O’Malley, P. M., & Bachman, J. G. (1981). Marijuana decriminalization: The impact 
on youth 1975-1980.  
Jones, Z. M. (2013). Enforcement & prices: An empirical assessment. University of Georgia.    
Kim, D. (2017). Does marijuana decriminalization Make the roads more dangerous?  
Kopak, A., & Frost, G. (2017). Correlates of program success and recidivism among participants in an 
adult pre-arrest diversion program. American Journal of Criminal Justice, 42(4), 727-745. 
doi:10.1007/s12103-017-9390-x 
Labriola, M., Reich, W. A., Davis, R. C., Hunt, P., Rempel, M., & Cherney, S. (2018). Prosecutor-led 
pretrial diversion. Center for Court Innovation.  
Lee, J., Abdel-Aty, A., & Park, J. (2018). Investigation of associations between marijuana law changes 
and marijuana-involved fatal traffic crashes: A state-level analysis. Journal of Transport & 
Health.  
Logan, W. A. (2014). After the cheering stopped: Decriminalization and legalism's limits. Cornell JL & 
Pub. Pol'y, 24, 319.  
Maier, S. L., Mannes, S., & Koppenhofer, E. L. (2017). The implications of marijuana decriminalization 
and legalization on crime in the United States. Contemporary Drug Problems, 44(2), 125-146.  
Males, M., & Buchen, L. (2014). Reforming marijuana laws: Which approach best reduces the harms 
of criminalization? A five-state analysis. Retrieved from San Francisco: 
http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/cjcj_marijuana_reform_comparison.pdf 
Miech, R. A., Johnston, L. D., O’Malley, P. M., Bachman, J. G., Schulenberg, J., & Patrick, M. E. 
(2015). Trends in use of marijuana and attitudes toward marijuana among youth before and 
after decriminalization: The case of California 2007–2013. International Journal of Drug 
Policy, 26(4), 336-344. doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2015.01.009 
Miron, J. A. (2002). The effect of marijuana decriminalization on the budgets of Massachusetts 
Governments, with a discussion of decriminalization’s effect on marijuana use. Paper 
presented at the Report to the Drug Policy Forum of Massachusetts. 
Model, K. E. (1993). The effect of marijuana decriminalization on hospital emergency room drug 
episodes: 1975–1978. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 88(423), 737-747. 
doi:10.1080/01621459.1993.10476334 
Munslow, D. Marijuana decriminalization and police enforcement of heroin and cocaine drug crimes.  
Newman, A. E., & Newman, J. A. Financial and social impacts of decriminalizing marijuana: A state 
statistical analysis aided by GIS mapping.  
Pacula, R. L., Chriqui, J. F., & King, J. (2003). Marijuana decriminalization: What does it mean in the 
United States? Retrieved from  
Pacula, R. L., Kilmer, B., Grossman, M., & Chaloupka, F. J. (2010). Risks and prices: The role of user 
sanctions in marijuana markets. B E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 10(1), 38.  
Pacula, R. L., MacCoun, R., Reuter, P., Chriqui, J., Kilmer, B., Harris, K., . . . Schäfer, C. (2015). What 
does it mean to decriminalize marijuana? A cross-national empirical examination. Advances 
in health economics and health services research, 16, 347-369. doi:10.1016/S0731-
2199(05)16017-8 
Pollini, R. A., Romano, E., Johnson, M. B., & Lacey, J. H. (2015). The impact of marijuana 
decriminalization on California drivers. Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 150, 135-140. 
doi:10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2015.02.024 
Ross, A., & Walker, A. (2017). The impact of low-priority laws on criminal activity: Evidence from 
California. Contemporary Economic Policy, 35(2), 239-252. doi:10.1111/coep.12179 
Saffer, H., & Chaloupka, F. J. The demand for illicit drugs. Economic Inquiry, 37(3), 401-411.  
Saveland, W., & Bray, D. F. (1981). Trends in cannabis use among American states with different and 
changing legal regimes, 1972-77. Contemp. Drug Probs., 10, 335.  
Suggs, D. L. (1981). A qualitative and quantitative analysis of the impact of Nebraska's 
decriminalization of marijuana. Law and Human Behavior, 5(1), 45.  
Thies, C. F. (2012). The relationship between enforcement and the price of marijuana. Journal of 
Private Enterprise, 28(1).  
Thies, C. F., & Register, C. A. (1993). Decriminalization of marijuana and the demand for alcohol, 
marijuana and cocaine. The Social Science Journal, 30(4), 385-399.  
Williams, J., Pacula, R. L., Chaloupka, F. J., & Wechsler, H. (2004). Alcohol and marijuana use 
among college students: Economic complements or substitutes? Health economics, 13(9), 
825-843.  
86 
 
Worden, R. E., & McLean, S. J. (2018). Discretion and diversion in Albany’s LEAD program. Criminal 
Justice Policy Review, 29(6-7), 584-610. doi:10.1177/0887403417723960 
Yulia, C. (2011). The effect of marijuana decriminalization on alcohol, marijuana and cocaine 
consumption. Central European University.    
 
 
 
